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Abstract 
This thesis explores the interaction of law with art auction house practices in the area of 
authentication and attribution. A key issue which is addressed is whether the 
understanding of authorship which the contemporary art market has adopted is in 
conflict with the creative processes of artists, both past and present. It is considered 
whether any such conflict may generate uncertainty, providing a fertile ground for 
disputes relating to attribution. On the basis of this, an analysis of the complex 
relationship between the auctioneer and buyer at auction under the current law is made. 
In particular, the duties and liabilities the art auctioneer owes to the purchaser with 
regard to the description of lots made in the course of an auction are explored. In an 
attempt to find the fairest and most cost-efficient solution to the art world's 
misattribution problem, a move from caveat emptor to caveat auctionator is discussed. 
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1 
Introduction 
This study will explore the interaction of law with art auction house practices in the area 
of authentication and attribution. Never in living memory has there been so much 
interest in buying art: buyers from the traditional markets in the United States and 
Europe are now being joined by those from Russia, the Middle East and Asia. What is 
more, this enlarged demographic is being matched by a widening of interest across the 
categories, from Old Masters, to Impressionists, to Pop Art. 1 Furthermore, good sales 
are seen not only at the top end of the market but in the middle levels too.2 Because of 
this broad spread of interest the market remains strong, and prices for single works of 
art continuously set new sale records. To a huge extent, auction houses have contributed 
to this unprecedented boom. In recent years, they have achieved tremendous public 
visibility, prompted by the fierce competition between large international auction firms 
to sell the most expensive and captivating art. In an attempt to gain bigger market 
shares, auction houses have successfully created new groups of buyers. From their 
previous role as wholesale suppliers to art dealers, auction houses now market art 
directly to the general public. Many of these new buyers, although they are 
inexperienced art amateurs, acquire art as an investment. After all, great and memorable 
art has always been traded and appreciated as much for the power it symbolises as for 
its aesthetic qualities. Good art speaks of wealth, sophistication and power. 
What, however, if a work of art sold at auction turns out to be a fake? In the excitement 
of the current market it is sometimes forgotten that the world of art is very complex. 
The high value and status given to art by our general culture often does not correspond 
with the immense problems experts face when they set out to authenticate and attribute 
works of art. Yet authenticity has always been a crucial issue in the modem market, not 
simply for the intrinsic worth of a work of art, but for its monetary value. It is obvious 
that jurisprudence has to keep up with this development and must tackle the legal 
1 See Joanna Pitman, 'Will the Boom Ever End?' in THE TIMES, 22 August 2006, p. 17. 
'See "'>tement ofUsa King, intemaHoang director of Christie's, ibid. 
2 
difficulties arising from it: the higher the price paid for a piece of art, the more severe 
the problems for the buyer who finds out that its attribution is defective, as this usually 
results in a significant decrease in its value. Should the auction house be automatically 
responsible in this situation for any misattribution? Or is it the case that the buyer 
should employ his own experts unless he wishes to take risks? In order to answer these 
questions, this thesis explores why truth in art may be an elusive concept and why 
misattribution may occur. 
Chapter 2 introduces the objects this study is concerned with: works of art have many 
special features that distinguish them from common commercial goods. These 
predominantly non-physical features explain the desire and "urge of possession" that 
make auctions an ideal marketplace for selling art. 
Chapter 3 intends to create a better understanding of the processes and realities of the 
art market by examining the pre-sale activities in the auction house especially 
concerning the attribution and cataloguing of artworks. The legal, historical and social 
issues that shape the relationships between auctioneers and buyers at auction are 
considered. A key issue which is addressed is whether the notion of authorship which 
the modem market has adopted is in conflict with the creative processes of artists, both 
past and present. A further question is whether any such conflict may generate 
uncertainty, providing a fertile ground for disputes relating to attribution. With the trend 
for auction houses to attract increasing numbers of inexperienced buyers, this chapter 
considers whether the conflict often goes unnoticed by bidders who, not having the 
expert knowledge to evaluate the works they are planning to bid for, must trust the 
information given by the auctioneer, especially the description in the catalogue. 
Chapter 4 undertakes an analysis of the complex legal relationship between the 
auctioneer and buyer and explores the duties and liabilities the art auctioneer owes to 
the purchaser with regard to the description of lots made in the course of an auction. It 
is concluded that the risks intrinsic to the authentication and attribution of works of art 
are to a large extent located with the buyer at auction. Since this puts auction houses in 
a position of unjustified superiority over consumers at auction, theoretical alternatives 
of auction house liability are examined in chapter 5. A move from caveat emptor to 
caveat auctionator is discussed in an attempt to find the fairest and most cost-efficient 
solution to the art world's misattribution problem. 
3 
2 
Preliminaries: Works of Art as Commercial Goods and the 
Significance of the Art Auction 
The aim of this chapter is to work out the significance of the art auction as a forum for 
the valuation and sale of art. The features that set works of art apart from common 
commercial goods will be identified. Both will enhance the understanding of the course 
and workings of auctions to be developed here. 
A. THE DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF WORKS OF ART 
The legal handling of art cases has always involved difficulties inherent in what has 
been appropriately referred to as the "distinctive autonomy" 1 of art. It will not be 
addressed here what makes something art in terms of an aesthetic discourse. This 
question, which would require entering a maze of different theories of art, is well 
beyond the scope of this study. 2 Yet writing about legal problems in the market for art 
must start by paying some attention to the peculiarities of artworks, that is, identifying 
what makes them different from common commercial goods. 
Essentially, the exclusivity of artworks is constituted through the way art is created: art 
is an expression of the individual and independent personality of its creator, the artist.3 
1 Paul Keams, The Legal Concept of Art (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998), p. 176. Keams identifies 
problems especially for the areas of obscenity and copyright laws, but extends his diagnosis to other areas 
of law as well, see p.172. Stephen Guest speaks of a "special intrinsic value of art- its 'sacred' quality", 
which would be different from values that are the interests of particular individuals which can be 
protected by rights (such as property interests), see 'The Value of Art' (2002) 7 Art Antiquity and Law 
305-316,316. 
2 Two recent introductions to art theory can be found in the works by Cynthia Freeland, But Is It Art? 
(Oxford University Press, 2001) and Robert Williams, Art Theory: An Historical Introduction (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2004), with further references. 
3 See for example the statement by the painter Caspar David Friedrich (1774-1840) on the artistic process 
in his 'Observations on a Collection of Paintings by Living or Recently Deceased Artists', translated 
excerpts in: Lorenz Eitner (ed.), Neoclassicism and Romanticism 1750-1850: Sources and Documents (2 
vols., Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970), vol. II, pp. 53-56 at 54: "The artist's feeling is his 
law;" ... "the heart is the only true source of art, the language of a pure, child-like soul. Any creation not 
sprung from this origin can only be artifice. Every true work of art is conceived in a hallowed hour and 
born in a happy one, from an impulse in the artist's heart, often without his knowledge." 
4 
In its highest form, this expression consists in a certain kind of artistic achievement, 
such as the realisation of the solution to an artistic problem, the development of a new 
artistic method or the new treatment of an already well established subject.4 As this 
process is imaginative and creative, taking place in an individual's mind, the resulting 
object is an original work. It is this intellectual process of the making of art that 
constitutes the difference between a work of art and other objects: art originates in a 
climate of absolute freedom where it is not subject to any order and where no laws and 
rules apply. 5 
But this absence of order and purpose only relates to the creation of the work of art, not 
to its further destiny as a commodity.6 As soon as a work of art appears in the public, 
such as in the marketplace, it becomes the object of legal and economic rules. Still, the 
above-described origins of art result in works of art being different from common 
commercial goods in many aspects. 
B. WORKS OF ART AS COMMERCIAL GOODS 
One of the most difficult problems of art as a commodity is the formation of its price. In 
general, the value of art is governed, like other goods, by the concept of supply and 
demand.7 However, the determination of the factors that bear upon this concept is more 
difficult in the case of artwork. The usual objective factors which help to fix the value 
of a commodity on the supply side, for example, expenses of materials, labour and other 
production costs, can, in the main, be discounted for artworks, as the intellectual effort, 
especially in the case of paintings, tends to outweigh the physical input. 8 
4 Matthew Kieran, Revealing Art (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 15; Ernst H. Gombrich, The Story of Art 
(16th edn, London: Phaidon, 1995), p. 35. 
5 Compare the writer Heinrich B511 (1917-1985): "What art needs, what art solely needs, is material- it 
does not need freedom, for art is freedom; ... no state, no city, no society can pretend to give or have 
given to art what it is by its nature: free."- Translation by the author from Heinrich B511, 'Die Freiheit der 
Kunst' in: Aufsiitze- Kritiken- Reden (K5ln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1967), pp. 488-493 at 488. 
6 Some heavily criticise the commodification of artworks, claiming it would harm artistic creation. See 
further on such views, which this author does not share as they do not distinguish rigorously enough 
between the moment of creation of a work of art and the completed object: John Henry Merryman and 
Albert E. Elsen, Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts (4th edn, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), 
~P· 856-858. 
In detail: Bruno S. Frey, Arts and Economics: Analysis and Cultural Policy (Berlin, New York: Springer, 
2000), pp. 23-34; James Heilbrun and Charles M. Gray, The Economics of Art and Culture (2"d edn, 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), ch. 9. 
8 That does not apply, of course, for artworks where precious materials such as gold etc. were used for. 
5 
On the demand side, the commercial value of a work of art is principally determined by 
the attraction it has for the buyer. As most pieces of art have almost no practical value, 
it is personal preferences and prevailing tastes that rule the formation of price. 9 
Fluctuations of taste 10 do not only concern artistic styles. Works from the school of 
Spanish Mannerism, for example, were not popular in the centuries following their 
completion11 and it was only after the First World War that works from that period were 
rediscovered and rehabilitated through widespread public appreciation. 12 Tastes also 
differ with regard to subject matter. Dutch seventeenth century winter landscapes, for 
example, are more highly regarded than paintings of 'common' landscapes. These 
preferences for certain styles or subjects can elevate the prices of lower quality 
paintings above those of an ostensibly higher quality. 13 
Quality, however, does not mean 'better' in terms of an aesthetic evaluation. 14 
Corresponding to the individual character of a piece of art, such an evaluation is subject 
to the individual taste of the buyer. Quality rather refers to such characteristics of 
artworks that though not being physical features, are provable, and thus influence the 
formation of price, even if they sometimes come in only second to the personal taste of 
buyers. 
9 Silvio Ferri, 'The Art Market' in: lstituto per Ia Collaborazione Culturale (ed.), The Encyclopedia of 
World Art (15 vols., New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959-1968), vol. IV, cols. 248-251 at 249. Ferri 
enumerates fashion, luxury or prestige value, historical interest, piety or the desire to make a good 
financial investment as non-aesthetic considerations, ibid. 
10 It is important to note here that economists cannot define factors affecting human preferences, see Frey, 
Arts and Economics, p. 24. 
11 Thus it was possible for John Bowes in 1869 to purchase El Greco's The Tears of St. Peter for his 
collection of Spanish paintings for only 200 Francs or £8, the equivalent of about £600 today. See: 
Charles E. Hardy, John Bowes and the Bowes Museum (Newcastle upon Tyne: Frank Graham, 1970), pp. 
140-141. 
12 Gombrich, The Story of Art, p. 373. Another example is, after decades of neglect, the new interest for 
German and Austrian Expressionist art. 
13 See the example given by Max J. Friedlander in On Art and Connoisseurship (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1960), pp. 158-159, from the sale of the property left by the late King William II of Holland in 1850, 
where many paintings of nowadays less regarded subjects brought more than the immaculate Lucca 
Madonna by Jan van Eyck. Further examples are given by George Savage, who drastically refers to the 
nineteenth century as " ... a period when fantastic aberrations of taste were common. For instance, the 
National Gallery bought one of their most noted van Eyck's in 1857 for little more than half what 
Landseer was paid for the Monarch of the Glen, while Mantegna's Agony in the Garden, unsold in 1849 
at £420, was bought by the National Gallery in 1894 for £1500." See The Market in Art (London: The 
Institute of Economic Affairs, 1969), p. 18. 
14 See for a distinction and a more detailed definition of "aesthetic" and "artistic" value: Peter H. Karlen, 
'Appraiser's Responsibility for Determining Fair Market Value: A Question of Economics, Aesthetics 
and Ethics' in: Martine Briat (ed.), International Sales of Works of Art (Paris: International Chamber of 
Commerce, 1990), pp. 667-705, p. 682-684. 
6 
Authenticity must be enumerated as a highly significant characteristic affecting the 
quality of a piece of art. Because of its individual character, a piece of art is normally 
unique. 15 Consequently, it is decisive for the value of a work of art whether it really 
stems from the master's own hand, or whether it was only executed in the studio or 
workshop of the artist, whether it is a copy of a work by a master or whether it is a 
forgery. 16 The provenance of a work of art is important in this context. Provenance 
refers to the origins and history of an object, which, in an ideal case, can be traced back 
to the studio of an artist and thus help confirm its authenticity. 17 
A further important factor for establishing the quality of a piece of art is its place within 
art history. Aspects to be considered in this respect are, for example, whether a work is 
from an unexciting period of an artist's career, or whether it marked a turning point in 
his oeuvre. 18 Finally, as a physical mark, the condition of a work is influential when 
considering its quality. Significant questions concern the conservation of the work, 
whether it has suffered any damages and whether it has ever been restored. 19 
However, the personal appreciation of potential buyers and aspects of quality, do not 
sufficiently explain the price outbursts witnessed on the art market in recent decades, 
with single works continuously setting new price records. The formation of prices for 
art is influenced by a further factor, which mainly concerns the supply side and gives 
auctions their special significance as a marketplace for art. 
C. IMPORTANCE OF THE ART AUCTION 
Works of art, as mentioned above, are usually unique. Consequently, the market for art 
is characterized by a shortage of goods: each piece of art represents a rarity. As soon as 
there is more than one person interested in buying the work, the shortage will regularly 
result in an escalation of the work's price, limited only by the financial power of the 
bidders and their urge for possession. 
15 Exceptions are, for example, serial art such as the series by Andy Warhol ( 1928-1987) or functional art, 
such as the ceramics by Pablo Picasso ( 1881-1973). See further Merryman and Elsen, Law, Ethics and the 
Visual Arts, pp. 923-938, on such contemporary art forms that are based on mechanical reproduction. 
16 See for a detailed categorization below, ch. 3, pp. 29-34. 
17 See Nancy H. Yeide, Konstantin Akinsha and AmyL. Walsh, The AAM Guide to Provenance Research 
(Washington, DC: American Association of Museums, 2001), p. 9. Another important aspect of 
provenance research is as a means of confirming legal ownership of an object. 
18 Merryman and Elsen, Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, p. 859. See also Eduardo Potter, 'Economists 
Have Advice for Buyers as the Art Market Heats Up' in THE NEW YORK TIMES, 1 December 2004, p. E I. 
19 Merryman and Elsen, Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, p.859. 
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A further important aspect is the rareness associated with the oeuvre of an individual 
artist. The moment an artist dies, his work is completed so that the number of his works 
can no longer increase.20 Should the number of buyers interested in that artist increase, 
or museums and foundations buy up a certain amount of his works, a sellers' market 
with rising prices will be the logical consequence.21 
Considering all these particularities, which show that the price formation for art is 
difficult in the majority of cases, the importance of the art auction for the art market 
relative to other ways of selling goods becomes clear: in other words, because of the 
unique nature of many art objects, only an auction allows a concentration of all those 
interested in a single work at a particular place and time.22 At this point, supply and 
demand come together and can be adjusted until they are in equilibrium by the 
emergence of the highest bid, which establishes the value of the work of art. 23 In 
contrast to a private treaty sale, the vendor gains the security of realizing a true market 
price, which will be regularly higher than a price formed through negotiations, where 
those involved cannot be exactly sure about the price forming factors, as there is no real 
exchange market for art. 24 
D. ORIGINS OF THE ART AUCTION AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE 
FOR THE ART MARKET 
Though the origins of auctions can be traced to antiquity, and auction sale rules under 
Roman law, in particular, were very similar to the rules still in use in present day 
auctions, 25 the first documented auction of paintings in England took place only in 
1674?6 It was not before the late seventeenth century that an interest in the arts emerged 
2
° Consequently, with the threat of future increases in supply removed, the price of an artist's work 
increases, see the study by Robert B. Ekelund, Rand Ressler and John Keith Watson, 'The "Death" Effect 
in Art Prices: A Demand Side Exploration' (2000) 24 Journal of Cultural Economics 283-300. 
21 A shortage in an artist's work can be created artificially as well, as the example of the art dealer Joseph 
Duveen shows, who bought up all works by Jean-Antoine Houdon with the intention of increasing their 
value. See Meryle Secrest, Duveen: A Life in Art (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), pp. 297-298. 
22 See Orley Ashenfelter and Kathryn Graddy, 'Auctions and the Price of Art' (2003) 41 Journal of 
Economic Literature 763-786. 
23 Lynde! Prott and Patrick O'Keefe, Law and the Cultural Heritage: Volume 3 - Movement (London: 
Butterworths, 1989), para. 634. 
24 Brian W. Harvey and Franklin Meisel, Auctions: Law and Practice (3'd edn, Oxford University Press, 
2006), para. 1.27. 
25 Leonard D. DuBoff, 'Auction Problems: Going, Going, Gone' (1977) 26 Cleveland State Law Review 
499-513, 50 I, with further references. 
26 Brian Cowan, 'Arenas of Connoisseurship: Auctioning in Later Stuart England' in: Michael North and 
David Ormrod (eds.), Art Markets in Europe, 1400-1800 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 153-166 at 153. 
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in England. At that point, art was mainly bought for decorative reasons rather than out 
of sophisticated connoisseurship. 27 Art auctions were part of the social round, an "arena 
for elite competition for status and for public recognition of that status"28 and bidders 
did not expect their bargains to be originals.Z9 In the eighteenth and nineteenth century, 
along with the discovery of many ancient sites and the opening of public museums, 
knowledge about art became widespread and the more learned connoisseur established 
his position. 30 Accordingly, the art market experienced a tremendous expansion: 
galleries opened throughout Europe and in America. Because private collectors, at that 
point, preferred to buy from knowledgeable and reliable dealers operating as middlemen, 
galleries also had the biggest market share. 31 Auction houses, by contrast, were mainly 
wholesale businesses that supplied dealers with stock.32 It is only about fifty years ago 
that auction houses became dominant players in the art market. The turning point is 
widely regarded as the auction sale of the collection of Gabriel Cognacq in Paris in May 
1952.33 From then on, auction houses consistently replaced dealers as the traditional 
sellers of art,34 and recent figures show that the British art and antiques market, valued 
at around £4.2 billion in 2001, is now almost evenly split between dealers and 
auctioneers. 35 
27 Neil de Marchi provides the following example from a Bullord auction sale catalogue of January 1690: 
"Paintings ... Fit for Chimneys, Stair-Cases, Halls, ladies Closets, &c." See: 'Auctioning Paintings in 
Late Seventeenth-Century London: Rules, Segmentation and Prices in an Emergent Market' in: Victor A. 
Ginsburgh (ed.), Economics of Art and Culture (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2004), pp. 97-128 at 121. 
28 Cowan, 'Arenas of Connoisseurship', p. 163. Though connoisseurship and investment reasons are 
today's driving forces, competition and social aspects still form an important part of the thrill of the art 
auction and contribute to its status as indelible fixture in the cultural life of the art centres in the world. 
29 Ibid., quoting from a letter by Jonathan Swift (1667-1745) where he expresses his doubts about a Titian 
he bought for cheap at auction being an original, p. 153 and p. 157 - at the same time, the first art 
auctioneers did not pretend to have any expert knowledge about the works they sold. 
30 Luigi Salerno, John Rewald and BernardS. Myers, 'The Modem and Contemporary Art Market' in: 
Istituto per Ia Collaborazione Culturale (ed.), The Encyclopedia of World Art (15 vols., New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1959-1968), vol. IV, cols. 252-262 at 255. On the influence of dealers and critics: David W. 
Galenson and Robert Jensen, Careers and Canvases: The Rise of the Market for Modern Art in the 
Nineteenth Century (Working Paper 9123) (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 
2002). A more detailed account of the development of the art market as we know it today follows inch. 3, 
E.2., pp. 27-29. 
31 According to Sophy Burnham, The Art Crowd (New York: MacKay Inc., 1973), p. 53, galleries had a 
market share of90 per cent of the New York art market in the time before the Second World War. 
32 George Savage, The Market in Art, p. 25. 
33 Burnham, The Art Crowd, p. 52. 
34 From the 1980s onwards, this process was further catalysed through the fierce competition between the 
auction houses Sotheby's and Christie's, which had to open up new groups of buyers in the fight for 
market leadership- an impressive account of this can be found in Christopher Mason, The Art of the Steal: 
Inside the Sotheby's-Christie's Auction House Scandal (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2004), 
especially ch. 4. 
35 See House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2004-05: The 
Market for Art (London: The Stationary Office Ltd., 2005), p.7, referring to a study undertaken by the 
European Fine Art Foundation. 
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E. RESULT 
The creative processes of artists result in works of art having special features that 
distinguish them from common commercial goods. Besides uniqueness, it is mainly non 
physical features, foremost authenticity and provenance, which qualify works of art and 
that are essential to their value. In addition to personal matters of taste and the strength 
of the urge of possession, these are the reasons for the merchantability of art following 
its own economic rules, especially with regard to the prediction of prices. 
In that respect, the art auction house plays an important part as a forum for the turnover 
and price transparency of goods in a difficult market. It is not too far fetched to compare 
art auctions with a stock exchange. 36 Similar to a stock broker who mediates between 
supply and demand, which allows the formation of a price, the activities of the 
auctioneer allow rare goods such as works of art to find their market value on the 
auction room floor. However, the art market is different in terms of the importance of 
attribution of artworks. As regards stock markets, companies are easily identified; in 
contrast, a work of art may generate much debate in terms of its provenance. Whether 
the auctioneer is thus only a mere intermediary who neutrally arranges the transfer of 
property from the vendor-consignor to the purchaser, needs to be seen in the following 
chapter, where an in depth study of the preliminaries worked out here will be made. 
36 See Dede Brooks, Sotheby's CEO from 1994 to 1999, quoted in Mason, The Art of the Steal, p. 83. 
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3 
Preparing the Art Auction: 
Attributing and Cataloguing Works of Art 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the pre-sale activities in the auction house 
concerning the attribution and cataloguing of artworks. Before an auction can be carried 
out, important preliminary steps need to be taken with regard to each individual object 
of art that has been consigned for sale. Among the questions that need to be clarified, 
the authentication and attribution of the consigned artworks are of the greatest 
importance. 1 As Jauregui stated, attribution is the 'cornerstone' of the process of selling 
art.2 
Basically, attribution means the identification of the authorship of a work of art. This 
allows the work to be put into its historical context and thus translates into a higher 
appreciation of the aesthetics of the work. 3 The more information the attribution-
dependent description of a work of art can provide, the more the value of that particular 
work increases and thus the potential profit for the seller.4 Often, however, buyers as 
well as sellers are induced to buy or sell works of art on the basis of attributions which 
can, later on, tum out to be wrong. In such cases the question arises whether the 
auctioneer can be held liable or not, and under what circumstances. A look behind the 
scenes from the buyer's point of view can ease the establishment and classification of 
the legal duties and liabilities of the auctioneer to the purchaser. This will be done in 
chapter 4. For the purpose of this chapter, however, the structure will be taken from the 
1 Another important preparatory task is the valuation of the art object and the decision on its presale 
estimate. This requires a thorough knowledge of the art market as usually only auctioneers have it and is 
also heavily dependent on the result of the here discussed attribution of the object - see ch. I on factors 
influencing the formation of price and the references given there. In recent years, the establishment of an 
immaculate provenance, especially for the years 1933 to 1948, has become increasingly important to 
confirm the legal ownership of the seller and to avoid later disputes of title. See on provenance research 
as it is carried out in an auction house: Lucian J. Simmons, 'Provenance Research: an art market 
perspective' [2001] Spoils ofWar. Special Edition 18-22. 
2 Raul Jauregui, 'Rembrandt Portraits: Economic Negligence in Art Attribution' (1997) 44 U.C.L.A. Law 
Review 1947-2029, 1950. 
3 See on the influences of our appreciation of art and why authenticity matters: Matthew Kieran, 
Revealing Art (London: Routledge, 2005), ch.1: Originality and Artistic Expression. 
4 Jauregui, 'Rembrandt Portraits', 1950. 
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chronological schedule of an art auction, which can be broadly divided as follows: first, 
there is the transaction between the vendor and the auctioneer, where a first exchange of 
information on the artworks takes place; secondly, there is an internal phase within the 
auction house where the auctioneer is researching and valuing a lot and editing the 
information for the catalogue entry; finally, there is a phase in which the results of the 
attribution and the valuation are communicated to the bidding public in general through 
the auction catalogue. 
A. SELLING ART VIA AN AUCTION HOUSE 
The auction house's supply of artworks comes from several sources: most important are 
private owners and collectors who consign single works or their collections in whole or 
in part to auction houses. 5 Art dealers form another significant group of consignors.6 
Further, institutional collectors, such as public museums and libraries, periodically 
dispose of artworks from their collections via auctions. 7 
The reasons behind arranging for an auction house to sell a work of art are manifold. 
Auctioneers act as agents for sellers, bringing sellers into a contractual relationship with 
buyers. 8 E~I'ecially for the private seller without specialist knowledge and without 
access to the art market, it is important to have an expert agent act as intermediary, as 
this helps to balance the information asymmetry which characterizes the common 
situation of an art sale, where the layman faces an expert dealer. 9 Often, auction houses 
are also the only entities in the art market that can handle the sale of large collections or 
of collections that consist of a variety of objects from different periods or of different 
styles or makings. In contrast to the specialized art or antique dealer, big auction houses 
have the facilities and the organisational capacity for splitting diverse consignments into 
5 See George Savage, The Market in Art (London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1969), p. 21. 
6 John Henry Merryman and Albert E. Elsen, Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts (41h edn, The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2002), p. 898. 
7 See on the controversies caused by this: Carol Vogel, 'Museums Set to Sell Art, and Some Experts 
Cringe' in THE NEW YORK TIMES, 26 October 2005, p. A24; and especially the criticism by Hilton 
Kramer, 'Deaccession Roulette' (2005) 24 The New Criterion 21. 
8 Lynde) Prott and Patrick O'Keefe, Law and the Cultural Heritage: Volume 3 - Movement (London: 
Butterworths, 1989), para. 601. See on the auctioneer's position as agent for the seller in detail: Brian W. 
Harvey and Franklin Meisel, Auctions Law and Practice (3rd edn, Oxford University Press, 2006), ch. 3. 
See further below, ch. 4, text accompanying n. 2 and n. 2. 
9 It must be mentioned that dealers sometimes also act as agents for sellers in arranging a sale. See about 
the advantages this involves: Prott and O'Keefe, Law and the Cultural Heritage, para. 601. On the role of 
art dealers in general and especially as sellers of contemporary art: Sophy Burnham, The Art Crowd (New 
York: McKay Inc., 1973). 
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smaller clusters and of grouping them together with similar objects from other 
consignments. 10 Such specialised auction sales promise to achieve the best possible 
price for the single object - an effect that is, as examined before, 11 further supported by 
the genuine competitive bidding created by an auction situation. 
B. THE QUALIFICATION OF THE ART AUCTIONEER 
Once art owners have considered selling their possessions by way of auction, it is 
important for them to obtain exact information about the value of their objects which 
will enable them to make a final decision on a consignment. Many do not possess the 
expertise and the knowledge to detect the significance and the value of their possessions 
themselves. Often, art and antiques have been in families for many generations before 
they come up for sale, and the original price of the purchase has been forgotten or 
cannot be of guidance any longer, as the market environment has changed in between. 
Because auction houses are always interested in consignments, they advise on current 
estimates and make appraisals of items. 12 Further, consignment agreements usually 
include a clause saying that the auctioneer will undertake the scholarly work involved in 
a consignment, especially researching a lot for the purpose of valuation. 13 This raises 
the question of the level of expertise and experience expected from art auctioneers. It 
may come as a surprise here that the profession of auctioneer is more or less 
unregulated. 14 The law does not require any special qualifications from those who want 
to practice as auctioneers. 15 
1° Further, the staffs of all leading auction houses nowadays not only consist of art historians, but market 
analysts and international tradesmen, tax experts and lawyers who can provide all services involved in 
difficult art transactions. See, in general, the portraits of Sotheby's and Christie's in Christopher Mason, 
The Art of the Steal (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2004). 
11 See ch. 2, C., pp. 6-7. 
12 See, for example, the services offered on the websites ofBonhams, Christie's and Sotheby's. 
13 Franklin Meisel, 'Auction' in: Lord MacKay of Clash fern ( ed. in chief), Halsbury 's Laws of England 
(4th edn, London: Butterworths, 2003), Vol. 2(3), para. 216; Joe A. Och, 'Sotheby's: Anatomy of an 
Auction House' in: Pierre Lalive (ed.) International Sales of Works of Art (Geneva: Institute of 
International Business Law and Practice, 1985), pp. 251-281, 251. 
14 See Harvey and Meisel, Auctions Law and Practice, paras. 2.01 and 2.02. 
15 Meisel, 'Auction', para. 203; Prott and O'Keefe, Law and the Cultural Heritage, para. 643. 
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1. Standard of Care and Skill 
It has been established, however, that an auctioneer is charged with a general duty under 
the common law to exercise such skill and knowledge as is reasonably to be expected 
from members of that profession. 16 Especially in the context of fine art auctions, it has 
been recognized that the standard of care must vary depending on whether the 
auctioneer is regarded as a specialist or more of a general practitioner: in Luxmoore-
May v Messenger May Baverstock17 the Court of Appeal justified a lower standard of 
care and skill to be required of provincial art auctioneers on the hypothesis that the 
valuation of art would "not [be] an exact science", but rather capable of accommodating 
wide ranging views and opinions. 18 
In that case, a provincial firm of fine art auctioneers who advertised themselves as 
offering expert and specialist advice on fine art undertook to make an appraisal of two 
small oil paintings picturing foxhounds for the plaintiff clients with a view to their 
being put up for auction. The auction house had three of its representatives examine the 
paintings, and all agreed that they were not works of quality or note, valuing them at 
£30 to £50 for the pair. Evidence was also given that shortly before the auction the 
paintings were taken to Christie's for their opinion, as one of the firm's representatives 
thought that there was a possibility that the paintings were by the eighteenth century 
artist George Stubbs (1724-1806). They were handed over at Christie's front counter, 
taken away to a department behind and handed back some 5 to 10 minutes later with 
nothing favourable being said about them. The paintings were subsequently sold at the 
defendant's auction for £840. Five months later they were sold with a full attribution to 
George Stubbs at Sotheby's for £88,000. The plaintiffs brought an action against the 
defendant firm claiming the difference between the two sale prices. In the High Court, 
the judge held that no competent appraiser could have failed to spot the Stubbs potential 
of the two paintings. In the judge's opinion this demonstrated actionable negligence and 
he gave judgment for the plaintiffs. 
16 Particularly on auctioneers in Denew v Davere/1 [1803-1813] All E.R. 199, KB. For the providers of 
services in general, now s.13 of the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 (i~lied term about care and 
skill). See further Francis Reynolds, Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency (18 edn, London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2006), paras. 6-015 to 6-022. 
17 [1990] 1 W.L.R.1009;[1990] 1 AliE.R.1067,CA. 
18 [ 1990] 1 W.L.R. 1009, 1021. The difficulties arising when valuating art will be investigated in detail in 
sections D. and E. of this chapter. 
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The Court of Appeal reversed that decision, naming a number of factors that made it 
reasonable even for experts to question the attribution of the paintings to Stubbs. 19 Still, 
both, Slade LJ, who gave the main judgment in the Court of Appeal, and the judge in 
the High Court were in substantial agreement as to the proper standard of skill and care 
which the law expects provincial auctioneers to display when they make appraisals of 
artworks, differing only in their conclusions as to whether that standard had been 
fulfilled. Rather than formulating a specific standard of skill and care for provincial art 
auctioneers, an analogy was drawn with what is expected from general medical 
practitioners. In his dictum, Slade LJ applied a statement of the law adopted in the 
medical malpractice case of Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority20 in 
which the House of Lords endorsed the reasoning of Lord President Clyde in Hunter v 
Hanley,21 where he stated that: 
"In the realm of diagnosis and treatment there is ample scope for genuine 
difference of opinion and one man clearly is not negligent merely because 
his conclusion differs from that of other professional men ... the true test of 
establishing negligence in diagnosis or treatment on the part of a doctor is 
whether he has been proved to be guilty of such failure as no doctor of 
ordinary skill would be guilty of if acting with ordinary care ... "22 
It appears, therefore, that a "general practitioner" will be regarded as negligent only if it 
can be said that no auctioneer of ordinary skill and care would have acted or failed to 
act similarly, given an identical set of circumstances. As such, so long as the auctioneer 
has acted honestly and diligently in attempting to arrive at his view, he cannot be 
charged with negligence if it transpires to be incorrect. 
Accordingly, in dealing with the standard of care, Slade LJ said: 
"The defendants submitted . . . that they were to be regarded as akin to 
general practitioners and that 
19 Ibid., 1023-1024. 
20 [1984] 1 W.L.R. 634; [1985] I All E.R. 635, HL. 
21 1955 S.C. 200. 
22 At 205-206. 
(1) the required standard of skill and care allows for differing views, and 
even a wrong view, without the practitioner holding that view (necessarily) 
being held in breach of his duty; 
(2) the standard is to be judged by reference only to what may be expected 
of the general practitioner, not the specialist - here provincial art auctioneers, 
rather than one of the leading auction houses; and 
(3) compliance with the required standard is to be judged by reference to the 
actual circumstances confronting the practitioners at the material time, 
rather than with the benefit of hindsight. 
The judge 'unhesitatingly' accepted these propositions, and so would 1."23 
2. The Importance of Reputation 
15 
The Court of Appeal did not, however, explicitly state what the specific standard of care 
expected from provincial art auctioneers should be, nor has it established what the 
higher standard of care and skill required of "leading auction houses" should include.24 
Bearing in mind that the Court of Appeal considered the valuation of art as "not an 
exact science"25 and knowing that legislation leaves it open to the ·discretion of anybody 
to call themselves "appraiser, "valuer" or "expert" either in one of the fields of art or in 
all of them, some conclusions as to the qualifications to be expected from either group 
can be drawn from the evidence accepted during the proceedings. 
The expert in the defendant's firm had 
"no formal fine art qualifications, but in about 1976 he started dealing in 
paintings and according to his evidence, before he was engaged by the 
defendants had attended auctions daily since 1976. It has not been submitted 
that, on the face of it, he was not fully competent to do the job for which he 
was engaged. "26 
23 [1990] I W.L.R. 1009, 1021. 
24 Further, as one commentator points out, the Court of Appeal did not offer any guidelines as to the 
categorisation ofbusinesses in either of the two groups, which leaves especially those firms in uncertainty 
that fall in the middle of the spectrum. See Nicholas J. Mullany, 'Let the Seller Beware' (1991) 107 Law 
Quarterly Review 28-31, 30. 
25 [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1009, 1021. 
26 Ibid., 1014. 
16 
In contrast, the persons later engaged with the valuation of the paintings at Sotheby's 
were 
and 
"a director and since 1981 in charge of So the by's British painting 
department specialising in the period 1500 to 1850. [That expert] 
immediately recognized the foxhounds as related to a celebrated Stubbs 
painting at Goodwood House, a large painting known as the 'The Third 
Duke of Richmond with the Charlton Hunt' painted in 1759-60."27 
"Mrs. Judy Egerton, universally acclaimed as the world's greatest expert on 
George Stubbs. She has recently retired after 14 years at the Tate Gallery, 
latterly in the post of assistant keeper. Before that she worked for Paul 
Mellon in America, in 1978 cataloguing his collection of British sporting 
and animal paintings. This included some 38 Stubbs, the largest collection 
of his work in the world. In 1984 she catalogued 190 works for a major 
exhibition of George Stubbs held at the Tate Gallery. She has for some years 
past been engaged on a catalogue raisonne of all Stubbs' work. Suffice to 
say that her qualifications and experience amply justify her reputation as the 
world's leading expert. "28 
It becomes obvious from these profiles that the persons involved in making appraisals 
are very different with regard to their experience and their particular field of expertise in 
leading auction houses when compared to their provincial counterparts. By drawing a 
distinction between provincial auctioneers and leading auction houses, it is implicit in 
the Court of Appeal's judgement that this is exactly what is expected from the latter: 
that they act in accordance with the current general and approved valuing practices, and 
that the experts involved in their appraisals have a thorough knowledge in the particular 
fields concerned?9 This finds support in the way big auction houses present themselves. 
Knowing that the competent appraisal of a consignment requires an extensive amount of 
knowledge, such institutions usually get only authorities involved who are eminent in 
27 Ibid., 1017. 
28 Ibid., 1018. 
29 This found confinnation in Thomson v Christie Manson & Woods Ltd. [2004] E.W.H.C. 1101, QBD, 
where Jack J adopted the tenninology from the Luxmoore case, speaking of Christie's as an "international 
auction house" of which it is expected that, with regard to them making appraisals, "[T]he examination 
must be as thorough as the circumstances reasonably require and it must be done by persons of 
appropriate qualifications and experience", at paras. 186 and 188. 
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the field of the particular object and who fulfil the highest professional standards.30 As 
the examples in Luxmoore-May show, their professional skills are usually evidenced by 
the private records of the experts, such as a long-time directorship in an art-trading 
house, or by the exercise of their functions as experts during many years, often m 
museums as well as in private occupations as freelance appraisers or employees in 
trading firms or in insurance companies. 31 Beyond this, many big auction houses make 
contributions to scholarship;32 some of them host scholarly exhibitions33 or subsidize 
exhibitions elsewhere - all this with a view to winning the trust of sellers as well as 
bidders;34 for with the profession being unregulated, the maintenance of an immaculate 
reputation is one of the most important assets in attracting customers. On the other side 
of the spectrum, the decision in Luxmoore-May arguably opened the opportunity to 
provincial auctioneers to say that if a consignor chooses them to sell artworks, and 
provided no negligence is shown, consigned goods ought to find their own value on the 
auction room floor. 35 It is thus for the sellers to give their property to an auctioneer most 
capable ofhandling its sale efficiently. 
C. THE SOURCES OF OBJECT INFORMATION 
When an auctioneer has been commissioned with attributing and describing an 
individual work of art and getting it ready for being sold at auction, the next question is 
which sources of information he will draw on when making his appraisal. 36 
30 See, for example, for Sotheby's: Och, 'Sotheby's: Anatomy of an Auction House', p. 251. For 
Christie's: Not!l Annesley, 'Attributing Old Master Drawings' in: Ronald D. Spencer (ed.), The Expert 
Versus the Object: Judging Fakes and False Attributions in the Visual Arts (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), pp. 79-88, p. 88. 
31 See further Otto Sandrock, 'Appraisal' in: Martine Briat (ed.), International Sales of Works of Art 
(Paris: International Chamber of Commerce, 1990), pp. 615-659, p. 622. 
32 See Gertrude Prescott Nuding, 'Saleroom Practice' (1988) 128 Apollo 34-41, fn. 62: Auction houses 
often give scholars access to works consigned to them, or provide them with information and photographs, 
as well as they forward scholarly enquiries to the new owners of artworks which were sold in one of their 
auctions. 
33 See for example the praise for Christie's presale exhibition of35 works by Donald Judd (1928-1994): 
"This exhibition is the most beautiful survey of Judd's work ever seen in New York, and the first to be 
displayed under conditions of space and light the famously demanding artist might have found 
satisfactory." Roberta Smith, 'Christie's Presale Show: Light and Space Enough to Really See Judd' in 
THE NEW YORK TIMES, 24 April2006, p. E l. 
34 Nuding, 'Saleroom Practice', 40. 
35 See conclusion on the Luxmoore-May case by Brian W. Harvey, Violin Fraud (2"d edn, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 70. Mullany, 'Let the Seller Beware', 30, criticises that the decision might 
induce lesser auctioneers to remain ignorant of the most advanced valuing techniques to avoid the higher 
and more onerous standard of care and skill expected from leading firms. 
36 It is important to stress here that this examination does not deal with the formal consignment procedure 
and the details of the consignment agreement beyond the question concerning the attribution and 
description of consigned property. See for a detailed examination of the contractual relation between the 
seller and the auctioneer: Harvey and Meisel, Auctions: Law and Practice, chs. 3 and 4. With regard to 
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The first source of information is the vendor. It is apparent that with a consignment the 
auctioneer will also require from vendors a disclosure of all they know about the work 
of art.37 This is especially important for establishing the provenance of an object. Often, 
the information given by the vendor stays the only source of information on the 
ownership of a work of art. It is thus common that auction houses include clauses in 
their conditions of business where the seller warrants to the auction house and the buyer 
that he is the true owner of the property and is able to transfer good and marketable title 
to the property free from any third party claims. 38 In cases where the ownership 
information provided by the vendor has to be accepted without the possibility of further 
verification, 39 the adoption of previously made attributions without subsequent 
examination will remain an exception. 
Of course, objects come up for sale that are well known in the market, and for which 
reliable documentation already exists,40 which the auctioneer will use and include for 
his own description. Such famous consignments, however, make up only a minority of 
transactions in the auction house, with the majority being objects, among them mostly 
antiques and handcrafts, which often make their first market appearance after their 
creation and decades or even centuries of private ownership. The information that can 
be provided for such objects is often ambiguous and starting an appraisal on the basis of 
dubious object information can often lead one in the wrong direction, as too little 
attention is paid to the obvious.41 
His own examination and qualification of the consigned object thus remain the most 
important sources of information for the auctioneer's appraisal. As mentioned before, 
the variety of controversial financial arrangements practiced by auction houses to attract consignments, 
such as the 'secret reserve' and 'guarantees', see introductory Brenna Adler, 'The International Art 
Auction Industry: has competition tarnished its finish?' (2003) 23 Northwestern Journal of International 
Law and Business 433-466. 
37 See, for example, Simmons, 'Provenance Research', 19. 
38 See clause 5(a) of Christie's Consignment Agreement; condition 2(a) (i) and (ii) of Sotheby's 
Conditions of Business for Sellers. 
39 Such as in the case of Rachmaninoffv Sotheby's and Eva Terenyi [2005] E.W.H.C. 258, QBD, paras. 8 
and 13, where Sotheby's pleaded that further historical research conducted by them had remained fruitless 
with regard to confirming or questioning the vendor's ownership of the autograph manuscript of 
Rachmaninoffs Second Sympony. The decision was on the continuation of a granted injunction until trial; 
case pending. 
4
° For example, a clear auction or exhibition record. 
41 For example, in de Balkany v Christie Manson & Woods Ltd [1997] Tr.L.R. 163; THE INDEPENDENT, 
19 January 1995, the auction house gave the question of attribution of a painting only the briefest 
attention because of relying on a dubious scholarly article and thus missing that the painting was heavily 
overpainted. From this overpainting, it became evident that the painting had been misattributed, and, 
moreover, forged. 
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the previously collected information will be considered and factual information on, for 
instance, the artworks' provenance or previous exhibitions etc. will certainly find entry 
into the auctioneer's description. Further, the auctioneer might find it necessary to 
consult external experts for obtaining a view on attribution problems that cannot be 
solved within the auction house. 42 Regularly, however, it is the auctioneer and the 
experts within the auction house who are responsible for the appraisal and the 
description of objects. Though they act as the seller's agent, auction houses are keen to 
ensure that works which they sell have been described by their own staff. Indeed, the 
conditions of business concerning the seller often make it clear that the auction house 
has even a "complete" or "sole and absolute" discretion as to the description of a lot in 
the catalogue.43 
D. ATTRIBUTION METHODS 
AND THEIR RECOGNITION BY THE COURTS 
The attribution process, in the auction house also referred to as the "hilling process",44 
which is the detailed examination of objects to determine their proper description, can 
consist of a combination of several methods. 
1. Connoisseurship: Visual Inspection by a "Knowing Eye" 
The primary means of determining the attribution of a work of art and the most difficult 
for the layman to understand is connoisseurship. 45 Basically, the exercise of 
connoisseurship involves a careful visual inspection of an object by a "knowing eye" -
the connoisseur.46 The purpose of such an examination is to identify those formal and 
structural characteristics in an object that are typical of a particular artist's technique. 
This stylistic approach was first exercised and described by Giovanni Morelli ( 1816-
1891), a comparative anatomist and connoisseur, who believed that each painter has an 
42 Clause 6(a) of Christie's Consignment Agreement; condition 3(b) ofSotheby's Conditions of Business 
for Sellers. 
43 See clause 6(a) of Christie's Consignment Agreement; condition 3(a) of Sotheby's Conditions of 
Business for Sellers. 
44 See Thomson v Christie Manson & Woods Ltd. [2004] E.W.H.C. 1101, QBD, para. 29. 
45 See for a more detailed history of connoisseurship: Mansfield Kirby Talley, Jr., 'Connoisseurship and 
the Methodology of the Rembrandt Research Project' ( 1989) 8 The International Journal of Museum 
Management and Curatorship 175-214. 
46 Francis V. O'Connor, 'Authenticating the Attribution of Art' in: Spencer (ed.), The Expert Versus the 
Object, pp. 3-27, p. 6. 
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inimitable use of schemata and techniques which a trained connoisseur can identify 
beyond reasonable doubt: by carefully analysing and comparing the way in which the 
Italian Renaissance artists executed details, such as the way they painted parts of the 
body, for example a finger or ears, he was able to attribute certain paintings to the hand 
of certain masters.47 
Morelli's method, developed principally for the attribution of paintings from the Italian 
Quattrocento, was then further developed and adjusted to be effective for artworks from 
other periods and schools as well. While a uniqueness of form can especially be found 
in the details of a work, Max J. Friedlander (1867-1958) highlighted the importance of 
the impression gained from looking at a work of art as a whole.48 Further, Friedlander 
added49 the inspection of the composition of a work of art,50 of its subject matter, 51 of 
the brushwork 52 and colour scheme, as well as of the materials used, as elements to the 
standard repertoire of the stylistic examination of paintings. 
As Talley Jr. states, both Morelli and Friedlander recognized that their initial judgement 
on a piece of art was informed by intuition. 53 However, using a systematic and 
organised approach, such as the methods of visual examination just described, allows 
the connoisseur to support an initially subjective attribution with facts and reasons and 
puts his attribution on a scientific footing. 54 0 'Connor consequently compares the 
47 
"[E]very great artist sees and represents these forms in his own distinctive manner; hence, for him they 
become characteristic." At p. 23 in Giovanni Morelli's groundbreaking work Italian Painters: Critical 
Studies of Their Works (2 vols., London: John Murray, 1892), in which he reattributed many paintings 
hanging in German galleries. 
48 See the chapter 'On Intuition and the First Impression' in Friedllinder's work On Art and 
Connoisseurship (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 172-178. 
49 Ibid., chapter 'The Analytical Examination of Pictures', pp. 184-196. 
5
° For instance, attention must be paid to the degree of symmetry; the proportions of figures; the 
disposition of figures in the plane or depth of space; the relationship of the figures to space as indicated 
by, for example, landscapes. See ibid., pp. 195-196. 
51 Elements such as the depicted iconography (political, religious and social motifs) and its relationship to 
tradition; the pictured persons, their costumes, arms and armour; geography and architecture, ornaments, 
etc. See ibid., pp. 195-196. 
52 For example, layers of paint; reconstruction of the process of creation from the edges to the middle, 
from left to right or vice versa, etc.- see O'Connor, 'Authenticating the Attribution of Art', p. 14, where 
he gives an example of inspecting the facture of a painting by Jackson Pollock (1912-1956). 
53 Talley, Jr., 'Connoisseurship', 189. 
54 The necessity of a methodological approach to an appraisal is widely acknowledged among 
connoisseurs, see for example David Best, 'The Objectivity of Artistic Appreciation' ( 1980) 20 British 
Journal of Aesthetics 115-127, at 127: "if I make an artistic judgment it is incumbent upon me, if 
challenged, to substantiate it by citing not my subjective feelings about it, but objective features of the 
work of art itself." 
See further on the importance of objectivity in making a judgment about authenticity as a guideline to 
determine whether negligence is given, below, ch. 4, B.3.d., pp. 81-82 and n. 142 and Peter H. Karlen, 
'Fakes, Forgeries and Expert Opinions' in: Lalive (ed.) International Sales of Works of Art, pp. 219-249, 
p. 241. 
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evidence drawn from the work of the connoisseur of art with the reasoning of forensic 
pathologists, anthropologists and medical doctors, who often deduce forensic causes 
from visual inspection alone, based on a perception trained over a long period of time 
and the experience of a high number of cases: 
"All these experienced perceptions of form would be considered scientific 
by most reasonable persons, in the sense that they are based on a studied 
empiricism and interpreted according to recognized standards and theory. 
The art expert, confronted with a painting of questioned authenticity, 
operates in much the same manner as the professionals just described. He or 
she has seen hundreds, maybe thousands, of works by the artist in question, 
and has absorbed into visual memory the artist's characteristic form ... to 
the extent that such an expert can tell, at a glance ... that the work presented 
is authentic or fake. "55 
FriedHinder himself stresses the importance of a "vigorous visual memory" as 
indispensable for the work of the connoisseur and such "concepts of visual 
imagination" as his most important tools. 56 Still, to withstand judicial review, an 
attribution that is solely based on connoisseurship must have thorough methodological 
foundations. This becomes apparent from the famous case of Hahn v Duveen before the 
New York Supreme Court, 57 in which Jack J instructed the jury as to what expert 
evidence would not be acceptable for proving the authenticity of a painting: 
"I have profound respect for critics whose conclusions rest upon facts. What 
they say should be carefully considered by a jury. The opinions of any other 
kinds of experts are as 'sounding brass and tinkling cymbals.' Some of them 
expound their theories largely by vocal expression and gesture; others 
wander into a zone of speculation founded upon nothing more tangible than 
'psychological correlation.' I do not say this is as absurd as it sounds to a 
layman, but it is too introspective and subjective to be the basis of any 
opinion a jury can pin its faith upon. There are also experts who admit that 
55 O'Connor, 'Authenticating the Attribution of Art', pp. 7-8. 
56 Friedllinder, On Art and Connoisseurship, p. 176. 
57 133 Misc. 871, 234 N.Y.S. 185 (Sup.Ct. N.Y.Co. 1929). In this case, Mrs Andree Hahn brought a libel 
claim against the art dealer Joseph Duveen for expressing doubts on whether a supposed Leonardo da 
Vinci painting owned by the claimant was an original and stating that the real La Belle Ferronniere was 
in the Louvre. The case was settled out of court. 
they have no formulas, rules, or ability to produce any artistic thing, but who 
claim to have a sixth sense which enables some of them after they have seen 
a picture even for five minutes to definitely determine whether it is genuine 
or not. I do not say that this faculty may not be possessed by some men, but 
it is not based upon enough objectiveness to convey definite meaning to a 
jury."58 
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In a positive way, Buckley J enumerated the skills a connoisseur must possess when 
making an attribution before a court in Drake v Thos Agnew & Sons Ltd 59 as follows: 
"While it is vital to have keen observation it is also necessary to have 
knowledge of an artist's methods and style and to be sufficiently familiar 
with his work to be able to recognise his artistic "handwriting". Even that is 
not all. It involves also a sensitivity to such concepts as quality, emotion, 
mood and atmosphere. To an extent "eye" can be developed but, like many 
other human attributes it is partly born in a man or woman. Were it 
otherwise there would be many more true experts."60 
In addition to a precise visual examination, the attribution of a work of art is usually 
supplemented by other methods, though this is not always the case. 
2. Historical Evidence and Scholarly Publications 
Where possible, the expert will conduct research into the documentation connected with 
the object of the appraisal. A very persuasive evidence of authenticity is when a 
complete provenance record can be established, leading from the work's current 
ownership to the original artist. 
As suggested before, the information the vendor can provide will be considered for this 
purpose. This may include the mentioning of the work in house inventories or in wills 
or in letters, memoirs and diaries.61 Often, though, the information that can be obtained 
from the vendor is limited. For example, in Thomson v Christie's, when trying to 
58 Ibid., at 877 resp. 191-192. 
59 [2002] E. W.H.C. 294, QBD. 
60 Ibid., at para. 43. 
61 David Philipps, 'Forgery' in: Jane Turner (ed.), The Dictionary of Art (34 vols., London: Macmillan 
Publishers, 1996), vol. XI, pp. 305-311, p. 309. 
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establish the provenance of two vases for reasons of dating them as either eighteenth or 
nineteenth century, the only information available to Christie's from the vendor was that 
they were shown on a photograph taken in 1921, thus only establishing that the 
purchase must have been before that date but revealing nothing about the date of their 
creation. 62 
Besides the vendor's records, the known writings of an artist and his contemporaries 
will be consulted for references about a work, as well as - if available - the catalogue 
raisonne 63 and further scholarly publications about the artist and the period under 
examination. 
A problem limiting the evidentiary persuasiveness of historical research is the 
ambiguity of documents. Particularly when it is very old works of art, the available 
information can often be inaccurate. Besides this, provenance research itself is not a 
static process and scholars may interpret old facts in new ways at different times. 64 
Another aspect the researcher must be cautious of is the authenticity of the documents 
themselves, as contrived provenances are one of the means forgers use when trying to 
convince experts ofthe authenticity of faked art objects.65 
It is well acknowledged, however, that historical research, if conducted in a manner 
sensitive to the above-mentioned problems, constitutes persuasive evidence of a work's 
authenticity. 66 In contrast, works of art that have left no historical traces must be 
considered as dubious. 67 This is especially the case if the work is attributed to a 
prominent artist. In de Balkany v Christie 's,68 the authenticity of a painting attributed to 
62 Thomson v Christie Manson & Woods Ltd. [2005] E.W.C.A. Civ. 555, at para. 22. 
63 See on the catalogue raisonne as the standard reference used to attribute a work of art: Michael Findlay, 
'The Catalogue Raisonne' in: Spencer (ed.), The Expert Versus the Object, pp. 55-62. 
64 Annesley, 'Attributing Old Master Drawing', p. 88: "Each generation is, however, the victim, or maybe 
the beneficiary, of a fresh historical and aesthetic perspective on and interpretation of the Old Masters 
which can on occasion render older views quite baffling." In consequence, the appraiser of art needs to 
assess the reliability of previous writings on an object, and check the confidence the art market has in the 
opinion of the scholar, see John Tancock, 'Issues of Authenticity in the Auction House' in: Spencer (ed.), 
The Expert Versus the Object, pp. 45-53, p. 49. 
65 In an unreported criminal case from 1999, the accused was convicted of having contaminated vital 
archives at the Tate Gallery and the Victoria & Albert Museum with fake provenances. These bogus 
backgrounds were then used to convince purchasers of the authenticity of fake paintings. See 'Faker who 
flooded art world isjai1ed for 6 years' in THE GUARDIAN, 16 February 1999, p.7. 
66 See as to the dating of objects: Thomson v Christie Manson & Woods Ltd. [2004] E.W.H.C. 1101, 
QBD, paras. Ill and 188; explicitly on authenticity in the US case of Greenberg Gallery v Bauman 817 
F.Supp. 167 (D.C. 1993), p. 173. 
67 O'Connor, 'Authenticating the Attribution of Art', p. 18; Philipps, 'Forgery', p. 309. 
68 (1997] Tr.L.R. 163; THE INDEPENDENT, 19 January 1995. 
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Egon Schiele (1890-1918) was under consideration. With regard to the painting's 
history, the court noted not only the absence of a flawless provenance, but also that 
there was no history of publication or public exhibition of the work available until the 
publication of an article in 1968 that, for the first time, attributed the painting to 
Schiele.69 
If a work does not satisfy the expert's visual inspection and remains without convincing 
documentation, there is still the possibility of scientific testing. It has been suggested, 
though, that such objects are most likely to be faulty and that it would not be worth 
taking the effort of undergoing further, often expensive, scientific analysis. 70 This needs 
to be decided on a case-to-case basis. 
3. Scientific Examination 
The option of employing scientific and technical means to assist in the attribution of 
artworks has evolved during the twentieth century and new techniques are still 
appearing. 71 The main purposes of scientific examination are to reveal anomalies in the 
manufacture, in the materials, or in the age ofthe object under scrutiny.72 
The studying of materials and of construction is mainly done with the aid of microscopy, 
ultra violet, X-ray and X-ray related methods, all of which enable a closer visual 
examination of the object. This way, restorations, repairs and overpainting as well as the 
binding agents or glues and false patina can be detected. 
While these techniques have the advantage of being non-destructive, those analysing the 
molecular components of an object for reasons of dating require samples being removed 
from the object. The most prominent of the techniques which allow for the 
determination of the age of objects is radiocarbon dating. 73 It is generally used for 
69 A catalogue raisonne published in 1930 and revised in 1966 had the painting not included, ibid. See 
also n. 41 above. 
70 O'Connor, 'Authenticating the Attribution of Art', p. 18. 
71 Fractal analysis, using digital technology to identify an artist's unique mathematical fingerprint, only to 
be named as the latest. See Alison Abbott, 'In the Hands of a Master' (2006) 439 Nature 648-650. 
72 See for a detailed account of testing techniques: Stuart J. Fleming, Authenticity in Art: The Scientific 
Detection of Forgery (London: Institute of Physics, 1975); Mark Jones (ed.), Fake? The Art of Deception 
(London: British Museum Publications Ltd, 1990), pp. 275-289. 
73 Other dating techniques are, for example, thermoluminescence for ceramics and dentrochronology for 
wood panels. 
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dating wood, bone, ivory, textiles, leather, parchment and paper by measurmg the 
natural radiocarbon decay from around the time of manufacture. 
Since the objectiveness of scientific methods is undoubted, the evidence that can be 
drawn from them is regularly given substantial weight by the courts, as long as the 
method is well established and not a "developing science". 74 
Nevertheless, the usefulness of scientific methods is seen as limited among art experts, 
as the following excerpt from an article by Simon Schama on the subject of the 
Metropolitan Museum's 1995 exhibition "Rembrandt/Not Rembrandt" reveals with 
regard to the Rembrandt Research Project: 
"And while the Amsterdam-based project was established in 1968, 
essentially as a committee of kenners, its experts were no longer willing to 
put their faith solely in the sharpness of their collective 'eye'. Instead, a new 
generation of techno-toys was marshalled to probe beneath the skin of the 
painting and to deliver final, irrefutable verdicts. No self-respecting 
Rembrandt exhibition catalogue these days is complete without x 
radiographs, infrared spectographs, auto radiographs, canvas warp and woof 
counts, dendrochronological (tree ring) analysis of panels, and 
microscopically differentiated strata of grounds, glazes, and pigments. But 
the techno-kenners had hardly donned their lab coats before it became 
apparent that scientific investigation was a lot stronger on promise than on 
delivery. For while dating wood or cloth samples could distinguish paintings 
made in Rembrandt's lifetime from later imitations, the vast bulk of 
questionable work originated from Rembrandt's own period - and in more 
than one instance, from the master's own studio. Technology, it seems, is 
""good for exposing [recent] fakes but no good for winnowing out 
Rembrandt wannabes. . . . The exhibition presents its scientific evidence in 
74 X-ray has been successfully employed as evidence as early as 1929 in the case of Hahn v Duveen 133 
Misc. 871,234 N.Y.S. 185 (Sup.Ct. N.Y.Co. 1929), pp. 878 resp. 193. The case of de Ba/kany v Christie 
Manson & Woods Ltd. [1997] Tr.L.R. 163; THE INDEPENDENT, 19 January 1995 has been mainly decided 
on grounds of the evidence drawn from scientific analysis. In Thomson v Christie Manson & Woods Ltd. 
[2004] E.W.H.C. 1101, QBD, while generally acknowledging the persuasiveness of scientific methods, 
Jack J did not accept the method used for dating metal objects by their composition on grounds of the 
method being a "developing science" with no collections of metallurgical data being established, paras. 
151-177; confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Thomson v Christie Manson & Woods Ltd. [2005] 
E.W.C.A. Civ. 555, paras. 58-69. 
form of photographs and other graphic displays, but also supplies ample 
reason not to put much faith in such evidence."75 
4. Analysis 
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The art expert in the auction house conventionally uses a range of tools to determine 
attribution, but, as seen, each has a caveat. Among those regularly making attributions, 
the primacy of connoisseurship is acknowledged. 76 Still, the help of scientific testing 
and provenance are appreciated as they can help to reduce doubts and can confirm the 
result of a visual assessment. Of course, it is also possible that the various methods turn 
up contradictory results. 
It is thus misleading to assume that scientific advance and scholarly expertise can solve 
all problems arising in the area of attribution. For many artworks, an absolute attribution 
is not possible. 77 As the excerpt from Schama 's article indicates, this is mainly due to 
the way art has been created over the ages, accompanied by a changing understanding 
of authenticity. This needs to be further investigated in the following section of this 
chapter. If the appraiser in the auction house cannot find a definite answer on a question 
of attribution, such uncertainty must be expressed in the description of the lot in the 
catalogue. 
E. CATALOGUING WORKS OF ART 
In contrast to museums and other art institutions, where attributions are made for 
reasons of scholarship and education/8 the attribution in the auction house is done with 
a view to selling the object. In the auction house, the result of an attribution is used for 
advertising the object to prospective buyers. This is primarily done through the medium 
of the auction catalogue. 
75 Simon Schama, 'Did He Do It? Sleuthing at the Met's Rembrandt Show' in The New Yorker (Issue of 
13 November 1995), pp. 114-118, p. 115 (as quoted in Spencer, 'Authentication in Court', p. 203). 
76 Instead of many: Ronald D. Spencer, 'Introduction' in: Spencer (ed.), The Expert Versus the Object, pp. 
xi-xviii, p. xiii. 
77 See the chapter 'The limits of expertise' in Jones (ed.), Fake?, pp. 291-307. Further below, text 
accompanying n.148 and n.148. 
78 See Christopher Reynolds, 'When the Artist Is Sketchy' in Los ANGELES TiMES, 4 May 2006, col. 1, 
quoting J. Patrice Marandel, curator of European paintings at the Los Angeles County Museum of Art, on 
re-attributions: "You tend to show on your walls the things you believe in, because that's our role with the 
public, to educate with quality, not with question marks." 
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1. The Auction Catalogue and Its Functions 
The result of an attribution sets the basis for the description of a lot in the auction 
catalogue. Catalogue entries usually consist of specific information which characterises 
an object, and of an estimate of the object's value. The purpose of cataloguing is to give 
prospective bidders information that should awaken their interest and allow them to 
decide whether they are going to set a bid or not. At the same time, auction houses use 
their catalogues as a marketing tool to influence groups of buyers and through them the 
outcome of an auction. Since the 1980's, big auction houses started to increase the 
distribution of their catalogues with the intention of directly targeting private buyers, 
among them many who have not invested into art before. 79 After all, increasing the 
audience attending an auction promises better auction results, with the possibility of less 
spectacular consignments also finding buyers. 80 
Both functions of the auction catalogue, providing a description of the lots and 
canvassing for buyers, need to be examined more closely. First, the groups of buyers 
and their expectations of the catalogue will be investigated. Secondly, it will be 
examined whether the information contained in a catalogue can fulfil these expectations. 
This requires an art historic excursus into the perception of authorship, before it can be 
established which information determining the characteristics and value of an art object 
must be expressed in the catalogue to give potential buyers an accurate basis for making 
their personal decision on the object. 
2. The Audience Addressed: Groups of Buyers 
It is still a widespread assumption that buyers of art belong exclusively to the moneyed 
upper classes that purchase art for reasons of patronage and connoisseurship. This is 
only partly true and might be traced to the times when painters and sculptors got their 
artworks commissioned81 from monarchs, the aristocracy and the church, as well as the 
79 See Mason, The Art of the Steal, p.37: "All that was required ... was to convince moneyed folk that 
Sotheby's was the most exciting and congenial place to buy fine art, furniture, rugs and jewelry, and that 
acquiring beautiful objects could improve the quality of their life and social status." 
8
° Compare David Norman, director of Sotheby's Impressionist and Modem department, as quoted in 
Marc Spiegler, 'The Hunt for the Red Collector' in New York Magazine (Issue of 28 August 2006): "If 
you get three to five more bidders on a piece, it completely changes the face of a sale." 
81 See Michelle O'Malley, The Business of Art: Contracts and the Commissioning Process in Renaissance 
Italy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005). 
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wealthy citizens of free cities.82 However, from the nineteenth century, interest in art 
became more widespread, which was paralleled by a greatly increased number of new 
potential buyers. 83 This development was related, of course, to the rise of the 
bourgeoisie and industrialisation. Patronage disappeared and was replaced by the art 
market as we know it today, with art dealers and auction houses getting established.84 
The motivations for buying art were extended by the facet of art as an investment, to be 
traded like any other commodity. 85 Today, the upper end of the market is dominated by 
the new rich made up of businesspeople such as hedge fund managers, bond traders and 
arbitragers who often came to art because of reports of soaring prices. 86 At the same 
time, the constantly growing wealth in the second half of the twentieth century allowed 
an even broader audience to engage their interests and to buy art. The popularity of 
television programmes such as the BBC's Antiques Roadshow demonstrates that the 
purchase and collection of artwork is no longer a privileged entertainment for the 
wealthy only. 87 Finally, the evolution of the market for prints, 88 which are less 
expensive to make and also often cheaper than historical artefacts, has attracted a 
younger and more fashion orientated audience to participate in the art market. It can 
therefore be said that, today, virtually all groups in society are active on the art market. 
As seen, auction houses take regard of this in the way they compete for customers. 89 
However, the shift towards art buyers becoming a more diverse and dynamic group also 
82 To give just one example, Basel hosts the world's oldest municipal art museum, the core formed by a 
collection which was purchased by the city in 1661. 
83 See also ch. 2, 'Origins of the Art Market and Its Significance for the Art Market', p. 7. 
84 This development was further pushed by the shifts in the world economy in the time between the late 
nineteenth century and the Wall Street crash of 1929, when European agricultural revenues collapsed and 
the land-rich families of the European aristocracy, who owned most of Europe's cultural treasures, faced 
economic ruin. The new rich were American industrial magnates and Wall Street titans who bought what 
the Europeans had to sell and so unprecedented quantities of Old Master paintings, sculpture, furniture, 
porcelain, ecclesiastical art pieces, libraries etc. were shipped from Europe to the United States - the art 
work that formed the basis of the great American museum collections we know today. This massive 
transfer was mainly handled by a small group of art dealers, such as Agnew's, Colnaghi, Knoedler and 
Duveen. See Meryle Secrest's biography of Joseph Duveen, Duveen: A Life in Art (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2004). 
85 The first investment fund solely investing into art was established in France in 1904, see James 
Surowiecki, 'Cash for Canvas' in The New Yorker (Issue of 17 October 2005). 
86 See, for example, Landon Thomas Jr. and Carol Vogel, 'A New Prince of Wall Street Uses His Riches 
to Buy Up Art' in THE NEW YORK TIMES, 3 March 2005, p. AI. Further Mason, The Art of the Steal, p. 
51. On other reasons why people engage in buying art, see Merryman and Elsen, Law, Ethics and the 
Visual Arts, pp. 858-861. Just like the American industrialists of the early twentieth century, n. 84, 
Russian oligarchs have recently entered the art market which has lead to the biggest art market boom in 
history, as the traditional buyers in Europe and the United States are still active too, see Joanna Pitman, 
'Will the Boom Never End?' in THE TIMES, 22 August 2006, p.17. 
87 Nuding, 'Saleroom Practice', at 34, speaks of"a mass media age version of the Victorians' notion of 
enjoyable and improving 'education"'. 
88 See on a definition Merryman and Elsen, Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, p. 923. 
89 A further example is Sotheby's 1984 business decision to stop selling objects that are valued below 
thousand US dollars (with the exception of inexpensive objects consigned as part of a larger estate) - a 
decision smaller auction houses hugely benefited from, see Mason, The Art of the Steal, p. 38. 
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went along with potential buyers now presenting a spectrum of knowledge on the 
subject. Even though general knowledge about art has increased, the opening of the art 
market has meant that nowadays people buy art at auction who lack the required 
expertise and experience; and it is this audience in particular who depend on and expect 
from the auctioneer an unambiguous and correct communication of information in the 
catalogue. 
3. Catalogue Description: Authorship as Essential Information on an Object 
When one thinks about the essentials for a description of an artwork in a trade context, 
the question arises which characteristics determine and influence the work's economic 
value. A look at art market headlines quickly reveals that nowadays the authorship of a 
piece of art is to be considered as the foremost characteristic for determining its 
monetary value: rather than referring to the pictured subject of a piece of art, such as for 
example "Study of a Male Torso", "Dora Maar With Cat" or "Small Tom Campbell's 
Soup Can (Pepper Pot)", the market tends to favour to refer to these works as 
"Michelangelo", "Picasso" and "Warhol" first. 90 This shows that in today's market a 
strong relationship is perceived between a piece of art and its creator. In consequence, 
the attribution to a well-known and demanded artist has a great influence on the value of 
an artwork.91 
The notion of authenticity and singularity of artworks has, however, changed through 
time, as well as the understanding of the creative process. This, of course, has an impact 
on the characteristics of art objects from different periods, and must be heeded if the 
conditions for a correct description in the auction catalogue are to be laid out. 
a. Authorship and Authenticity 
Authorship has not always been a central characteristic of a work of art: "concern with 
the creator's hand would seem to be the exception rather than the rule throughout 
90 See the NEW YORK TIMES' headlines: "Michelangelo Drawing Is Headed to Auction Block", 14 
October 2005, p. E33; "A Picasso Sells for $95 Million as Spring Art Auctions Continue", 4 May 2006, p. 
B5; "Warhol and Judd Soar in $143 Million Art Sale", 10 May 2006, p. B4. 
91 See the statement by the London dealer Rory Howard: "Artists like Picasso and Warhol are big brand 
names. So their paintings are like international currency." in Marc Spiegler, 'The Hunt for the Red 
Collector' in New York Magazine (Issue of 28 August 2006). Likewise Paula Weideger, '"Who Dunnit" 
and the Numbers Game' in FINANCIAL TIMES, 26 August 2006, p.8. 
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Antiquity, when the name of the artist, alone, stood for certain pictures or statues. 
Therefore, when copies were made, even at a far later date than the originals, they were 
given the names of the original creators."92 During the Middle Ages, artistic expression 
only served as an auxiliary craft for "giving visual form to the beliefs of church and 
state- to express the ideas ofpatrons."93 Artists were seen as craftsmen who specialised 
in painting or sculpture. 94 Consequently, questions such as about the rarity or the 
authorship of a work of art did not play a role. Artists did not sign their works95 and the 
audience was unacquainted with concepts of originality or of manner and style. 96 This 
understanding only began to change in the middle of the fifteenth century: with 
Humanism, the school of thought underlying the fundamental cultural and social 
changes of the Renaissance, the value of each individual human being was redefined, 
which also allowed artists to put their personal satisfaction and original ideas ahead of 
what their patrons demanded and thus develop art further and shape new, individual 
styles.97 Accordingly, the understanding of art by the patrons slowly began to change: 
beginning with the Renaissance, the uniqueness of the artist's creation as an expression 
of his individual personality came into the foreground, which made authenticity an 
essential characteristic of a work of art. 
Authenticity was at the centre of a dispute as early as 1457: 98 the frescoes for the 
Ovetari Chapel in the church of the Eremitani in Padua had been commissioned by the 
lmperatrice de Ovetari to, inter alia, Andrea Mantegna (1431-1506) and Niccolo 
Pizzolo (1421?-1453) in 1448. 99 When Pizzolo died, Mantegna's share of the work 
became bigger. Still, when it came time for the lmperatrice to pay for the work, she 
refused to compensate Mantegna for his efforts, which resulted in a law suit over 
92 Talley, Jr., 'Connoisseurship', 175, stating that at that point the 'invention' was of more importance for 
the collector than the 'execution' of the art. 
93 Jonathan Jones, 'This Is What Heaven Must Look Like' in THE GUARDIAN, 6 March 2006, pp. G2-6-17, 
8. 
94 Larry Shiner, The Invention of Art (The University of Chicago Press, 200 I), p. 31: "But the artificer, as 
Bonaventura said, was a maker, not a creator. God creates nature out of nothing, nature in tum brings 
£otential being to actuality; the artificer simply modifies what nature has made actual." 
5 Jauregui, 'Rembrandt Portraits', 1954. 
96 Talley, Jr., 'Connoisseurship', 176. 
97 Ernst H. Gombrich, The Story of Art (16th edn, London: Phaidon, 1995), p.315, gives an example of this 
"feeling of proud independence" by quoting from a letter by Michelangelo: "Tell him not to address his 
letters to the sculptor Michelangelo, for here I am known only as Michelangelo Buonarrotti ... I have 
never been a painter or sculptor, in the sense of having kept a shop ... although I have served the popes; 
but this I did under compulsion." 
98 Case quoted by Jauregui, 'Rembrandt Portraits', 1953. See for a translation of the original witness 
statement by Pietro da Milano: Creigthon E. Gilbert, Italian Art 1400-1500: Sources and Documents 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980), pp. 31-32. 
99 See O'Malley, The Business of Art, p. 270 app. 
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exactly how much he was entitled to, depending on the work he did and thus a tacit that 
a work of art is above all the result of its maker's creative activity. 100 This was 
confirmed when another painter, Pietro da Milano, who was called to identify the 
authorship, was able to establish that certain disputed scenes were painted by Mantegna, 
not because "that he the witness saw him painting them, but out of long experience, 
which he has in this art of painting, he knows that these paintings are by the hand of the 
said Master Andrea" - according to Gilbert, in fact, probably the first record of a 
stylistic attribution of a painting. 101 It becomes clear from this case that patrons from 
about this time onwards were paying for the authorship of a work of art rather than for 
the artwork itself. 
As a result, authenticity can be defined as a work of art originating from a particular 
artist. 102 For works whose value depends primarily upon their antiquity regardless of the 
artist's identity, e.g., in the case of furniture and handcrafts, authenticity refers to the 
object originating from a specific culture, period or school. 103 
b. Forgeries 
The authentic object must be distinguished from the forgery. A forgery is an object that 
has been made with the intention of passing it off as the work of a different hand or of a 
different period. 104 Definite forgeries fall into four main categories: 105 the first group are 
100 Gilbert, Italian Art 1400-1500, p.32. 
101 Ibid., p.31. 
102 See for a definition of'authenticity': Spencer, 'Introduction', p. xi. 
103 Nelson Goodman, 'Authenticity' in: Turner (ed.) The Dictionary of Art, vol. II, pp. 834-835. 
104 Hans Tietze, Genuine and False ( 1948), excerpt reprinted in Merryman and Elsen, Law, Ethics and the 
Visual Arts, pp. 940-945, p. 940. 
105 The following taxonomy is supported by section 9 of the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 which 
exhaustively defines eight ways in which a document may be "false" for the purposes of forgery-based 
offences: 
"(I) An instrument is false for the purposes of this Part of this Act -
(a) if it purports to have been made in the form in which it is made by a person who did not in 
fact make it in that form; or 
(b) if it purports to have been made in the form in which it is made on the authority of a person 
who did not in fact authorise its making in that form; or 
(c) if it purports to have been made in the terms in which it is made by a person who did not in 
fact make it in those terms; or 
(d) if it purports to have been made in the terms in which it is made on the authority of a person 
who did not in fact authorise its making in those terms; or 
(e) if it purports to have been altered in any respect by a person who did not in fact alter it in 
that respect; or 
(f) if it purports to have been altered in any respect on the authority of a person who did not in 
fact authorise the alteration in that respect; or 
(g) if it purports to have been made or altered on a date on which, or at a place at which, or 
otherwise in circumstances in which, it was not in fact made or altered; or 
(h) if it purports to have been made or altered by an existing person but he did not in fact exist." 
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copies or exact reproductions that try to imitate an original. 106 The second group are the 
rare fakes without a model, 107 best explained with the famous forgery Christ and His 
Disciples at Emmaus by Han van Meegeren (1889-1947), done in imitation of Jan 
Vermeer (1632-1675): in that painting, van Meegeren adopted the style and technique 
from the least documented period of Vermeer's career and created a completely new 
work which was indeed taken as a so far unknown Vermeer. 108 A third group is formed 
by alterations and additions to an existing work, 109 which includes restorations that 
change the character of a work and the inscription of false dates and signatures. 110 The 
form of pastiche is to be mentioned as a fourth group of forgeries, where the forger 
assembles units from a variety of authentic materials for his own copy. 111 
Yet, the distinction between authentic works of art and forgeries is still too broad to 
illustrate the circumstances that can lead to disappointment on the part of the buyer of 
art. In order to clarify this, an excursus into the workshop routines of the Old Masters 112 
is required. 
c. Routines in the Workshops of the Old Masters 
As Shiner demonstrates, speaking of Renaissance artists as being generally 
"autonomous", "sovereign" or "absolute" would be an exaggeration: most of them still 
worked - without feeling offence to their creative individuality - in cooperation out of 
workshops that fulfilled specific contracts for patrons who still stipulated the terms of 
their commissions, such as the size of the object, its subject matter and the materials. 113 
The manner in which art was created in the times from the Renaissance onwards opens 
up the possibility of a whole range of further variations on the scale between an 
authentic work of art and forgeries as categorised above. They can best be exemplified 
by looking at traditional workshop practices in seventeenth century Flanders and 
Holland. Peter Paul Rubens (1577-1640) and Rembrandt van Rijn (1606-1669), for 
106 Tietze, Genuine and False, p. 941. 
107 Fleming, Authenticity in Art, pp. 7-8. 
108 See Jones (ed.), Fake?, pp. 237-240. 
109 Fleming, Authenticity in Art, p. 8. 
110 See the case of the overpainted Schiele, de Ba/kany v Christie Manson Woods Ltd [ 1997] Tr.L.R. 163; 
THE INDEPENDENT, 19 January 1995. 
111 Fleming, Authenticity in Art, p. 9. 
112 The term "Old Masters" is commonly used to refer to the great European painters from the 
Renaissance up to about 1800. See Gombrich, The Story of Art, pp. 475-476. 
113 Shiner, The Invention of Art, pp. 42-47. See further on the collaboration between patrons and artists, 
the illuminating study by O'Malley, The Business of Art. 
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example, had their studios fully employed with assistants and disciples who were 
working under their supervision and following their instructions: many of them were 
occupied with the task of carefully colouring their master's drawings for the pictures 
after his colour sketches, subsequently to which the master would return to put final 
finishing touches to the paintings. 114 It was also common for assistants to complete 
works by the master's own hand through the addition of staffage or landscapes or other 
accessories to sections that were left blank by the master. Especially with large 
commissions, the master often provided only a drawing and left the minutiae to his 
assistants. 115 Then, there were the joint efforts between specialists. For instance, Jacob 
van Ruisdael (1628?-1682), considered as the pre-eminent landscapist of the Golden 
Age of Dutch art, collaborated with other masters who contributed figures and animals 
to his panoramic views and landscapes. 116 
Ever since early Renaissance times, when materials for drawing and painting became 
more generally available and also dropped in price, copying has become a fundamental 
element in the training of artists 117 - according to Merryman, a time-honoured practice 
with a benign motivation, but still, when the resulting copies are accurate, creating 
confusion and inviting misrepresentation. 118 Indeed, this practice was also designed to 
ensure that students achieved a uniformity of style within a single studio. 119 The masters 
114 See the description of Rubens' studio routine according to Jacob Burckhardt, Recollections of Rubens 
(New York: Phaidon Publishers Inc., 1950), pp. 28-32. 
115 Jauregui, 'Rembrandt Portraits', 1954: "Many of Rembrandt's sitters wore expensive jewellery or lace 
that is often painstakingly recorded in the oils. There is little discernible difference between one pearl and 
the other, or between one ruff and the other. What then would be the point of keeping the master occupied 
with this minutiae when any competent assistant, under the master's direction, could finish the job and 
definitely bring forth the master's creation to the master's specifications?" 
116 See Seymour Slive, Jacob van Ruisdael: Master of Landscape (London: Royal Academy of Arts, 
2005). Cat. 20 (The Great Oak) was painted in collaboration with Nicolaes Berchem; cat. 38 (Stag Hunt 
in a Wood with a Marsh) and cat. 45 (Extensive Landscape with a Ruined Castle and a Village Church) 
are examples for joint efforts between van Ruisdael and Adriaen van de Velde. 
Rubens and Jan Brueghel the Elder (1568-1625) formed another famous working partnership. In a series 
of about twenty-five works, Rubens painted the figures and Brueghel the landscapes, flora and fauna, see 
Anne Woollett (ed.), Rubens and Brueghel: A Working Friendship (Los Angeles: Getty Publishing, 2006). 
117 Jones (ed.), Fake?, 41. 
118 John Henry Merryman, 'Counterfeit Art' in: John Henry Merryman (ed.), Thinking about the Elgin 
Marbles: Critical Essays on Cultural Property, Art and Law (London: Kluwer Law International, 2000), 
pp. 378-430, p. 403. 
119 Jones (ed.), Fake?, 41. See further Christiana J. Herringham (ed. and trans!.), The Book of the Art of 
Cennino Cennini (London: George Allen, 1899), a contemporary manual in which Cennini (c. 1370- c. 
1440) encourages students to copy from the master as" ... daily following him, it will be against nature if 
you do not come close to his manner and style ... ", at p. 22. 
34 
often extensively retouched and corrected their pupils' sketches, passing sheets back 
and forth to stimulate their pupils to imitate their work. 120 
Of course, the masters themselves acquired their bravura only by intensively studying 
the works of other masters. Either works were simply copied, often using different 
materials, or they served as the inspiration for new compositions, with only slight 
variations on the original. 121 It was even common that works of other masters were 
reworked. A famous example is The Feast of the Gods, a painting by Giovanni Bellini 
(1431?-1516), that was later extensively overpainted by the most famous of the 
Venetian painters, Bellini's pupil Titian (1485?-1576), who added a mountain with 
cliffs and an ultramarine blue sky. 122 
The studio routines as described above were publicly stated by the masters themselves. 
In a letter to Sir Dudley Carleton, Rubens described with great care the exact degree of 
authenticity with regard to each single painting he offered in negotiations about a 
purchase. 123 Inter alia, he used the following degrees of authenticity: "Original by my 
hand"; "Original by my hand, and the eagle done by Snyders"; "Original, by my hand, 
except a most beautiful landscape, done by the hand of a master skilful in that 
department"; "begun by one of my pupils, after one which I did in a much larger size ... 
but this one, not being finished, would be entirely retouched by my own hand, and by 
this means would pass as original"; "begun by one of my pupils, after one that I 
made ... but all retouched by my hand"; "done by the best of my pupils, and the whole 
retouched by my hand". 124 
120 See for example the training of artists as it is described for Michelangelo's studio in Hugo Chapman, 
Michelangelo Drawings: Closer to the Master (London: The British Museum Press, 2005), pp. 192-202, 
esp. cat. 59 ("Draw Antonio draw Antonio, draw and don't waste time") and cat. 60 ("Andrea have 
patience"). 
121 Jones (ed.), Fake?, 43. 
122 David Jaffe (ed.), Titian (London: National Gallery Company Ltd., 2003). Titian's modifications did 
not happen with the intention of covering up Bellini's original authorship, thus making it a forgery, but to 
harmonise the painting with other decorations that were added to the owner's favourite room in which the 
painting hung, see cat. 15 and pp. 101-111. This example also sheds light on a Renaissance patron's 
attitude towards art. Today, with Bellini being regarded as one of the greatest painters, altering his work 
would not be tolerated. Back then, a work of art was seen as personal property with a decorative purpose, 
and with the owner having the freedom of changing it at will. 
123 Letter from 28 April 1618. See Ruth Saunders Magum (ed. and trans!.), The Letters of Peter Paul 
Rubens (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971 ), pp. 59-61. 
124 Ibid. 
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d. Perception of the Concept of Authorship 
It is important to state that at the time of their creation such joint efforts were 
appreciated in the context of having come from the workshop of the master. As 
described, the scope of style afforded to artists increased as time went on. But it was 
usually only the leading masters, whose skills were supreme, who had the freedom to 
express new ideas and thus develop art further. 125 They also acquired the most 
important commissions; patrons, though, knew that works commissioned to a famous 
master were likely to be produced collaboratively, but they were satisfied with this, as a 
work coming from a studio still had the master's "seal of approval" and conformed to 
his standard of excellence. 126 
The perception of authorship and therewith authenticity only changed towards the end 
of the eighteenth century, when, with the birth of Romanticism, our modem idea of the 
artist took shape. As a movement, Romanticism pulled away from the rationalism of the 
preceding era of the Enlightenment and put an emphasis on individual inspiration and 
feeling. 127 Romantic artists rejected the idea that great art depended on adhering to long 
established models: genius was innate and the artist should follow his own vision, even 
if that meant isolation from society. 128 Only with the Romantic era, the process of 
creation, and therefore the figure and status of the artist, started to be accorded an 
importance it has not yet shaken off. 129 The re-evaluation of art that went along with 
this movement, making art the individual creation of inspired outsiders, combined with 
the consequent emphasis on attribution by nineteenth century art historians such as 
Morelli, created an art market in which what an image represented became less 
important than when, where and by whom it had been made. 
125 Gombrich, The Story of Art, p. 503. 
126 See Jauregui, 'Rembrandt Portraits', who gives the example of Marie de Medici's commission of the 
Medici-cycle to Rubens and his studio - 24 canvasses so monumental in scale and composition that they 
"obviously" could not have been completely painted by Rubens without the help of assistants, at 1957 and 
n.IO. 
127 Kieran, Revealing Art, p. 46. 
128 Gombrich, The Story of Art, p. 503. See further on the glorification of artists as nonconformists: 
Alexander Sturgis eta/., Rebels and Martyrs: The Image of the Artist in the Nineteenth Century (London: 
National Gallery Company Ltd., 2006). 
129 Jauregui, 'Rembrandt Portraits', 1956. 
36 
e. Art Market Consequences: Attribution Problems 
The standards developed during Romanticism still govern contemporary art market 
expectations. In today's market environment, the key test is no longer whether a work 
of art has aesthetic qualities but whether it is an original work, thus explaining what 
Jauregui calls an "obsessive interest" in knowing who painted even the smallest details 
in a work. 130 As the previous discussion tries to explain, this disregards the reality of the 
art production process of previous, non-Romantic periods where a different 
understanding of authorship dominated. 131 
Unsurprisingly, the flowing transitions from authentic works of art, created from 
beginning to end by one artist, collaborative efforts and studio works, and copies 
through to forgeries, are the reason for art experts facing such immense difficulties 
when they set out to establish the oeuvre of a particular artist and when they have to 
make definite and precise attributions. A review of recent press reports will show this. 
The most ambitious project in the area of attribution, the previously mentioned 
Rembrandt Research Project, which is endeavouring to determine a corpus of authentic 
works by Rembrandt, still regularly hits headlines with the results of its research: in 
January 2006, a painting that had previously been rejected to be by Rembrandt and 
thought to be by one of his students instead, headed for the auction block as a newly 
authenticated work by the master himself. 132 For many years, experts were puzzled by 
the dark fur collar of the Elderly Woman in a White Bonnet reflecting the light falling 
from behind the sitter instead of absorbing it - something Rembrandt, who was known 
as the "painter of light", would not have gotten wrong. Scientific examinations then 
revealed that the fur collar had been added about a century later to make the sitter look 
130 Ibid., 1957. 
131 An area where the pre-romantic concept of authorship is accepted by contemporary scholars is French 
furniture from the seventeenth and eighteenth century: Under the ancien regime, all trade was subject to 
strict control through specialist guilds. Every trade had its own guild. At that time, fine furniture design 
demanded gilt-bronze mounts. But the cabinet-makers, or ebenistes, did not have the right to design, cast, 
chase or gild such mounts. They had to commission this work to the bronziers and become the owner of 
the models. Aware of the strict regulation, scholars of French furniture do not try to attribute parts of one 
piece of furniture to one or the other master of the particular workshops involved, but attribute the pieces 
to the person principally responsible for their creation, thus acknowledging that the work as a whole 
would not exist without the maitre-ebeniste, "a sort of manager of talent, and an artist in his own right." -
see Jauregui, 'Rembrandt Portraits', n. 22, and further John Whitehead, The French Interior in the 
Eighteenth Century (London: Laurence King, 1992), p. 41 and F.J.B. Watson, Louis XVI Furniture 
(London: Alec Tiranti, 1960), pp. 62-66. 
132 Carol Vogel, 'A Storied Rembrandt Goes to a Mystery Bidder' in THE NEW YORK TIMES, 27 January 
2006, p. E31. 
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more like a lady and make the painting more saleable. After removing the overpainting, 
uncovering a whitish collar, the reflections made sense and the painting could 
unmistakably be classified as an oil study Rembrandt did to experiment with the issue 
of light. 133 In the same way, scholars from the Rembrandt Research Project do not 
hesitate to rigorously de-attribute paintings that have previously been admired as 
Rembrandts, the most spectacular cases being the downgrading of the Frick Collection's 
Polish Rider in 1984 and the Gemaldegalerie Berlin's Man With The Golden Helmet in 
1985. 134 
In 2005, Scotland's most loved painting, The Skating Reverend, was in the spotlight, 
when the curator of the National Portrait Gallery in Edinburgh presented striking 
evidence 135 that the painting could not be by the Scottish master Sir Henry Raeburn 
(1756-1823), but by a little known French painter instead. 136 Similarly, severe doubts 
have been expressed about the National Gallery's celebrated purchase of The Madonna 
of the Pinks in 2004. This painting has traditionally been attributed to Raphael (1483-
1520), but eminent Raphael scholars have since pointed out that the painting displays 
too many infelicities to be from the hand of the master, and criticise the National 
Gallery for having spent twenty two million pounds without first having established its 
authenticity using modem methods. 137 
The list of Old Master paintings left in attributional limbo could be continued at will. It 
is especially in American museums, which have the most advanced technologies for 
scientific analysis available, that collections get continuously reassessed. 138 Problems of 
attribution, though, are not limited to the works of Old Masters. For example, 
previously unknown works supposed to be by Jackson Pollock (1912-1956) recurrently 
133 See on a more detailed account: Carol Vogel, 'The Case of the Servant With the Fur Collar' in THE 
NEW YORK TIMES, 22 September 2005, p. E I. 
134 On this case, as well as further demoted paintings previously attributed to Rembrandt: Richard Cork, 
'The Old Masters That Weren't: Authentic Rembrandt?' in THE TIMES, 14 March 1992, p. 19. 
135 The evidence is based on stylistic analysis and historical research. There have been doubts about the 
attribution to Raeburn for a long time, but what stopped experts from making any headway was that no 
one knew who else the painting could be by. The starting point thus was to investigate which other 
portraitists were in Edinburgh at the time of the painting's creation, then applying their style and 
technique on the portrait under investigation. See Stephen Lloyd, "'Elegant and Graceful Attitudes": The 
Painter of the "Skating Minister'" (2005) 147 The Burlington Magazine 474-486. 
136 Shirley English, 'Scots Icon Is Skating on Thin Ice' in THE TIMES, 4 March 2005, p. 3. 
137 Alasdair Palmer, 'A Lot of Pounds for a Few Pinks' in THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, 23 October 2005, p. 
R5. 
138 Julia M. Klein, 'The Barnes Revises Attributions of Old Masters' in THE NEW YORK TIMES, 27 August 
2005, p. B7. Further Samir S. Patel, 'Museums Use New Tools to Fix Old Works' in THE NEW YORK 
TIMES, 5 July 2005, p. F3. 
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emerge in the United States, causing fierce controversies between experts about their 
authenticity. 139 
On the other hand, the tightening of attribution standards in the post-Romantic era can 
be seen as a sign of art history progressing. For instance, the results of the revision of 
Rembrandt's entire work have led to enhanced reputations for some of his students, 
such as Carel Fabritius (1622-1659) or Willem Drost (1633-1659), who are now 
appreciated in an individual light. 
However, especially for the works of the Old Masters, the change in definition which 
led to the downgrading of many previously celebrated masterworks can have dramatic 
consequences. Questioned works where no new unambiguous attribution can be made 
will forever remain marked by the stigma of accusation, in the worst case making them 
unsaleable. 140 As a matter of fact, a de-attribution also results in a significant drop of the 
monetary value of the work affected. 141 This might have lesser consequences for works 
owned by museums, as they are usually unmarketable anyway. From a private owner's 
point of view the situation looks different, though. Here, the art expert who writes an 
attribution sets a commercial system to work. The drop in value alone, if it emerges that 
an object does not stem from the name previously given to it, is sufficient proof for 
showing that the matter of attribution is most essential for the merchantability of an 
artwork. 
f. Conclusions for the Description of Lots in the Catalogue 
Bearing all this in mind, it needs to be answered what specifications about the art 
objects presented in the auction catalogue are required if accurate information is to be 
139 See on the find of32 paintings supposed to be by Pollock in a metal storage bin in Wainscott, N.Y., in 
2003: Randy Kennedy, 'Is This a Real Jackson Pollock?' in THE NEW YORK TIMES, 29 May 2005, p. 2.1, 
and 'Computer Analysis Suggests Paintings Are Not Pollocks' in THE NEW YORK TIMES, 9 February 
2006, p. El. On the theft of an unauthenticated Pollock in 2005: Paul Vitello, 'The Case of the Purloined, 
Unauthenticated Pollock' in THE NEW YORK TIMES, 14 February 2006, p. El. 
140 On this and further implications, see Peter Landesman, 'A Crisis of Fakes: The Getty Forgeries' in The 
New York Times Magazine, 18 March 2001. For instance, La Belle Ferroniere, the painting in the centre 
of the lawsuit Hahn v Duveen 133 Misc. 871, 234 N.Y.S. 185 (Sup.Ct. N.Y.Co. 1929), remains unsold. 
See Secrest, Duveen: A Life in Art, p. 243, and further n. 57 above. 
141 In case of an object being identified as a forgery, it becomes "virtually worthless". This art market fact 
has been acknowledged in May v Vincent (1990) 154 J.P. 997 and in Har/ingdon & Leinster Enterprises 
v Christopher Hull Fine Art [ 1991] I Q.B. 564, at 583. For the downgrading of a work, see Sarah Jane 
Checkland, 'Who drew the Michelangelo?' in THE TIMES, 6 July 1991, quoting Leo Steinberg: "A lot of 
money is involved. If a drawing is by Michelangelo, it would sell to the Getty for $1 million or $2 million; 
if by one of his followers, such as Condivi, you would be lucky to get £500 for it." 
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conveyed to potential bidders. For unlike other areas of trade, private law in England 
does not provide definitions or guidelines that are specifically drafted for transactions in 
art. 142 Instead, as we shall see in the next chapter, English law treats works of art like 
any other tangible property. 143 
So long as there are no legally binding guidelines, lawyers have to draw on the practice 
in the art trade and make it the basis for their legal assessment. If there is material doubt 
as to the description or the dating of a work of art offered for sale at auction, good 
auctioneering practice requires the auctioneer to articulate the doubt in suitable terms. 144 
The glossaries which the two leading auction houses of Sotheby's and Christie's use in 
their catalogues are identical in essence. In both, different levels of attributional 
certainty are distinguished, which take the characteristics of historical artefacts into 
account. These sets of qualifications allow for catalogue descriptions with an exactly 
defined meaning and give the bidder at auction an exact idea of what they can expect. 145 
Christie's distinguishes seven categories: 
"A work catalogued with the name(s) or recognised designation of an artist, 
without any qualification, is, in our opinion, a work by the artist. 
In other cases, the following expressions, with the following meanings are 
used: 
142 Especially typical areas of consumer sales are governed by very detailed regulations as to the quality 
and fitness of particular types of goods, for instance those supplied for public consumption in the Food 
Safety Act 1990. The reason for regulating this area is that consumer protection is regarded high in this 
area and a permanent control and supervision by the authorities is required to provide and enforce this 
protection. See Patrick S. Atiyah, John N. Adams and Hector MacQueen, The Sale of Goods (11th edn, 
Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2005), pp. 288-290. 
143 An in depth discussion of the common law and statute governing transactions in art follows in chapter 
4. Tax legislation must also be considered. The Value Added Tax Act 1994 contains a provision on works 
of art in s. 21 (5) and (6). However, this provision is only applicable in the context of relief from value 
added tax on the importation of works of art and is not directly helpful. The Value Added Tax Act 1994 
counts, inter alia, paintings, drawings, collages and any original engravings, lithographs or other prints 
among works of arts (s. 21 (6)(a)-(h)). More detailed, paintings and drawings belong to works of art 
relieved from tax when they were executed by hand (s. 21 (6)(a)). The age, style, or artist's technique do 
not matter to qualify for this purpose, nor does the authorship. For engravings, lithographs and other 
prints the tax relief is granted when they were produced from one or more plates executed by hand by an 
individual who executed them without using any mechanical or photomechanical process (s. 21 (6)(b)). It 
does not matter whether the prints were signed by the artist. See David R. Harris, Michael McGarvey and 
Andrew Young, 'Value Added Tax' in: Lord MacKay of Clashfern (ed. in chief), Halsbury's Laws of 
England (4th edn, London: Butterworths, 2005), Vol. 49( 1 ), paras. 119 and 132. 
144 See Thomson v Christie Manson & Woods Ltd. [2005] E.W.C.A. Civ. 555, para. 73. 
145 Some argue that these definitions would still be misleading, see Charlotte Higgins, 'The Auction 
House, the Fashion Designer, and the £78,000 Refund' in THE GUARDIAN, 8 November 2006. 
'Attributed to ... ' in our opinion probably a work by the artist in whole or in 
part. 
'Studio of .. .'; 'Workshop of .. .' in our opinion a work executed in the 
studio or workshop of the artist, possibly under his supervision. 
'Circle of ... ' in our opinion a work of the period of the artist and showing 
his influence. 
'Follower of .. .' in our opinion a work executed in the artist's style but not 
necessarily by a pupil. 
'Manner of .. .' in our opinion a work executed in the artist's style but of a 
later date. 
'After ... ' in our opinion a copy (of any date) of a work of the artist." 14~ 
Further, it is specified that: 
"'Signed .. .'; 'Dated .. .'; 'Inscribed .. .' in our opinion the work has been 
signed/dated/inscribed by the artist. The addition of a question mark 
indicates an element of doubt. 
'With signature ... '; 'With date ... '; 'With inscription ... ' in our opinion the 
signature/date/inscription/stamp is by a hand other than that ofthe artist."147 
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In answer to the question above it can thus be said that a simple classification of 
especially old master paintings into "authentic" and "fake" only is not feasible. 
Absolute certainty is not always possible. 148 The previous analysis has shown that what 
matters is what the particular object pretends to be, that is, with what attribution and 
description it enters the market. What matters is whether the description accorded to the 
work is objectively correct or whether the work in fact departs from this description. 
In the course of this it must be admitted that a description can only be based on the art 
historic and scientific knowledge available and generally accepted for use at the time 
146 See 'Explanation of Cataloguing Practice' as stated in: Auction Catalogue 5819 -Impressionist and 
Modern Art, South Kensington, 27 October 2005. 
147 Ibid. 
148 See above, D. 4., p. 26; further: Peter H. Karlen, 'Appraiser's Responsibility for Detennining Fair 
Market Value: A Question of Economics, Aesthetics and Ethics' in: Briat (ed.), International Sales of 
Works of Art, pp. 667-705, p. 680; Robyn Sloggett, 'The Truth of the Matter: Issues and Procedures in the 
Authentication of Artwork' (2000) 5 Art Antiquity and Law 295-303, 298; Ernst van de Wetering, 'Thirty 
Years of the Rembrandt Research Project: The Tension Between Science and Connoisseurship in 
Authenticating Art' (2001) 4/21FAR Journal, 14. 
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when the description is written. 149 Of course, new scientific processes can establish new 
certainties at a later point in time. However, when it comes to assessing the description 
attached to a work of art one has always to look to the knowledge then current when it 
entered the market, which in the case of an auction will be the time when it is held. 150 
F. SUMMARY AND RESULT 
Issues relating to the attribution of works of art are immensely complex. This is because 
they hang on a complex resolution between the creative processes of artists, both past 
and present, and the overburdened expectations of authenticity and value that arise 
when works of art enter the modem market. 
The auctioneer of art stands in the centre of this conflict. As the discussion in this 
chapter has shown, the position and function of the auctioneer is not merely one of a 
neutral intermediary who arranges for the confluence of supply and demand. Rather, he 
is processing the works consigned for a sale by attributing and valuing them. The result 
of this process is then communicated to potential buyers via the description of the goods 
in the auction catalogue. This description forms a key feature of the buyer's decision 
when setting a bid. Considering the problems that can arise during the attribution 
process one is justified to say that "no aspect of auctioneering is so fraught with 
potential hazard as the application of descriptions to lots to be sold."151 
On the one hand, the auctioneer has to be vigilant so as not to fail to describe a lot to its 
full potential, since undercataloguing to produce a "sleeper", such as in the case of 
Luxmoore-May v Messenger May Baverstock, may give rise to a breach of a duty of 
care to the vendor-consignor. On the other hand, there is the danger of overdescribing 
objects which may result in liabilities towards the buyer at auction. Here, the analysis of 
the problems arising from the attribution of especially old master paintings has shown 
that the question of "authentic" I "fake" becomes less important in the light of the 
question of whether the attribution and description of the object offered is correct. The 
never ceasing process of re- and de-attribution, which is an intrinsic risk in relation to 
historic works of art, does not allow the establishment of an everlasting definition of 
authenticity. The pragmatic solution of legal disputes over issues of attribution should 
149 See above, D. 2., pp. 22-23; further: Karlen, 'Fakes, Forgeries and Expert Opinions', p. 244. 
150 Acknowledged in Thomson v Christie Manson & Woods Ltd. [2005] E.W.C.A. Civ. 555, para. 78. 
151 Harvey and Meisel, Auctions Law and Practice, para. 5.13. 
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thus follow the practice of the art market and waive this criteria to base attribution on 
the description attached to an object at the time ofthe auction sale instead. 
To what extent the art auctioneer is liable to the purchaser for his services, especially to 
what extent he is liable for the description of lots in the catalogue, is the subject matter 
of the next chapter. 
4 
Holding Auctioneers Accountable 
for Describing Works of Art: 
Duties and Liabilities Owed to the Purchaser 
43 
The sale of works of art at auction has changed dramatically over the past couple of 
decades. From previously being wholesale businesses which supplied art dealers with 
stock, auction houses have grown to multinational corporations which market art 
directly to the public. It has become obvious in the preceding chapter that the auctioneer 
is deeply involved in the transaction of art objects from the vendor-consignor to the 
purchaser at auction. As the character of auction houses and the course and workings of 
art auctions have changed, it is questionable whether the traditional application of the 
laws of agency, contract and tort, which primarily govern auctions, are still capable of 
regulating the complex relationships in which the art auctioneer is involved. 
A. CONCEPTUAL OUTLINE 
The concern of this chapter is the duties and liabilities of the art auctioneer owed to the 
purchaser with regard to the description of lots made in the course of an auction. In the 
context of an auction, three significant relationships exist from which disputes about 
attributions normally arise: the relationship between the seller-consignor and the 
auctioneer; the relationship between the seller-consignor and the buyer; and the 
relationship between the auctioneer and the buyer. The last relationship is of particular 
interest. In contrast to sellers of art, buyers have less freedom of choice when entering 
the art market. Sellers have the option to consign their artworks to an auctioneer, to sell 
them through a dealer, or to conduct a sale on their own. In a market for goods whose 
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main characteristic is their uniqueness, the potential buyer thus must deal in the setting 
the seller has chosen. 1 
In the auction situation, it is undisputed that the auctioneer's role is primarily that of an 
agent for the seller-consignor.2 The seller at auction obtains legal protection with regard 
to misconduct by the auctioneer, such as misrepresentations, from, inter alia, the agency 
relationship that exists between him and the auctioneer, because the auctioneer owes to 
him a duty of care and skill and fiduciary duties. 3 The question is, however, whether the 
buyer of a work of art through such an intermediary receives an equal protection against 
possible misconduct, if any at all. 
This question is of such importance because the catalogue description, for which the 
auctioneer is responsible, forms a key feature for the potential buyer's decision to 
engage in the bidding or not. After authentic works of art have become established as an 
investment vehicle and auction sales an important method for acquiring and evaluating 
that investment, the problems of the buyer who finds out that the object purchased at 
auction is defective have become more severe and urgent, as a misattribution usually 
results in a significant financial loss. 
Still, there are only a few decisions spread across English case history that confront the 
issues of the liability of the auctioneer who sells an incorrectly attributed work of art. It 
can be assumed, though, that many such cases are settled out of court because neither 
the deceived buyer nor the auction house have an interest in making a case of a disputed 
attribution public, due to embarrassment and fear of getting "bad press".4 A survey of 
the existing case law reveals a considerable variety in the reasoning of those cases 
which makes it difficult to distinguish any sort of consistent authority. Further, the 
courts seldom clearly differentiate between the various doctrinal bases which underlie 
1 Jorge Contreras, 'The Art Auctioneer: Duties and Assumptions' (1991) 13 Hastings Communications 
and Entertainment Law Journal 717-7 51, 731. 
2 Lynde! Prott and Patrick O'Keefe, Law and the Cultural Heritage: Volume 3 - Movement (London: 
Butterworths, 1989), para. 601. This role is usually also emphasized by auction houses in their terms and 
conditions of trade, see for example, Condition 1 of Christie's Conditions of Sale: 'Except as otherwise 
stated Christie's acts as agent for the seller. The contract for the sale of the property is therefore made 
between the seller and the buyer.'; Condition l(b) of Sotheby's Conditions of Business for Buyers: 'As 
auctioneer, Sotheby's acts as agent for the Seller. A sale contract is made directly between the Seller and 
the Buyer.' See also ch.3, text accompanying n.8. 
3 A detailed account of the capacity, the authority, the duties and the liabilities of the auctioneer in 
relation to the vendor-consignor can be found in Brian W. Harvey and Franklin Meisel, Auctions Law and 
Practice (3'd edn, Oxford University Press, 2006), chs. 3 and 5. 
4 Kai B. Singer, "'Sotheby's Sold Me a Fake!"- Holding Auction Houses Accountable for Authenticating 
and Attributing Works of Fine Art' (2000) 23 Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 439-455, 443. 
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the suits of the disappointed buyer. Here, the analysis of the law is further complicated 
by the use of conditions of sale which always accompany auction sales. 
In attempting to establish a conceptual framework governing the auctioneer's liabilities 
to the disappointed buyer with regard to disputes over attribution, the following 
structure has been chosen: the chapter will conduct a detailed review of the relevant 
case law as to how the courts have decided to allocate responsibility and risk in the 
misattribution context. The structure of the chapter is prescribed by the general legal 
regime governing auction sales: after an examination of the auctioneer's liability on the 
contract of sale and possible independent contractual liabilities, the chapter will turn to 
an investigation of the auctioneer's liability to the buyer in tort. The chapter will end 
with an analysis of the conditions of business usually employed by auction houses in 
relation to buyers and finally make an excursus to possible compensation claims under 
criminal statute. 
Once an account of the current legal regime has been given, conclusions can be drawn 
on whether the level of responsibility for misattributions by auctioneers is adequate. 
Finding that the law puts auction houses in a position of unjustified superiority over 
buyers, theoretical alternatives under which auction house accountability for erroneous 
attributions may be strengthened can be discussed. This will be done in chapter 5. 
B. LEGAL TREATMENT OF DISPUTES OVER ATTRIBUTION: 
THE CURRENT REGIME GOVERNING THE LIABILITIES OF THE AUCTIONEER TO 
THE PURCHASER 
As said, 5 an auctioneer predominantly acts as an agent for a principal who is interested 
in selling goods via auction. The most important effect of the agency agreement 
between the seller and the auctioneer is that it enables the auctioneer to make a contract 
of sale between his principal and a third party, here the successful bidder at auction.6 
When an auctioneer is acting as the seller's agent, liabilities to the buyer can arise in a 
variety of ways. Not all of them are relevant with regard to disputes over attribution. 
5 See text accompanying n. 2 and n. 2 above. 
6 Franklin Meisel, 'Auction' in: Lord MacKay of Clashfem (ed. in chiet), Halsbury's Laws of England 
(4th edn, London: Butterworths, 2003), Vol. 2(3), para. 207. 
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The following examination will concentrate on those circumstances under which a 
liability for misattributions may arise. First, the legal situation for possible liabilities 
arising from the contract of sale the auctioneer has arranged for will be considered. 
Next, liabilities under specific contractual arrangements besides the contract of sale will 
be explored. Finally, the examination will turn to the law of tort, in particular to 
liabilities arising in tort for negligent misrepresentation. 
1. Liability on the Contract of Sale 
The general effect of a disclosed agency agreement, where the agent is acting within his 
actual or apparent authority, is that an agent is neither liable under, nor entitled to 
enforce, a contract which he makes on behalf of his principal: 7 by reason of the fact that 
he is acting as an agent, the agent does not have a contract with the third party. Because 
an agent owes a duty of care to his principal in relation to the transaction on which he is 
employed, 8 and if there has been a breach by the agent of this duty to his principal, for 
example in form of a contractual misrepresentation for which the principal becomes 
accountable, then it is possible for the third party to recover from the principal, and for 
the principal to recover from the actual person at fault, the agent.9 The agent, however, 
is not directly liable to the third party upon the contract. In an agency situation, claims 
based upon misrepresentations by auctioneers are usually brought directly against the 
principal. There are, however, two exceptions that are of significance in the auction 
context. 
a. Undisclosed Principal 
Where the agency is undisclosed at the time of the contracting, the existence of the 
principal will not be obvious to the third party. The contract therefore is, objectively 
7 Francis Reynolds, Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency (18th edn, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), 
para. 9-001; Guenter Treitel, The Law of Contract (I lth edn, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003), p. 732. 
Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency, paras. 6-015-6.022. 
9 Notwithstanding matters of solvency. Cf wording of Hobhouse LJ in McCullagh v Lane Fox & 
Partners Ltd [1996] P.N.L.R. 205, CA, at 226. 
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interpreted, made between the agent and the third party. Consequently, the agent is 
personally liable and entitled to sue on the contract. 10 
In relation to auctions, one might argue that an auctioneer can never sell for an 
undisclosed principal, because it is necessarily implied in the conduct of business of an 
auctioneer that he acts as an agent, which is known by the party bidding at auction. 
However, it is settled that there is no objection to an auctioneer also being allowed to 
sell his own property at an auction. 11 In such a case the auctioneer sells as a principal in 
his own right and becomes a party to the contract of sale with the fall of the hammer. 12 
Still, a case of an undisclosed principal is nowadays unlikely to happen at an art auction. 
While the general rule of the auctioneer acting as an agent is usually always clearly 
stated in the terms of trade applying to a sale, 13 it is also common usage to attach 
symbols to lots which indicate when the auction house has any ownership interests in 
the property that is up for sale, so that there is no room for uncertainty. 
b. Disclosed but Unidentified Principal 
More problematic is the situation where the agency is disclosed but not the identity of 
the principal. This is a circumstance that is very common especially at art auctions. 14 
Due to the values at stake, not only sellers, but also buyers often prefer to remain 
unidentified. This desire can be easily fulfilled with the secrecy an auction sale offers. 15 
10 See Siu Yin Kwan v Eastern Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 2 A.C. 199, PC, 207; Boyter v Thomson [1995] 2 
A.C. 629, HL, 632. At the point when the principal is disclosed the third party may elect whether to 
proceed against the agent or against the principal, so that the agent's personal liability may continue after 
the principal's existence becomes known, see Clarkson Booker Ltd v Andjel [1964] 2 Q.B. 775, CA. 
Further Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency, para. 9-012 and authorities cited there. 
11 Flint v Woodin (1852) 9 Hare 618. 
12 See on possible liabilities of the auctioneer in that situation briefly below, 4.a., pp. 84-87. 
13 See n. 2 above. 
14 Typical descriptions in auction catalogues where the principal remains unidentified are, for example, 
"Various properties"; "Property from a private European collection"; or "Property from an estate". 
15 This practice has come under scrutiny in the recent case of Rachmaninoffv Sotheby's and Eva Terenyi 
[2005] E.W.H.C. 258, QBD, where Tugendhat J pointed to the "dark side to the confidentiality 
surrounding the identity of an auctioneer's principal." Namely that "[t]he public and the law have 
increasingly come to recognise the potential for abuse by criminals of works of art, and of those who deal 
in them (consciously or unconsciously), for money laundering, and for disposing of the proceeds of 
crime. The less the legal risks involved in committing a work for auction, the more attractive the market 
in works of art and manuscripts becomes for criminals.", at para. 35. See also note by Norman Palmer, 
'Keeping the Score- The Rachmaninoff Claim and the Circumspection of Auction Houses' (2005) 10 Art 
Antiquity and Law 317-324, who welcomes that the judge "placed transparency above confidentiality in 
his evaluation of the relative rights of the parties", at 322. 
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Whether an agent of a disclosed but unnamed principal becomes liable upon a contract 
cannot be answered in the same clarity as in the case of an undisclosed principal. It has 
been suggested in Teheran-Europe Co. Ltd v S. T Belton (!'rae tors) Ltd that in an 
ordinary commercial transaction a willingness on the side of the third party to enter into 
a contract with the principal, notwithstanding who he is, may be assumed by the agent 
in the absence of other indications. 16 Reynolds points out that this would sometimes be 
an "improbable construction to put on the situation", because, at the other end of the 
spectrum, the facts may give rise to the conclusion that the third party deals only with 
the agent. In such a case the agent's position in relation to his principal (of whose 
existence the third party knows from the start) would be disregarded. 17 
In N & J Vlassopolus Ltd v Ney Shipping Ltd (!'he Santa Carina), 18 Lord Denning 
favoured a middle course suggested in para. 321 of the American Restatement of the 
Law of Agency, 19 which states that: "Unless otherwise agreed, a person purporting to 
make a contract with another for a partially disclosed principal is a party to the 
contract." However, this general proposition has been rejected by the Court of Appeal in 
The Santa Carina case in respect of unwritten contracts,20 and in the Supreme Court of 
Canada in respect of a written contract.21 
Reynolds thus argues that the courts should be willing to adopt a prima facie rule 
(applicable to both written and unwritten contracts) making the agent liable together 
with the unnamed principal unless it is absolutely clear that the person concerned acted 
solely as an agent.22 Such a prima facie rule would help to avoid the confusion 
previously created by the courts by wrongly classifying unnamed principal cases as 
undisclosed principal cases with the intention of preventing the agent escaping from 
personalliability.23 
16 [I968] 2 Q.B. 545, per Dipiock LJ, at 555. 
17 Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency, para. 9-0I6. 
18 [I977] I Lloyd's Rep.478,CA,at481. 
19 Restatement of the Law Second, Agency (St. Paul, Minn.: American Law Institute, 1958). Excerpt of 
para. 32I in Len Sealy and Richard Hooley, Commercial Law: Text, Cases and Materials (3rd edn, 
London: Butterworths, 2003), p. I67. 
20 [I977] I Lloyd's Rep. 478, CA, at482. 
21 Chartwel/ Shipping Ltd v Q.N.S. Paper Co Ltd [I989] 2 S.C.R. 683; (1989) 62 D.L.R (4th) 36. 
22 Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency, para. 9-0I6. 
23 Ibid. 
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The case law involving auctions goes into this direction. In the case of Benton v 
Campbell Parker & Co,24 it has been presumed, quite contrary to the Teheran-Europe 
case, that a purchaser would only be willing to contract with an unknown principal if 
the auctioneer made himself personally liable, if called on, to perform the contract 
which he arranged for his principal.25 On the basis of this presumption, the principle 
applied in previous auction cases26 on the question was restated by Salter J, namely that: 
"Where an agent purports to make a contract for a principal, disclosing the fact that he 
is acting as an agent, but not naming his principal the rule is that, unless a contrary 
intention appears, he makes himself personally liable on the authorised contract."27 
However, in the same section Salter J interprets this liability of the agent to perform the 
contract which he arranged for his principal as quite limited:28 
"But where the agency, as in this case, is an agency for the sale of a specific 
chattel, which the buyer knows is not the property of the agent, it seems to 
me impossible to presume that the buyer, who contracts to buy that chattel 
from the principal, would stipulate that the agent, if called on, shall himself 
sell the chattel to the buyer and shall himself warrant his own title to a thing 
which the buyer knows is not his. It is impossible to presume that the agent 
would agree to undertake such a liability. The only way in which he could 
discharge it would be by acquiring the chattel from his principal, a thing he 
has no right to demand and a thing inconsistent with the contract he has 
been instructed to make, by which the principal sells that chattel to the 
buyer. For this reason I think that the presumption above mentioned is 
rebutted in the case of a sale of a specific chattel by an unknown agent for 
an undisclosed principal." 
What, then, is the extent of the personal liability of the auctioneer? This question has 
been considered by Williams J in the earlier case of Wood v Baxter:29 
24 [1925] K.B. 410. 
25 Ibid., at 414. 
26 Hanson v Roberdeau (1792) Peake 120; Franklyn v Lamond (1847) 4 CB 637. 
27 Benton v Campbell Parker & Co [ 1925] K.B. 410, at 414. 
28 Ibid., at 415. 
29 (1883) 49 L T 45, at 46. 
"What is the character and extent of the contract entered into by the 
auctioneer when he sells without disclosing the name of his principal? ... 
[I]t would certainly be going too far to say that an auctioneer, selling 
without disclosing the name of his principal, makes himself a contracting 
party in the same way and to the same extent that another agent acting for an 
undisclosed principal does. The auctioneer sells, not as an owner having a 
right to sell by virtue of his own right of property, but as an auctioneer 
empowered and entrusted by his employer to sell. If he is selling livestock 
or implements in the market place or furniture in a room, the extent of his 
contract would ordinarily be to deliver the goods to the buyer; ... if he was 
selling timber stacked in a yard ... or growing crops on a farm, it would be 
in each case to give such constructive delivery as according to the nature of 
the subject matter was practical and usual. Upon making such delivery, his 
obligation would ordinarily be fulfilled." 
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It follows from this dictum30 that the duty of performance is limited to a delivery of the 
goods sold at auction. This duty to deliver, however, does not arise from the contract of 
sale. Rather, it is the other side of the coin that gives the auctioneer the right to sue for 
the price. This right to sue for the price is from a contract quite separate from the 
contract of sale, as stated in the Benton case: 
"These rights and liabilities do not arise from the contract of sale which 
binds only the buyer and the principal. They arise from the contract which 
the auctioneer makes upon his own account with the buyer ... The duty to 
deliver and the right to receive the price are usually expressed in the 
conditions of sale. But whatever its terms may be, the contract is entirely 
independent of the contract of sale."31 
Harvey and Meisel conclude from this that if the duty to deliver is the correlative of the 
right to sue for the price, 32 then it would be obvious that the liability of the auctioneer 
should not extend beyond this duty to deliver.33 If the buyer is unable to take recourse 
from the auctioneer for any want of title, as seen in the Benton case, then it is also 
3
° Con finned in Benton v Campbell Parker & Co [1925] K.B. 410, at 416. 
31 Ibid., at 415. Treitel, Law ofContract, p. 738, qualifies this agreement as a collateral contract. 
32 According to Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency this right of the auctioneer is traditionally said to be 
based on his lien over the goods, at para. 9-023. 
33 Auctions Law and Practice, para. 5.124. 
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impossible for the buyer to have recourse against the auctioneer if the goods are 
defective. Interestingly, this result arises quite independent of considerations about the 
importance ofthe seller's identity. 
Still, Harvey and Meisel point to the fact that if the auctioneer fails to identify an 
unnamed principal, the buyer will be unable to bring any actions against the seller/4 
which would speak for making the auctioneer personally liable where he declines to 
name the vendor. However, this obstacle can be overcome by an action for discovery.35 
As Harvey and Meisel sum up, an action for discovery against the auctioneer would 
even be justified in cases where the buyer would otherwise be unable to bring an action 
against the seller-consignor for a breach of implied terms under the Sale of Goods Act 
1979?6 
c. Result 
In summarising the above discussion, the following conclusion can be drawn: the 
liability of the auctioneer in disputes over attribution can hardly be established upon the 
contract of sale which he has arranged for his principal, the seller at auction. This 
follows from the application of general rules of the law of contract and the law of 
agency: in a disclosed principal situation, it is apparent to the buyer that the counter-
party of the contract is the principal and not the agent. A situation where the existence 
of a principal remains completely unknown to the buyer, which would result in the 
agent becoming the counter-party of the contract of sale, is very unlikely to happen at a 
modern auction, due to auction houses taking the necessary precautions in their 
descriptions of lots, namely whether they are being sold for a principal or as own 
property of the auction house, so that there remains no room for uncertainty. 
The interesting question then is whether a liability might arise in the case very common 
at auctions where the agency is disclosed but the identity of the principal remains 
unknown to the buyer. In so far, a general rule to the effect that the agent is liable on 
the contract he has arranged for the principal has not emerged.37 The tendency in the 
34 Ibid., para. 5.125. 
35 Ibid., based on the principle laid down in Norwich Pharmacal v Customs and Excise Comrs [1974] AC 
133, [1973] 2 All E.R. 943, HL, that an action for discovery can also be brought against a non-party-
which the auctioneer would be in claims other than for non-delivery. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Cf Treitel, Law of Contract, p. 734. 
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case law goes towards establishing such a liability. However, with regard to auctions, 
this liability has been held to be quite limited and in no case extending beyond a 
liability for non-delivery - a result that, again, follows from the application of general 
principles of the law of contract. It can thus be concluded that the liability for a false 
statement about an auctioned chattel generally lies with the seller-consignor rather than 
with the auctioneer, as a liability upon the contract of sale is not established in that 
respect in any of the cases typical in the agency context of an auction. 
2. Independent Contractual Liability of the Auctioneer 
It has been shown in chapter 3 that auctioneers ensure that they have sole discretion as 
to the description of lots in the catalogue, and it has been concluded that this 
description is of overwhelming importance from the buyer's point of view.38 
Considering the above, it can be said that the auctioneer finds himself in a comfortable 
situation: buyers are induced to rely on the auctioneer for the description of goods 
offered. In case the buyer develops doubts about whether that description has been 
correct at a later point, he can only take recourse against the seller-consignor, which, as 
has been seen, is especially difficult in cases where the seller remained unnamed. 39 
It is probably also in an effort to mitigate this asymmetry40 that the leading auction 
houses include in their standard conditions a provision that the auctioneer will set aside 
a sale and refund the amount paid to the buyer if it is shown under certain limited 
circumstances that the lot is not authentic.41 The nature and scope of such provisions 
came under scrutiny in the case of de Balkany v Christie's, which requires a close 
analysis. 
38 See above, ch. 3, text accompanying n. 43. 
39 There might also situations occur where the buyer does not want to try for the seller, for example 
because of jurisdictional difficulties. 
40 Brian W. Harvey, 'Problems of Identity and Description in the Saleroom' (1995) 46 Northern Ireland 
Legal Quarterly 423-433, argues, at 427, that the reason for such provisions might be to mitigate the 
effect of the other terms of trade which are largely excluding any responsibilities on the auctioneer's or 
seller's side as to authenticity questions. 
41 In the case of Sotheby's, this provision is called "Authenticity Guarantee", see Condition 4(a) of 
Sotheby's Conditions of Business for Buyers; Christie's terminology is "Limited Warranty", see 
Condition 6 of Christie's Conditions of Sale. 
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a. De Balkany v Christie 'i2 
The facts in de Balkany v Christie's were as follows.43 In 1987, Madame de Balkany, a 
Swiss collector, bought a painting for £500.000 plus a ten per cent buyer's premium44 
at a Christie's auction in London. She was delighted because she believed that the 
picture was, according to the catalogue description, by the Austrian expressionist Egon 
Schiele (1890-1918), "signed with initials" and "painted in 1908". Before the painting 
carne up for auction, it was displayed on permanent loan in the Kunsthaus Ziirich, one 
of the most reputable and well-known art museums in Switzerland, where it was 
exhibited as a painting by Schiele. In 1990, however, a new catalogue raisonne of 
Schiele's paintings was published which expressed considerable doubts regarding the 
authenticity of the painting in question. Having learned about these doubts, Mme de 
Balkany complained to Christie's in 1991 under their conditions of sale. By reason 
thereof, a buyer has five years from the date of purchase to exercise the right to return a 
forged painting and to rescind the contract. The painting was then sent to another expert 
whose examination revealed "ill-matched over-painting" and concluded that the 
painting must be subjected to chemical and spectographical tests. 
This evidence was given in the High Court in 1994, after Mme de Balkany had sued 
Christie's for the purchase price, claiming that the painting was a forgery. There, 
Morison J found that an unknown person had extensively overpainted what had 
previously been on the canvas. Although clearly far from certain, Morison concluded, 
"on a balance of probabilities" that the original painting (i.e., the underpainting), was 
by Schiele. However, some time after Schiele's death in 1918, 94 per cent of its surface 
area had been overpainted. Christie's argued that no amount of overpainting could 
make the painting a forgery if the overpainter followed the design of the original artist 
and reproduced as best as he could the original colours used by the artist. Yet, for the 
judge, this case was distinguished from other restoration cases because of the addition, 
by the unknown overpainter, of the blue initials "E" and "S" in the left and right hand 
comers of the painting. Schiele's original mauve monogram, which could be seen by X-
ray, consisting of the initials "E" and "S" intertwined, had been overpainted with black. 
The judge reasoned that a restorer who simply overpaints, to a greater or less extent, is 
42 [1997] Tr.L.R. 163; THE INDEPENDENT, 19 January 1995. 
43 See for certain aspects of the case already above, ch. 3, text accompanying ns. 41 and 68. 
44 See on reasons for the introduction of a buyer's premium by British auction houses from 1975 onwards: 
Christopher Mason, The Art of the Steal (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2004), pp. 69-74. 
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not seeking to deceive. By adding the blue E and S initials over the black paint which 
covered Schiele's mauve monogram, however, the overpainter sought to deceive 
viewers that the initials were painted by Schiele. 
Having summarised these facts, Christie's Conditions of Business now needed to be 
analysed to assess their effect. The forgery condition at that time read as follows: 
"A. 11. Guarantee 
(b) if, within five years of the date of the auction, (1) Christie's has notice in 
writing from the Buyer of any Lot that in his view the Lot is a Forgery, (2) 
within fourteen days of such notice, Christie's has the Lot in its possession 
in the same condition as at the date of the auction, and (3) within a 
reasonable time thereafter, the Buyer satisfies Christie's that the Lot is a 
Forgery and that the Buyer is able to transfer a good and marketable title to 
the Lot free from any liens or encumbrances, Christie's will set aside the sale 
and refund to the Buyer any amount paid by the Buyer in respect of the Lot 
provided that the Buyer shall have no rights under this Condition if: 
( 1) the catalogue description at the date of the auction was m 
accordance with the then generally accepted opinion of scholars or 
experts or fairly indicated there to be a conflict of such opinion; or 
(2) it can be established that the Lot is a Forgery only by means of a 
scientific process not generally accepted for use until after 
publication of the catalogue or by means of a scientific process not 
generally accepted for use until after publication of the catalogue or 
by means of a process which at the date of the auction was 
unreasonably expensive or impractical or likely to have caused 
damage to the Lot; 
(c) The Buyer shall not be entitled to claim under this Condition for more 
than the amount paid by him for the Lot and, in particular, shall have no 
claim for any loss, consequential loss or damage whether direct or indirect 
suffered by him;" 
Further, the term "Forgery" as used in the Conditions of Business was to have the 
following meaning: 
" a Lot made or substantially made with an intention to deceive as to 
authorship, origin, date, age, period, culture or source which is not shown to 
be such in the description in the catalogue and which at the time of the 
auction had a value materially less than it would have had if it had been in 
accordance with the description."45 
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Morison J had no difficulties in identifying that Christie's had incurred independent 
direct contractual liability to the buyer with their forgery condition: "Christie's do not, 
vis-a-vis the buyer, simply act as an agent for a named principal. Thus, for example, if 
the painting is a forgery it appears to be Christie's who take the risk, if it is discovered 
after the seller has been paid the price. In other words, Christie's contracts both as agent 
and principal." It appears that the judge constructed this independent contract as a 
bilateral contract because the buyer gave consideration in the form of the buyer's 
premium, in exchange for the auctioneer's promises contained in the Conditions of 
Business.46 
The question then was whether the forgery condition applied in the circumstances, 
which was, as Morison J clarified, a question of contractual construction47 rather than 
one of evidence capable of contributing to the academic debate, based on the explicit 
definition of forgery Christie's provided in their Conditions. Therefore, bringing the 
addition of the new monogram under the definition provided, Morison J had no 
problems in concluding that the painting was a forgery. 
Still, Christie's argued that they were not obliged to compensate the buyer because the 
plaintiff did not act within reasonable time as required under Condition 11. And further 
that they would be exculpated because their catalogue description was in accordance 
with the then generally accepted opinion of scholars, and, for this reason, the buyer 
would have lost her rights under the forgery condition. Both objections were rejected. 
As to the first point, the judge confirmed that the plaintiff acted promptly after she had 
become aware of the new catalogue raisonne. That Christie's remained unconvinced 
over a long time that the painting was a forgery was simply because of the view they 
45 Then Condition C. 7. 
46 Cf Norman Palmer, 'Misattribution and the Meaning of Forgery: The de Balkany Litigation' (1996) 1 
Art Antiquity and Law 49-58, at 56. Harvey and Meisel, Auctions Law and Practice, para. 5.126. 
47 See Palmer, 'Misattribution and the Meaning of Forgery', 50. 
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had advanced of what a forgery as used in the contract would be. Any time that would 
be reasonably required for a buyer to persuade the defendant through a court process 
would be included in the "reasonable time" provided for in Condition 11. 
As to the second point, the judge was satisfied that any competent art dealer or 
auctioneer would have been able to tell that the picture had been substantially 
overpainted and that the initials had been put on afterwards if a careful inspection had 
been made.48 Interestingly, the reliance on the "state of the art" exceptions would have 
only been available for Christie's if they had been able to show that they took 
reasonable care in their attribution. The defences only worked where Christie's neither 
knew, nor should reasonably have known, that the work was a forgery. 49 That, however, 
had not been the case. 
Because the plaintiff had proved that the painting was a forgery within the meaning of 
Christie's Conditions, and the exceptions under this Condition were not available to 
relieve Christie's of liability, the repudiation of Mme de Balkany's complaint by 
Christie's meant a straightforward breach of contract and she was entitled to the refund 
of the money she had paid. 50 
b. Result 
The practice of auction houses of including anti-forgery conditions in their terms of 
trade overrides common law and creates a contract between the buyer and the auction 
house which provides the disappointed buyer of a forgery with a contractual remedy. 
Due to wide reaching exculpatory clauses usually included in such provisions, the 
circumstances under which they become effective are very limited. The reason of 
liability in the de Balkany case was quite narrow, based on the judge's understanding of 
the definition of forgery as expressed by Christie's being wider in scope than that for 
48 This was the conclusion from the expert evidence heard in the court, whereof one witness stated that 
virtually all that was visible was the restorer's work and that he would have "dismissed the painting out of 
hand." See also above, ch. 3, n. 41. 
49 Palmer, 'Misattribution and the Meaning of Forgery', 51 and at 54, interpreting the exculpatory 
provisions: "No measure of scholarly opinion in support of an attribution will therefore by itself exonerate 
an auction house if other circumstances should reasonably have alerted it to the contrary. Such other 
circumstances will conventionally include, it seems, the availability of the work for ultra violet or other 
physical examination. It follows that if, for some reason, the exculpatory provisions ... do not operate, the 
auctioneer who fails to take such active verificatory measures as are reasonably within his capability is 
answerable for an unwarranted attribution." 
50 In an obiter dictum, the judge also considered whether Christie's had any liability to the plaintiff in tort. 
An examination of this part of the judgment follows below, pp. 64-68. 
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which the auction house had contended. 51 Also, as a result of the de Balkany litigation, 
both, Christie's and Sotheby's further tightened their warranties in 1995.52 Compared to 
the bulk of exclusion clauses usually contained in the conditions of business, these 
voluntary provisions cannot be considered as a far reaching attempt of self governance. 
3. Liability to the Buyer in Tort 
It has been stated above that an auctioneer who is acting within his authority does not 
incur liabilities which arise out of the contract of sale he has arranged for his principal. 
This must also apply to statements53 made by the auctioneer during the course of 
contractual negotiations: if an agent acts within the scope of his authority, it must be the 
principal upon who the liability for misrepresentations in contract will fall, where that 
contract was entered into on the basis of a false statement made by the agent. 
a. Dogmatic Distinction of Tortious Liability 
And indeed, in Resolute Maritime Inc v Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (/'he Skopas),54 it was held 
that it is the principal and not the agent, upon whom the statutory liability for 
misrepresentations arising from section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 falls. 55 
The question posed there, as a preliminary point of law arising out of the sale of a ship, 
was as follows: if an agent, A, makes a negligent representation to B as a result of 
which B enters into a contract with A's principal, can B use section 2(1) to found a 
cause of action against A? Mustill J answered this question with "no", relying, first, on 
51 Palmer, 'Misattribution and the Meaning of Forgery', 54. Further, even in case of the wider 
understanding, forgeries are rare, ibid. 
52 See Harvey, 'Problems of Identity and Description in the Saleroom', 433. Sotheby's now use the term 
"counterfeit" rather than "deliberate forgery" in their Authenticity Guarantee, which is defined as " ... an 
imitation created to deceive as to authorship, origin, date, age, period, culture or source ... " and provide 
that "No lot shall be considered as counterfeit by reason only of damage and/or restoration and/or 
modification work of any kind (including repainting or over-painting)." Christie's current provision 
appears to be even more cautious, warranting under Condition 6 Limited Warranty as follows: " ... that 
any property described in headings printed in UPPER CASE TYPE . . . in this catalogue . . . which is 
stated without qualification to be the work of a named author or authorship, is authentic and not a forgery. 
The term 'author' or 'authorship' refers to the creator of the property or to the period, culture, source or 
origin, as the case may be, with which the creation of such property is identified in the UPPER CASE 
description of the property in this catalogue." Further, it is clarified that the warranty does not apply to 
any supplemental material which appears below the upper case type headings and any responsibility for 
any errors or omissions in such material is explicitly excluded. The five-year period remains in both 
cases. 
53 Notwithstanding the legal nature of such statements in the context of transactions of art. See on this 
question below, 4.a., pp. 84-87. 
54 [1983] 1 W.L.R. 857, QBD (Comm). 
55 Ibid., at 861. This has been recently confirmed in favour of an auctioneer in Morin v Bonhams & 
Brooks Ltd [2003] E.W.H.C. 467, QBD (Comm}, at paras. 42 and 43. 
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the fact that a principal was clearly liable for the representations of his agent and, 
secondly, on the draftsman's intention to fill a gap which existed in the remedies of one 
contracting party for an innocent representation by the other. 56 
The judge also found that such a gap did not exist in relation to the agent. Although it 
has been stated above that the general rule is that an agent drops out of any contract 
made on behalf of his disclosed principal, this does not mean that the mere fact that a 
person acts as agent allows him to escape from all liabilities to the third party. Or, as 
Lord Scarman put it in Yeung Kai Yung v Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp: 57 
"It is not the case that, if a principal is liable, his agent cannot be. The true 
principle of law is that a person is liable for his engagements (as for his 
torts) even though he acts for another, unless he can show that by the law of 
agency he is to be held to have expressly or impliedly negatived his personal 
liability. "58 
While the agent's exculpation under the section 2( 1) Misrepresentation Act 1967 
liability functions because the rule only applies where the negligent misstatement results 
in a contract between the party making the representation and the party receiving it, 
such agency based exculpation is not possible for actions that give rise for a liability in 
tort. 
Tort liability differs from contract liability. It is in general no defence for a tortfeasor to 
prove that he acted under the authority of another. Rather, the general rule is that an 
agent, who causes loss or injury to a third party through a wrongful act (or omission) 
while he is acting on behalf of his principal, is personally liable, regardless of whether 
he is acting with the authority of his principal or not, to the same extent as if he were 
acting on his own behalf. 59 
56 [1983] 1 W.L.R. 857, QBD (Comm), at 860 and 861. 
57 [1981] A.C. 787, PC. 
58 Ibid., at 795. 
59 See, for example, for the tort of deceit Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corpn 
(Nos 2 and 4) [2003] 1 A.C. 959, HL; for the tort of negligence for misrepresentation McCullagh v Lane 
Fox & Partners Ltd [1996] P.N.L.R. 205, CA. See further Janet Ulph, Commercial Fraud (Oxford 
University Press, 2006), paras. 8.19 and 8.20. Further, Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency, para. 9-112. 
This does not mean, however, that agency is excluded in tort altogether. See on the principal's vicarious 
liability in the law of tort: ibid., paras. 8-176 and following. 
59 
Equally, an auctioneer cannot rely on the fact that he is acting as an agent when he 
makes statements during the course of an auction. While he may not find himself liable 
to the buyer for contractual misrepresentations under the common law or statute, he may 
still face common law liabilities under the tort of deceit and the tort of negligence for 
misrepresentations. 
The circumstances under which a liability of the auctioneer particularly m tort of 
negligence can arise are most complex and require careful consideration. 
b. Tort of Deceit 
An action in tort for deceit is straightforward to construct: such action requires a false 
statement made by the defendant with intent to defraud the claimant, who acts on it and 
suffers damage as a result.60 To be liable in deceit, it is required that the defendant had 
acted fraudulently. In Derry v Peek,61 Lord Herrschell explained: " ... fraud is proved 
when it is shewn that a false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without 
belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false". 62 
Problematic is that for deceit to be committed there must be a false representation of 
fact. The mere representation of an opinion is not sufficient.63 This requisite can make 
the remedy inadequate for buyers of art: as will be discussed below,64 statements on the 
authenticity of art are regularly qualified as expression of an opinion only, 65 so that the 
remedy would fail. The requisite can be overcome, though, as it has been held that when 
the person rendering what is an "opinion" has special knowledge, a person relying on 
the statement may do so as if it were a statement of fact. 66 
However, notwithstanding the legal nature of statements on traded goods in the context 
of art transactions, it is upon the claimant to show that the defendant did not honestly 
believe that what he said was true. As Harvey and Meisel put it: "If [the defendant] did 
60 Pasley v Freeman (1789) 3 Tenn. Rep. 51. 
61 (1889) L.R. 14 App. Cas. 337. 
62 Ibid., at 374. 
63 John Cooke, Law ofTort (5th edn, Harlow: Longman, 2001), p. 325. 
64 See below under 4.a., pp. 84-87. 
65 The decision in Jendwine v Slade (1797) 2 Esp. 572 established the traditional approach to this issue 
and has been confirmed for the auction context only recently by the Court of Appeal in Thomson v 
Christie Manson & Woods Ltd. [2005] E.W.C.A. Civ. 555, para. 161, referring back to para. 188 of Jack J 
[2004] E.W.H.C. 1101, QBD. 
66 Esso Petroleum Co Ltdv Mardon [1976] Q.B. 801, CA. 
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have that honest belief, however foolish, credulous or negligent he might have been, he 
will not be liable to the [claimant] for deceit." It is obvious that the buyer at auction will 
rarely ever be able to prove that the auctioneer acted with the intention to deceive. 
c. Tort ofNegligence for Misrepresentation 
The real liability of the auctioneer with regard to attributions, in most cases, will be for 
negligence. 
( 1) Preliminaries 
Under the famous doctrine of Derry v Peek (1889, HL), a mere negligent representation 
was ruled not to entitle the claimant to recover his damages. However, this doctrine was 
reversed in 1963 by the House of Lords in its opinion in Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd v 
Heller & Partners Ltd.67 It was stated there that a duty of care was the foundation of the 
tort of negligence and it was established that such duty could also be violated by a 
misrepresentator who, though not being linked to the injured party in contract, was in a 
"special relationship" with him obliging the misrepresentator to exercise reasonable care 
when giving his information and advice. In the words of Lord Morris:68 
"My Lords, I consider that it follows and that it should now be regarded as 
settled that if someone possessed of a special skill undertakes, quite 
irrespective of contract, to apply that skill for the assistance of another 
person who relies on such skill, a duty of care will arise. The fact that the 
service is to be given by means of or by instrumentality of words can make 
no difference. Furthermore, if in a sphere in which a person is so placed that 
others could reasonably rely on his judgment or his skill or upon his ability 
to make careful inquiry, a person takes it upon himself to give information 
or advice to, or allows his information or advice to be passed on to, another 
person who, as he knows, or should know, will place reliance upon it, then a 
duty of care will arise." 
The precise circumstances under which a special relationship will be held to exist were 
doubtful for some time after the ruling in Hedley Byrne. A clarification came when the 
67 [1964] A.C. 465. 
68 Ibid., 502-503. 
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case of Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon69 was decided by the Court of Appeal in 1976. 
In that case, the Court ruled that a mere negligent representation could give rise to a 
claim in contract as well as in tort and that the "special relationship" justifying such 
action in tort could result from the trust placed by the injured party upon the 
information, advice or opinion given by the misrepresentator. It was held by Lord 
Denning MR: 70 
"A professional man may gtve advice under a contract for reward; or 
without a contract, in pursuance of a voluntary assumption of responsibility, 
gratuitously without reward. In either case he is under one and the same 
duty to use reasonable care: ... in the one case it is by reason of a term 
implied by law. In the other, it is by a reason of a duty imposed by law. For 
a breach of that duty he is liable in damages; and those damages should be, 
and are, the same, whether he is sued in contract or in tort." 
In summary, it can be said that a special relationship incurring liability exists whenever 
someone possessed of special skill undertakes to apply it for the assistance71 of another 
who relies upon it. 
However, when considering the tort of negligence for misrepresentation, one must bear 
in mind that the courts have always taken a cautious approach to claims for pure 
economic loss (as opposed to physical damage),72 because of, inter alia, the risk of 
exposing a defendant to limitless claims and limitless liability. The law on this subject is 
still at an early stage of development. In particular, a theory of liability has still not 
emerged in this area.73 It is arguable, however, that certainty is required in this area of 
law, if only to guide the indemnity insurance market. 
69 [1976] Q.B. 801, CA. 
70 Ibid., 820. 
71 I.e. a "voluntary assumption of responsibility". 
72 Cf Norman Palmer, 'The Civil Liability of the Professional Appraiser or Attributer of Works of Art 
under English Domestic Law' in: Quentin Byrne-Sutton and Marc-Andre Renold (eds.), L 'expertise dans 
Ia vente d'objets d'art: aspects juridiques et pratiques (ZUrich: Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag, 
1992), pp. 19-36, p. 32. 
73 Cooke, Law of Tort, p. 67 and pp. 87-89, pointing to the problem whether this form of liability 
represents a change in the doctrine of privity of contract in cases which are "equivalent to contract", or 
whether it is an expansion of the tort of negligence into the area of pure economic loss (the former 
making the scope of liability narrow, the latter massively expanding the scope of negligence liability). 
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(2) The Tort in the Auction Context 
Yet the principles of the tort as mentioned above, if applied to the auctioneer, would 
make him liable as to all persons who, trusting upon his description in the catalogue, 
suffer a loss, provided he has acted negligently when preparing his appraisal. The 
auctioneer who has assisted the seller-consignor of an object of art in the sale of such an 
object may be sued by the buyer for the damages sustained by him if and in so far as the 
auctioneer has carelessly prepared a false description which has led the buyer into the 
bad deal. 
Interestingly, there is little authority on the question of an auctioneer's liability to the 
buyer for negligent misrepresentations under the principles of Hedley Byrne. One reason 
for this may be that buyers will usually prefer to take recourse against the seller, as the 
seller's liability in cases of negligent misstatement of the auctioneer as his agent is 
easier to establish: the seller is in a contractual relationship with the buyer and, under 
section 2(1) ofthe Misrepresentation Act 1967, it is for the seller positively to disprove 
negligence, whereas in the law of tort the burden of proof is on the buyer. 74 Conversely, 
the rules under the law of tort may be more advantageous in certain circumstances, 
especially when rules on limitation come into play. 75 
Considering the individual requirements necessary for establishing the tort, the 
difficulty in the auction context cannot lie in an absence of a "special relationship" 
between auctioneer and buyer. Following Harvey and Meisel, there can be little doubt 
that an auctioneer finds himself in a position that results in a "special relationship" with 
the buyer at auction. 76 As the following review of the case law will show, the 
controversy seems to arise from the more complicated question of the standard which 
the auctioneer should be held to in relation to the duty of care. 
74 Harvey and Meisel, Auctions Law and Practice, para. 5.145. 
75 Cf Ruth Redmond-Cooper, 'Time Limits in Art and Antiquity Claims' (1999) 4 Art Antiquity and Law 
323- 346, 341. 
76 Auctions Law and Practice, para. 5.145. 
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(a) Hoos v Weber17 
The first case to refer to, although it is not about an action in tort, is Hoos v Weber, 
which was decided before the Court of Appeal in 1974. In this case, a personal liability 
ofthe auctioneers was not at stake, rather, the circumstances were about the effect of the 
auctioneers' conduct on the rights of their principal (the seller): the defendant bought a 
painting auctioned by Sotheby's as a Rembrandt self-portrait. On the day following the 
auction, doubts about the painting's authenticity were published in a newspaper article, 
and the defendant subsequently refused to accept delivery. He argued that Sotheby's 
had not taken proper care in their catalogue description because they did not consult the 
(at that time newly established) Rembrandt Research Project, which later confirmed the 
doubts of the trade mentioned in the newspaper article. On the basis of this, the 
defendant resisted the seller's action for the price. He referred, inter alia, to the opening 
statement of the Sotheby's catalogue, stating that: 
"Care is taken to ensure that any statement as to authorship, attribution, 
origin, date, age, provenance and condition is reliable and accurate but all 
such statements are statements of opinion and are not to be taken as 
statements of representation or fact. Sotheby & Co. reserve the right, in 
forming their opinion, to consult and rely upon any expert or authority 
reasonably considered by them to be reliable." 
Lord Denning MR found that this statement was an express assumption of a duty of care 
by Sotheby's. However, he could not find want of care in Sotheby's preparation of the 
catalogue description: in the statement they had expressly reserved the right to consult 
and rely on those persons whom they considered reliable. So they were not bound to 
consult the Rembrandt Research Project. In Sotheby's opinion, the painting was by 
Rembrandt. Nevertheless they did in the catalogue draw attention to doubts expressed 
by the Rembrandt scholar Professor Gerson: 
"Rembrandt's authorship of the picture is accepted by all the authorities 
mentioned in the bibliography with the exception of Gerson." 
77 THE TIMES, 5 October 1974. A transcript of the judgment can be found as enclosure 4 in Joe A. Och, 
'Sotheby's- Anatomy of an Auction House' in: Pierre Lalive (ed.) International Sales of Works of Art 
(Geneva: Institute oflntemational Business Law and Practice, 1985), pp. 251-281. 
64 
According to Lord Denning MR that was enough to conclude that Sotheby's had 
produced the catalogue "honestly and fairly": 
"Any sensible buyer bidding for this picture in sums of this magnitude, 
ought to have consulted Gerson. I do not know whether Mr. Weber did or 
not. If he did, he would be perfectly aware of the doubts. If he did not, he 
has only himself to thank. In any case, he had the advantage - the very 
considerable advantage- of having Sotheby's opinion themselves. In their 
opinion, it was a work by Rembrandt." 
While this is a clear enforcement of the principle of caveat emptor in the auction 
context, the court did not, unfortunately, determine what extent of details is to be given 
in a catalogue description to satisfy the duty of care. Here, Sotheby's had warned as to 
Gerson's doubts. Thus it became unnecessary for the court to decide whether there is, in 
general, an obligation to disclose in a catalogue description that other scholars have a 
different opinion on an object to that concluded and expressed in the catalogue by the 
auction house. 78 
(b) De Balkany v Christie's 79 on Liability in Tort 
In the case of de Balkany v Christie's, there was also an allegation made against 
Christie's that they had a liability to the plaintiff in tort. Mme de Balkany argued that 
Christie's had voluntarily undertaken responsibility to her for the exercise of reasonable 
care in the making of their attribution. Since this attribution was inaccurate, caused by 
negligence on the side of Christie's, they would be concurrently liable to her in tort. 
Because of the success of the contractual claim as analysed above, it became 
unnecessary for the judge to formally decide on this question. 80 Still, Morison J felt 
obliged to say something on this topic, which was at this point obiter. 
78 This question has now been considered in the recent case of Thomson v Christie Manson & Woods Ltd. 
[2005] E.W.C.A. Civ. 555, see discussion below, pp. 72-80. See further on an art seller's duty to inform: 
Carolyn Olsburgh, Authenticity in the Art Market (Leicester: Institute of Art and Law, 2005), p.37. 
79 [1997] Tr.L.R. 163; THE INDEPENDENT, 19 January 1995. 
80 As stated before, it would normally be easier for the claimant to proceed an action against the seller in 
respect of the defect description of the lot given by the seller's agent, the auctioneer. In this case, the 
seller was not sued at all, though, which left the auctioneer the only target. Here, the circumstances gave 
the exceptional possibility of an action in contract, as the Condition could be qualified as a contractual 
one, so that the remedy did not depend on a sophisticated analysis whether there was a duty of care where 
only economic loss results, which is part ofthe law of tort. See discussion of this case above, pp. 53-57. 
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Based on Hedley Byrne, Morison J summarised that the following principles were to be 
applied: 81 the judge acknowledged that a voluntary assumption of responsibility existed 
as a distinct and independent basis for a duty of care in tort. In the words of the judge, 
''there is no necessity for any further inquiry as to whether it is 'fair, just or reasonable' 
to impose such liability". Further, the judge accepted that an assumption of 
responsibility may be negatived by an appropriate disclaimer: "Clear words are needed 
to exclude liability in negligence." 
Morison J then turned to the question of whether Christie's had assumed responsibility 
to the plaintiff for making the statements in the catalogue with due care and skill. For 
the purpose of this, the judge first looked at the question generally, leaving aside the 
effect of any disclaimers. In a very comprehensive paragraph he identified the reasons 
which were in his opinion material for regarding Christie's as having undertaken a 
responsibility in tort for the accuracy of their attribution. Palmer disentangled and 
summarised the judges' reasoning in his analysis of the case and enumerated five facts 
which are set out here in extenso: 82 
"1. The special nature and position of Christie's, as compared to the role of 
ordinary auctioneers. An ordinary buyer at auction has no reason to suppose 
that the auctioneer, who is the seller's agent, is assuming any responsibility 
towards the buyer, and becomes contractually bound by the auctioneer's 
conditions only when his/her bid is accepted. 
2. The fact that Christie's reserve to themselves, in their dealings with 
potential sellers, the sole discretion as to the manner in which a lot is to be 
described, and maintain a skilled staff whose task it is to ensure the accuracy 
of catalogue entries. 
3. The fact that Christie's cataloguing practice allows considerable latitude 
for margins of qualification where this is thought necessary. 
4. The fact that the foregoing circumstances are known generally to buyers. 
Buyers at Christie's know that Christie's will have satisfied themselves as to 
the authenticity of a lot which is attributed without qualification. 
81 Relying on the clarifications of Hedley Byrne by Lord Goff in the House of Lords' decisions in Spring 
v Guardian Assurance pic and others [1994] 3 W.L.R. 354, HL and Henderson and others v Merrett and 
others [1994] 3 W.L.R. 761, HL. 
82 See Palmer, 'Misattribution and the Meaning of Forgery', 53. 
5. The imposition of the buyer's premium. Buyers like Madame de Balkany 
pay substantial sums to auction houses for the privilege of buying at auction. 
As the judge implied, for what is this payment made, if not in return for 
some assumption of responsibility on the part of the auctioneer?" 
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Morison J stated that it was primarily because Christie's take sole responsibility for the 
catalogue description and because the buyer pays a premium that he was inclined to 
upheld a duty of care on the basis of voluntary assumption of responsibility, such that 
Christie's became, prima facie, liable to a buyer for negligent misstatement in the 
catalogue entry. 
However, referring to the numerous Conditions in the terms of trade which excluded 
Christie's responsibility for ''the correctness" of any statement of description, his 
conclusion was that Christie's had effectively disclaimed any responsibility which they 
might otherwise have assumed or undertaken. The judge did not regard this conclusion 
as satisfactory because it meant that a buyer had got nothing of substance for his 
premium. This last finding was later criticised as an "oddity"83 as the judge refrained 
from a discussion of whether any such disclaimer should not first be assessed for 
reasonableness under the terms of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. A full 
consideration of this issue cannot be made in the present context.84 However, it needs to 
be mentioned that it was made clear in a number of cases, but particularly in the House 
of Lords' decision in Smith v Eric S Bush,85 that the Act does catch disclaimers which 
try to bypass the statutory obligation to show reasonableness by claiming to exclude the 
relevant duty of care rather than liability for breach of such a duty, as was the case in 
the Conditions employed by Christie's. 86 
In the present context, the important point of de Balkany v Christie 's remains the fact 
that, absent the disclaimers, the court was prepared to regard Christie's as having 
voluntarily assumed a duty of care. As said, the judge mainly based his reasoning on 
Christie's charging a buyer's premium and the auction house's sole responsibility for 
the catalogue description. These two arguments concern specific points in the way 
83 Harvey, 'Problems of Identity and Description in the Saleroom', 432. See also criticism by Palmer, 
'Misattribution and the Meaning of Forgery', 55. 
84 The problem of the reasonableness of conditions of business will be discussed further below, 4., pp. 83-
92. 
85 [1990] I A.C. 831, HL. 
86 See Palmer, 'Misattribution and the Meaning of Forgery', 55. 
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auction houses conduct business nowadays, and, for this reason, they certainly weigh 
heavily when it comes to identifying a voluntary assumption of responsibility in a 
. l 87 part1cu ar case. 
However, it is also important to note that Morison J, on a more general level, 
recognized a difference between auction houses: "The wide variety of circumstances in 
which auctions may take place must, I think, be borne in mind when deciding whether 
Christie's have assumed responsibility. Not every auctioneer conducts business as 
Christie's do." At the time Hoos v Weber88 was decided, that is in the 1970s, such 
considerations did not play a role when it came to identifying the criteria filling the duty 
of care expected from an auctioneer of art. As put forth in chapter 3,89 it has only been 
since the 1980s that a separation in the ways auction houses operate took place which 
was mainly due to the fierce global competition between Sotheby's and Christie's and 
further stirred up by the boom the art market experienced at that time. The first time the 
diversity in the auction market was acknowledged was in the Court of Appeal's 1989 
decision in Luxmoore-May v Messenger May Baverstock, 90 where the standard of care 
and skill expected from an art auctioneer in relation to the seller-consignor was under 
consideration. 
While the auction house in Luxmoore-May was qualified as a "provincial auctioneer", 
the defendant in de Balkany v Christie's, decided in 1995, was recognized by Morison J 
as one of the large international auctioneers. Christie's presented themselves as being 
knowledgeable about objects of art and their potential value, and as having solid teams 
of experts with sufficient expertise to make reliable qualifications about the objects 
offered in the auction- all facts that are commonly known to the buyer. 
The judge recognized that Christie's did not play as passive a role as auction houses 
have in the past. Nonetheless, they sought to define their position as a mere 
intermediary and facilitator of the transaction between the seller and the buyer. Such a 
87 Considering that a buyer's premium is not charged in every auction, it is argued that this feature should 
not be regarded as an in any event essential feature, in particular not in an action in tort (in contrast to an 
action in contract). Cf Harvey, 'Problems of Identity and Description in the Saleroom', 433. 
88 THE TIMES, 5 October 1974. 
89 See ch. 3, text accompanying n. 79. 
90 [1989] I W.L.R. 1009; [1990] 1 All E.R. 1067, CA, per Slade LJ: "the standard is to be judged by 
reference only what may be expected of the general practitioner, not the specialist - here provincial 
auctioneers, rather than one of the leading auction houses", at para. 35. See the discussion of this case 
above, ch. 3, pp. 13-17. 
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position could be easily justified in the simplest of regional auctions, where the auction 
house is seen as merely providing a publicized forum in which buyers and sellers 
interested in the same type of goods can gather and where none of the parties expects 
the auctioneer to have more than a guess as to who may have painted a painting. 
Considering the facts which the judge established here, however, there is good reason to 
ask whether there is not a need to protect the market against abuses by the auctioneer of 
his specialised services and know-how. 
Of course, the judge was not in a position to decide on this question, because, in the 
circumstances of this case, a liability could be established under the limited contractual 
responsibility Christie's had undertaken with their anti-forgery condition. Further, one 
must recall that the courts generally hesitate to grant damages for pure economic loss on 
the basis of negligently made misrepresentations. However, Morison J clarified, in line 
with other judgements, that the fact that someone has undertaken a contractual 
responsibility does not preclude the existence of a more extensive duty in tort.91 The 
judge identified a discrepancy between the sophisticated way large auction houses 
conduct business nowadays and their claim that their services should nonetheless be 
assessed under the definitions of the traditional auction house, that is as a mere 
intermediary and facilitator of transactions. The recognition of this conflict clearly 
marks a move away from the straightforward application of caveat emptor in Hoos v 
Weber towards holding auctioneers more accountable for their offering of specialized 
services which go beyond the traditional task of an auctioneer merely providing a 
marketplace for the exchange of goods. 
(c) Morin v Bonhams & Brooks Ltd and Bonhams & Brooks SAJvf2 
The obiter dictum in de Balkany v Christie 's has since been considered in the case of 
Morin v Bonhams & Brooks Ltd and Bonhams & Brooks SAM. In this case, M Morin, a 
French national who conducted an antiques business in London, commenced an action 
for misrepresentation against the London parent company of the auctioneering group 
Bonhams and its Monegasque subsidiary, after he had bought a classic car at an auction 
sale that was held by Bonhams Monaco in Monte Carlo in 2001, and had subsequently 
discovered that the car had a much higher mileage than that shown in the catalogue 
91 Palmer, 'Misattribution and the Meaning of Forgery', at 57. Cf Holt v Payne Skilling! on [ 1996] 
P.N.L.R. 179. 
92 [2003] E.W.H.C. 467 QBD (Comm) and [2003] E.W.C.A. Civ. 1802. 
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supplied to M Morin by the London office of Bonhams.93 The instant proceedings 
concerned an application by the claimant for permission to serve Bonhams Monaco out 
of the jurisdiction, and that raised the question of whether the claimant had a reasonable 
prospect of success against the defendant auctioneers. 
M Morin based his action for misrepresentation on a number of claims, including claims 
for rescission of the contract or alternatively damages in lieu of rescission pursuant to 
section 2 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 and most notably at common law under the 
principles of Hedley Byrne. With regard to this last claim, Jonathan Hirst QC, sitting as 
a deputy judge of the High Court, first considered whether Bonhams London owed any 
duty to M Morin to exercise reasonable skill and care in the description of the car. The 
assumption of responsibility was argued to have flown from the fact that, at M Morin's 
request, they had sent him a copy of the catalogue and had later told him about the 
estimated sale price for the car in question. This, however, was not seen to be enough 
for an argument that Bonhams London had entered into a special relationship with M 
Morin and assumed responsibility to him for the description of the car.94 The fact that 
they had sent out the catalogue was considered as a merely ministerial act, not sufficient 
to add their imprimatur to the catalogue description. 95 
Hirst QC continued to assess a possible liability of Bonhams Monaco under the tort for 
negligent misrepresentation. However, since he found that the applicable law of any tort 
possibly committed by Bonhams Monaco would be Monegasque, 96 his considerations 
on this question became, in his wording, "academic".97 Because the catalogue was 
prepared by Bonhams Monaco and because of the buyer's premium paid by M Morin, 
the judge found a "clear case" for holding that there was a special relationship between 
Bonhams Monaco and M Morin whereby Bonhams Monaco accepted responsibility for 
the description in the catalogue, and for holding that Bonhams Monaco owed M Morin 
a duty of care. However, similar to the circumstances in de Balkany v Christie's, the 
93 While the catalogue stated of the car: "Use has always been sparing, and total mileage covered from 
new by this ultra-rare, virtually one owner Ferrari is a mere 16,626 km", it later turned out that the true 
kilometerage was about 200,000. The claimant was able to inspect the car visually before the auction, but 
he was not allowed to start the engine or to test-drive the car. See [2003] E.W.H.C. 467 QBD (Comm), 
r,aras. 10-15. 
4 [2003] E.W.H.C. 467 QBD (Corum), para. 45. 
95 Ibid. 
96 The claim was regarded as tortious and thus, under sections 11 and 12 of the Private International Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, the law of the country was to apply in which the most significant 
facts had occured. Ibid., paras. 29-36. 
97 Ibid., paras. 50 and 55. 
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auction catalogue contained extensive exemption clauses on which the defendant, 
pointing at Morison J's decision in de Balkany, relied. Comparing the situation in de 
Balkany to the current case, the judge said:98 
"Plainly this authority provides substantial ammunition for [Bonhams] 
Monaco to contend that they owed no duty of care to M Morin but, if 
English law applied, I would hold that he had surmounted the fairly low 
threshold of showing reasonable prospect of success on this point for the 
following reasons. (a) But for the conditions of sale, there could be little 
doubt that [Bonhams] Monaco owed a duty of care. (b) The decision in De 
Balkany on whether Christie's owed any duty in tort was expressly obiter 
and moreover it would appear that the court was not addressed on the impact 
of s 2(2) of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. (c) The conditions in this 
case are not the same as Christie's in the case: (d) In particular, cl 3 is 
prefaced with the following: 'whilst every effort has been made to ensure 
the accuracy of the description'. I think it is arguable that the exclusions of 
liability which ensue proceed on the assumption that every effort has indeed 
been made by [Bonhams] Monaco and that if every (reasonable) effort has 
not been made the exclusions are not to be effective to exclude a duty of 
care. It is right to bear in mind that these are [Bonhams] Monaco's 
conditions of sale, and they should be construed contra proferentem. (e) It is 
unclear what, if any, efforts were made by [Bonhams] Monaco to ensure the 
accuracy of the description of the Ferrari (especially the kilometerage) in 
the catalogue. If it is right that the Ferrari had actually done over 200,000 
kms, it is a matter of real concern how an international auction house could 
have stated that it had done 'a mere 16,626 kms' when ... a short road test 
would have revealed the true position." 
This reasoning was later confirmed by the Court of Appeal,99 where Mance LJ stated 
that in case English law had been found to apply, there would have been a good case for 
a breach of a duty of care, despite the conditions of business having been at pains to 
exclude any warranty or guarantee, and to refer to catalogue statements as matters of 
'opinion': "It is a usual implication in relation to any expression of opinion by a 
98 Ibid., para. 53. 
99 [2003] E.W.C.A. Civ. 1802. 
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professional person that due diligence has been exercised in preparing and expressing 
the opinion, and the opening words of cl. 3 are entirely consistent with this."100 
It needs to be said that the drafting of Bonhams' conditions of business has meanwhile 
been modified, 101 and the words "every effort has been made ... " are no longer used. 102 
Lord Justice Mance indicates, though, that this does not make a difference with regard 
to the auctioneer's responsibility: he clearly states that in situations such as the one 
under consideration it is implied that a duty of competence exists, so that it does not 
need an express assumption of the same. Only at the end of his reasoning does he 
mention that his argument finds confirmation in the phrasing of the opening words of 
the exclusion clause. 
Although the reasoning on the existence of a tortious duty between auctioneer and buyer 
in this case, as well as in de Balkany v Christie's discussed previously, were clearly 
obiter, both cases give important indications as to current judicial thinking on the 
potential liability of auctioneers. In the past, it seemed to be practically impossible for 
buyers to hold auctioneers accountable for misrepresentations made in the auction 
catalogue. 103 The decisions in both de Balkany v Christie's and Morin v Bonhams 
confirm that auctioneers owe a duty to buyers and that the courts are well prepared to 
hold auctioneers liable under the principles of Hedley Byrne in case the question should 
become subject to judicial testing. 104 
However, it must be borne in mind that in practice it may be easier to determine the 
extent of the duty of care expected from auctioneers in cases such as the present, where 
100 Ibid., para. 24. 
101 See for a set of the present Conditions of Sale employed by Bonhams: http://www.bonhams.com. 
102 It should be recalled that the relevant exclusion clause in Hoos v Weber, n. 77 above, was construed in 
a similar way, namely opening with "Care is taken to ensure that any statement ... is reliable and accurate 
... "-a wording that is also no longer used by Sotheby's. 
103 On the one hand, as examined above, B.l., pp. 46 et seq., auctioneers can escape from liability because 
of their position as agents to the seller. On the other hand, in tort, auctioneers for a long time benefited 
from the non-existence of a tort that granted damages for negligently made representations, and then from 
the general reluctance of the courts to grant damages under the principles of Hedley Byrne because the 
law first had to be developed in this area. Finally, buyers have to overcome the hurdle of sweeping 
exclusion clauses in the conditions of business employed by all auction houses, should they seek recovery 
for damages suffered because of misrepresentations. 
104 See also Harvey and Meisel, Auctions Law and Practice, para. 5.150. They point to the Irish case of 
McAnarney v Hanrahan [1993] I.R. 492, in which the Irish High Court held that an auctioneer was under 
a duty of care under the Hedley Byrne principles because in providing information, in this case 
voluntarily, he had created an express assumption of responsibility as to the accuracy of the provided 
details on the object. The auctioneer also knew that the plaintiff would rely on the information. This 
created a "special relationship" and a duty of care. 
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the issues, i.e. the evaluation of the mechanical state of a car, include a larger factual 
element than is the case in the area of dating and attribution of fine art objects. 105 
(d) Thomson v Christie 's 106 
The question of the extent of the duty of care owed by an expert auctioneer of fine art to 
his private buyers has now been considered in Thomson v Christie's. In what must rank 
as one of the most complex and confusing cases of its kind, the Court of Appeal 
reversed the judgment in the High Court, which hinted at a wider cataloguing duty owed 
by auction houses of Christie's level, and decided in favour ofthe auction house. 
In December 1994, Christie's auctioned the contents of Houghton Hall on behalf of 
Lord Cholmondeley in its London auction rooms. One of the lots were two urns, 
described in the catalogue as "A pair of Louis XV porphyry and gilt-bronze two-
handled vases" (the 'Houghton Urns') with an auction estimate of £400,000 to 
£600,000. Closely advised by Christie's Special Client Services, the claimant Ms 
Thomson bought them after competitive bidding for £1,750,000. 107 The Special Client 
Services were an advisory group Christie's in New York had set up for some years prior 
to the purchase in order to identify potential buyers, inform them about upcoming lots 
and to pass on information about the merits of items from the auction house's expert 
departments, so that the clients could make a judgment about whether to bid or not. 
Some time after the sale, Ms Thomson received word that the market had serious doubts 
about the urns indeed being Louis XV, and that they had most likely been made in the 
nineteenth century instead, when there was a revival of interest in eighteenth century 
designs. As a result, Ms Thomson commenced proceedings against Christie's. In her 
action brought against Christie's in 2004, she asserted that the Houghton Urns were not 
the eighteenth century originals they were sold as, but rather far less valuable nineteenth 
century copies, worth only some £20,000 to £30,000. Her claim for damages against 
Christie's was based on an alleged breach of their common law duty of care or for 
rescission or damages for misrepresentation under section 2( 1) of the Misrepresentation 
Act 1967. Christie's did not rely on the claims being barred by limitation108 and they 
105 Anthony Hugh Hudson, 'A Tale of Two Urns: Dating and Attribution of Art and Antiques' (2005) 10 
Art Antiquity and Law 307-316, 316. 
106 [2004] E.W.H.C. 1101, QBD; [2005] E.W.C.A. Civ. 555. 
107 With the buyer's premium payable to Christie's the total price of the urns was £1,957,388. 
108 With regard to the first claim, it was accepted by Christie's that the operation of section 14A of the 
Limitation Act 1980 saved the claim from being barred; with regard to the second claim, Christie's 
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further announced that they would not rely on their conditions of business, which 
sought to exclude liabilities. 109 This meant that the case was to be decided on the 
accuracy of their original judgment about the urns' dating alone. 
(i) The Decision in the High Court 
In the High Court, the case was decided in the claimant's favour. The first claim -
breach of duty of care - arose in tort under Hedley Byrne principles. Jack J first 
examined whether a breach of duty on Christie's side could be concluded with regard to 
their dating of the urns, that is, whether the urns indeed originated from the period of 
Louis XV or whether Christie's was wrong. Jack J concluded his extensive hearing of 
visual, historical and scientific evidence with a finding that the urns were likely to have 
been made in the eighteenth century, about 1760 to 1765: "If a figure must be placed on 
it, I would put it in the region of 70 per cent."110 With regard to the duty of care, which 
Christie's admitted to owe, the standard being that of the reasonably competent 
international auction house specialising in the sale of fine arts and antiques, 111 Jack J 
ruled that Christie's dating of the urns as Louis XV was an opinion which an auctioneer 
of their standing could reasonably reach. To conclude as such on the well-established 
practices of auction houses generally was acceptable and there was no breach of duty in 
Christie's doing so: 
"It is the well-established practice of auction houses and the art world 
generally to date items such as the Houghton urns by visual examination in 
conjunction with such information as to the item as may be already available 
or obtainable by such research as is reasonably to be expected of the auction 
house in the circumstances. The examination must be as thorough as the 
circumstances reasonably require and it must be done by persons of 
appropriate qualifications and experience. It will not, cannot, and need not 
be as exhaustive as the examinations which have been carried out for the 
purposes of this trial: that is impractical. The outcome will be an expression 
of opinion as to date, which may be expressed in absolute terms such as 
here, or in more guarded terms, using words such as 'probably' or 'possibly'. 
declared that they did not rely on the action being barred by limitation. (2004] E.W.H.C. 1101, QBD, 
paras. 6 and 7. 
109 Ibid., para. 14. 
110 Ibid., para. 182. 
111 Ibid., para. 13. 
Where it is expressed in absolute terms it remains nonetheless an expression 
of opinion, which may later be shown to be doubtful or wrong. That is the 
basis on which the market proceeds, and that is generally well-
understood." 112 
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However, Jack J did think that Christie's cataloguing of the urns fell below the standard 
to be expected of auctioneers of their standing in: 113 
• Failing to add the qualification to the description that the urns may have been 
made in Parma - which was "an unjustified firming-up of the catalogue 
description." 
• Misleadingly stating that the urns were designed by Petitot when it was not 
known that this was the case and for the Duke of Parma when there was "not a 
jot of evidence" to suggest that. 
• Saying that the vases were "reworked" by Petitot when there was no grounds for 
so thinking. 
This would have created an unjustified feeling of confidence and certainty about the 
urns. After the judge had concluded that Christie's had not been negligent in their dating 
of the urns and thus had been justified in making the catalogue statements so far as the 
general readership was concerned, he ruled in favour of the claimant in those respects 
on the basis of her status as "special client". According to the judge, the circumstances 
of the special client relationship increased Christie's duties and would have required 
them to warn the claimant that the dating of objects in this area was unusually difficult 
because of the existence of nineteenth century reproductions and the fact that their 
dating was based on visual inspection and judgment. Further, the judge said that Ms 
Thomson should have been told that the catalogue inflated what could properly be said 
about the urns. 114 This finding was supported by the fact that Christie's knew that the 
claimant was not an experienced collector and that she did not take independent advice 
but relied solely on Christie's guidance. It was argued on behalf ofMs Thomson that, if 
she had been told of the nineteenth century revivalist fashion and of the difficulties 
which this introduced for the dating of these urns by Christie's special client advisor, 
112 Ibid., para. 188. 
113 See ibid., paras. 195-196. 
114 Ibid., paras. 197. 
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she would not have bid for the urns. 115 Since this argument was left unchallenged, Jack 
J held the defendant auctioneers liable for damages because of breach of their duty of 
care.ll6 
It needs to be repeated that this finding was solely based on the "special client" status 
granted to Ms Thomson. The judge expressly disclaimed any intention to decide 
whether an auctioneer such as Christie's owes a general duty of accuracy in 
cataloguing. 117 As regards the dependency of the breach of duty on the accuracy of the 
catalogue, it is argued, however, that there does not seem to be a clear basis for 
distinction between Ms Thomson and another user of the catalogue who might have 
gone on to purchase. 
( ii) The Judgment of the Court of Appeal 118 
In view of that, Christie's immediately launched an appeal, claiming that the judge had 
been wrong in finding that they had been in breach of duty to Ms Thomson. And 
indeed, in the Court of Appeal, the judge's findings were largely reversed. May LJ: " ... 
the judge's finding that Christie's were in breach of their duty to Ms Thomson cannot 
stand upon the reasons which the judge himself gave." 119 Looking at the High Court's 
evidence, he concluded that Christie's decision about the dating of the urns as 
eighteenth century was certain and definite. When Christie's were confident in their 
opinion about the age of the urns, it would be difficult to establish an obligation to 
express anything other than this confidence, as that would have been an expression of 
fanciful, unreal doubt, where there was no real doubt. 120 May LJ consequently could not 
see an obligation on Christie's for pointing out the process by which they had formed 
their view, which includes any initial doubts and considerations as to whether the urns 
might be nineteenth century revivalist objects: "If Christie's were, as the judge had held, 
justifiably confident (sure) in their judgment, extraneous indications of confidence do 
not make more apparently sure that which is sure already." 121 
115 Ibid., para. 198. 
116 Accordingly, Ms Thomson's misrepresentation claim was successful for the reasons stated, see para. 
199 of the judgment. 
117 Ibid., para. 187. 
118 [2005] E.W.C.A. Civ. 555. 
119 Ibid., para. 167. 
120 Ibid., para. 157. 
121 Ibid., para. 162. 
Thus, the court concluded the judge in the High Court as having: 
" ... reached two essentially inconsistent conclusions. In short, if Christie's 
were, or should have been, less than completely confident about their 
description . . . they should have qualified their description of them. Either 
Christie's were not negligent in advising Ms Thomson or they were m 
breach of duty at least to her in their catalogue description."122 
(iii) Comment 
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Earlier in his judgment, May LJ seemed to have accepted the High Court judge's 
reasoning that there is a difference in the extent of the duty owed to the general 
readership of the catalogue (among them experienced dealers and collectors and those 
with independent advice) and that owed to Ms Thomson, known to be inexperienced 
and relying on Christie's: 
"I have no difficulty with ... the submission that Christie's owed Ms 
Thomson a Hedley Byrne duty beyond any duty arising out of the catalogue 
alone .... Nor is there a necessary difficulty with Christie's being in breach 
ofthe Hedley Byrne duty, but not of a catalogue duty." 123 
As seen in the above concluding remark, May LJ combined the two duties in the end. In 
the particular case, this was possible on the ground of the facts which the judge in the 
High Court found in relation to the catalogue. Still, when analyzing the case with the 
intention of drawing conclusions about the extent of the duties owed by the auctioneer 
of art to the purchaser, it is advisable to distinguish between the two. 
Regardless of the "special client" relationship Christie's had promoted with Ms 
Thomson, the decision has removed remaining doubts whether a catalogue description 
gives rise to a Hedley Byrne liability. Though in none of the cases discussed an 
auctioneer has been held liable under Hedley Byrne, the case of Thomson v Christie's 
allows to conclude that such a liability exists. Apparently, as Meisel points out, 124 the 
122 Ibid., para. 167. 
123 Ibid., para. 153. 
124 Franklin Meisel, 'Auctioneers and Buyers: A Special Relationship?' (2005) 21 Journal of Professional 
Negligence 250-256, 255. 
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existence of such a duty has simply been assumed by the Court of Appeal: as follows 
from the two quotes above, the Court of Appeal came to the conclusion that Christie's 
had satisfied their general duty arising out of the catalogue description in overturning 
the finding in the High Court, in which the judge ruled that the particular duty arising 
out of the "special client" relationship and voluntarily undertaken by Christie's had 
been broken. 
There seems to be no reason why such liability should not be attached to cataloguing. It 
is the auctioneer who profits most from high sales prices, as both, the commission he 
charges the seller and the buyer's premium rise with each additional bid. An optimistic 
description of a lot can thus increase the auctioneer's profit. The line must be drawn 
where the description turns, in the light of expert evidence, into a careless overstating of 
a lot's potential. When doubts remain after a careful examination has been conducted, 
these must be outlined in the catalogue in form of qualifications as they were laid out in 
chapter 3. 125 If, however, a buyer is induced to bid or bid higher than he otherwise 
might on basis of a description that is so lacking in diligence or care as to risks of 
authenticity which might exist, than the auctioneer may, depending on the extent of the 
duty of care which is to be expected of the particular firm of auctioneers, be held liable 
for damages in tort of negligence. 
With regard to the wider duty found by the judge in the High Court to arise out of the 
"special client" relationship between Christie's and Ms Thomson, things are, however, 
more complicated. To recall, the judge held that Christie's should have warned Ms 
Thomson about the dating of the urns being difficult; that they based their judgment on 
visual inspection; and that the catalogue description overstated what could be said about 
the urns. 126 
Does this finding conform with the general rules of law? Two insurmountable 
difficulties suggest that this is not the case. Again, it must be recalled that, according to 
the judge, the duty arose out of the circumstance that Christie's had specifically 
undertaken to give advice to Ms Thomson as a special client, knowing that she was not 
seeking her own independent advice but that she was relying on them as her expert 
125 See above, ch. 3, pp. 38 et seq. 
126 See above, p. 74. 
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advisers. In principle, that would have required that she be treated not just as anyone or 
every one but in accordance with her individual needs and skills. 
In an art auction situation, however, there are two reasons which imply that the extra 
care owed to a "special client" in addition to the contents of the cataloguing duty can be 
only limited. In the Court of Appeal, May LJ rightly pointed to the fact that an 
auctioneer still primarily acts as the seller's agent, a fact well-known to potential 
buyers. As the seller's agent, the auctioneer's primary duty is to get the highest possible 
price for his principal. 127 While May LJ accepted an auctioneer's interest in attracting 
wealthy buyers, he clarified that everything going beyond facilitation in the relation to a 
potential buyer would constitute a conflict of interest with the duty owed to the 
principal. 128 
Allowing prospective buyers to inspect lots and answering their questions can be 
categorized as such facilitation. 129 Priority treatment such as arranging for private 
viewings or instructing clients on auction room strategies, or assisting them in building 
rapports on a work's condition, its unpublished reserve price and "the level of interest in 
a work" before a sale can also be categorized as facilitation. 130 The provision of 
information as defined and expected by the judge in the High Court, however, obviously 
works not only against the interests of the principal but also of the auctioneer himself. 
Meanwhile, Christie's have given up their "special client" concept. 131 Cases such as the 
present show that its intention was misleading in essence. While clients relied on 
Christie's to provide them with information going beyond facilitating priority treatment 
as described, it should be clear that an auctioneer would not go beyond such possible 
facilitation, as that would bring him into a conflict with his principal and the duties 
owed to him. Since the buyer at auction knows about the agency relationship between 
seller and auctioneer, it is justified to argue that an extra duty arising from a "special 
client" treatment is limited to the point where the "extra" expected would constitute a 
conflict of duties. As described, that still gives the "special client" a considerable 
127 This is a fiduciary duty, see Keppel v Wheeler [ 1927] 1 K.B. 577, CA. 
128 (2005] E.W.C.A. Civ. 555, paras. 33 and 34. 
129 Ibid., para. 33. 
130 On preparing for bidding at auction and help offered by auctioneers: Greg Allen, 'Rule No.I: Don't 
Yell, 'My Kid Could Do That" in THE NEW YORK TIMES, 5 November 2006, p.2.1. 
131 See [2004] E.W.H.C. 1101, QBD, para. 48; (2005] E.W.C.A. Civ. 555, para. 33. 
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advantage in comparison to other bidders - which was probably the original intention 
when the "special client" scheme was introduced. 
The second reason, however, is the question of whether a duty to warn existed at all on 
Christie's side. To answer this question, general developments of the law must be 
considered as well as the specificities effective in the art world. 
Allen describes the circumstances in which the existence of such a duty to warn of risks 
as found by the judge in the High Court would be significant as follows: 132 
"A claimant in the same position as Ms Thomson would be able to rely 
upon the orthodox Hedley Byrne duty if an auctioneer unreasonably and 
falsely described a lot. The duty to warn of risks would come into play, 
however, when the auctioneer reasonably came to the conclusion that the 
catalogue description is correct. Should the law really impose liability on 
auctioneers who have produced a reasonable description of goods?" 
The Court of Appeal rightly considered that people who provide information in the form 
of advice may assume a responsibility giving rise to a duty of care. The Court also 
acknowledged that the characteristics and experience of the recipient of the information 
are relevant when determining the extent of the advice to be given. But even in such a 
case the duty would not involve drawing attention "to the obvious" or "to risks which 
are fanciful". 133 By acknowledging the existence of such a duty, and against his own 
findings that Christie's had reasonably held a certain and definite opinion on the 
Houghton Urns, the judge in the High Court recognized a novel tortious duty of care for 
which there was no authority nor any reason in principle that would support such a 
development in liability. Thus, in overruling the High Court judgment in this respect, 
the Court of Appeal also brought the case back in line to the general recent development 
of limiting the scope of tortious liability in circumstances where the risk of loss should 
be obvious to the reasonable person. 134 
132 Rupert Allen, 'Caveat Emptor Beware' [2004] Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 442-
445,443. 
133 [2005] E.W.C.A. Civ. 555, para. 95, citing Tomlinson v Conge/ton Borough Council [2004] 1 A.C. 46, 
HL. 
134 Tomlinson v Conge/ton Borough Council [2004] 1 A.C. 46, HL. See also Allen, 'Caveat Emptor 
Beware', 443. 
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But what is it that the Court of Appeal believes to be obvious for those participating in 
the art market? First, the case confirms the long standing convention that a catalogue 
description of a work of art, however detailed, is in the end a matter of opinion as 
absolute certainty in attributing works of art often is not possible. 135 Secondly, if it is 
done with care and by appropriately qualified staff, dating and attribution of artifacts 
may be effected by visual examination and judgment. 136 Thirdly, when an auctioneer 
achieves what he feels to be reasonable certainty, then he may state this in unqualified 
terms and is under no obligation to disclose any initial doubts he may have had or to 
point out the process by which he has formed his view. 137 
It is thus submitted that the wider duty found by the judge in the High Court did not 
exist in the first place. Rather, provided that the auctioneer has not conducted the 
cataloguing process negligently, the remaining risks intrinsic to the dating and 
attribution of works of art are located with the buyer. Despite the somewhat unfortunate 
circumstances of the case, the decision has thus only clarified and affirmed earlier 
authorities on the subject matter of description in auction sales of art. 
d. Result 
An auctioneer's liability in disputes over the description of lots is most likely to be 
established under the tort of negligence for misrepresentation. Although in none of the 
cases discussed has an auctioneer been held liable under the principles of Hedley Byrne, 
the development that culminated in Thomson v Christie 's has made clear that such 
liability attaches and has brought clarification about the circumstances under which 
auctioneers of works of art can be held liable. 
135 [2005] E.W.C.A. Civ. 555, para. 161, referring back to para. 188 of Jack J [2004] E.W.H.C. 1101, 
QBD. According to Hudson, 'A Tale of Two Urns', the decision in the Court of Appeal constitutes the 
recognition of a trade usage for the field of cataloguing, at 310 and 312. See on the operation and 
essential characteristics of a trade usage as an aid to interpretation of commercial texts ibid., with further 
references. For unfolding effect, a usage needs not necessarily be known to the world at large or even not 
to the individual against whom it is asserted, but it must be capable of being easily discerned by anyone 
entering the field, ibid. 
136 (2005] E.W.C.A. Civ. 555, para. 161, referring back to para. 188 of Jack J [2004] E.W.H.C. 1101, 
QBD. 
137 Ibid. 
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For a long time, auctioneers138 have benefited from the non-existence of a tort that 
grants damages for negligently made representations. Until today, a general reluctance 
of courts to grant damages for pure economic loss under the principles of Hedley Byrne 
can be recorded, not only because the law on the subject is still at an early stage of 
development. 
With regard to the tort applying in the context of an art auction, however, current 
judicial thinking can be summarized as follows: there are now no difficulties in 
concluding that a special relationship between auctioneer and buyers exists 139 and that 
an assumption of responsibility is implied. 140 The difficulty lies in defining the standard 
of duty of care owed by the auctioneer of art. Insofar, courts have consistently 
acknowledged that the particular characteristics of the art world must be taken into 
account in deciding whether goods satisfy their description. 
The extent of duty owed by a particular firm of auctioneers when describing goods to be 
auctioned first depends on whether the firm belongs to one of the large international 
auctioneers or whether it is to be qualified as a "provincial auctioneer". 141 In the latter 
case, the extent of duty is smaller because the role of the auctioneer is still more that of 
an intermediary and facilitator of the transaction between buyer and seller. In the first 
case, however, the auctioneer takes active influence on the course of a sale by his 
offering of specialized services and know-how and by often demanding to keep the sole 
discretion for the description of lots. It is this sophisticated way of conducting business 
- the reliance on own expert departments with sufficient expertise to produce reliable 
descriptions - that provides indications on whether a higher level of diligence is to be 
expected from a firm. 
Once the scope of the auctioneer's responsibility has been determined, what is the level 
of care to be expected in producing the catalogue description itself? Here, the findings 
138 Like other individuals engaged with giving advice, be it in a professional or private occupation, 
provided the defendant has some special knowledge. In Chaudhry v Prabhakar [1989] 1 W.L.R. 29, for 
example, the liability of the gratuitous agent, here one providing a recommendation on the purchase of a 
used car, was established. In a professional occupation, an estate agent has been held to be potentially 
liable to the buyer for negligently misdescribing the acreage of property in McCullagh v Lane Fox & 
Partners Ltd [1996] P.N.L.R. 205, CA, although in the result the claim failed because the purchaser could 
establish no loss. 
139 See above, p. 77. 
140 See the above discussion of de Balkany v Christie's and of Morin v Bonhams, pp. 64-72. 
141 This distinction has been established in the decisions of Luxmoore-May v Messenger May Baverstock 
and of de Balkany v Christie's, discussed above, pp. 13 et seq. and pp. 64 et seq. See also Palmer, 'The 
Civil Liability of the Professional Appraiser', p. 34. 
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from this section and from chapter 3 must be drawn together. Of course, a firm of 
auctioneers who represents that they have special skill and expert knowledge will be 
required to have and exercise that skill or knowledge. 142 
Three main propositions have emerged and been adopted by the courts, in particular in 
Thomson v Christie's: first, dating and attribution of works of art may be carried out by 
visual examination and judgment provided it is done with care and by appropriately 
qualified personnel. Insofar, compliance with the prescribed standard must be judged by 
reference to the knowledge of art history available and generally accepted for use at the 
time the description is being written, rather than with the benefit ofhindsight. 143 
Secondly, when the auctioneer comes to the conclusion that the result of his 
examination can be held with reasonable certainty, i.e. when he believes that it is 
correct, then he may express this in unqualified terms in his catalogue description and is 
under no obligation to disclose any initial doubts he might have had or to detail the 
process by which he has formed his view. At this point of the assessment one must 
remember that an auctioneer does not only act as an art expert when producing a 
description, but also as a merchant with an interest in gaining the highest possible profit. 
Here, the expert judgment may not make concessions to what might be commercially 
desirable - if doubts remain they must be expressed in the form of the qualifications 
developed by the auction houses as quoted in chapter 3. 144 Equally, an unjustified 
inflation of a catalogue description must give rise to liability. 
Thirdly, courts acknowledge that the art world deals in opinions. That means that it is 
not necessarily negligent of an auctioneer if he holds an opinion that later turns out to be 
wrong, as long as he has formed his view by applying the care which is reasonable in 
light of his specialist knowledge. An auctioneer who chooses between two respectable 
142 While this seems to be self-evident, it is important for determining whether negligence is given: not 
only should the auctioneer have the represented expertise, but he must also know how to apply this 
expertise because expertise without application is useless. Thus, the person making an attribution must 
know how to apply his knowledge of art history, style, and scientific testing, first, by conducting the right 
types of tests and comparative analyses and, second, by drawing the right conclusions. Negligence is "not 
having" and/or "not applying" the represented knowledge. See in detail: Peter H. Karlen, 'Fakes, 
Forgeries and Expert Opinions' in: Lalive (ed.) International Sales of Works of Art, pp. 219-249, p. 229. 
Further above, ch. 3, D.1., pp. 19-22. 
143 See above, ch. 3, E.3.f., pp. 38-41. 
144 Ibid 
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schools of professional opinion does not necessarily act negligently, even if the adopted 
school transpires to be erroneous. 145 
Considering that in the area of art authentication "one expert's certainty is another's real 
doubt"146 it becomes obvious that the threshold for holding auctioneers liable under the 
tort of negligence for misrepresentation is still extremely high. While in line with the 
general rules and developments of the law, it is questionable whether such a strict 
application of the principle of caveat emptor promotes the measure of transparency to 
be regarded as desirable in an art market that is filled with private buyers, many of 
whom are amateurs and beginners and far from being expert. 147 The urgency of this 
question is only heightened by the use of sweeping exclusion clauses in the conditions 
of business employed by all auction houses in case disappointed buyers want to seek 
recovery for damages suffered because of misrepresentations. The examination of 
conditions disclaiming liability for misrepresentations is the concern of the next section 
of this chapter. 
4. The Role of Exclusion Clauses in Conditions of Business Affecting the Buyer 
It has become obvious in the previous discussion that the employment of standard terms 
and conditions forms a key feature in auction business. Conditions of business deal with 
a variety of questions, such as the terms under which an auction house accepts goods for 
auction or terms under which it conducts the auction sale. It is especially the exclusion 
clauses that seek to exclude any liabilities arising out of statements made by the 
auctioneer during the course of an auction that are of interest for the purposes of this 
study. 
Before an examination of such clauses and their validity can be made, it is important to 
mention that the conditions of business employed in relation to the buyer at auction 
usually aim to protect both the seller and the auction house. It is thus important to keep 
the two cases apart: first, these conditions seek to limit or exclude liabilities with regard 
to the contract of sale, which especially happens through modifying the conditions 
145 Cf Palmer, 'The Civil Liability ofthe Professional Appraiser', p. 33 and the discussion of Luxmoore-
May v Messenger May Baver stock above, ch.3, 8.1, pp. 13 et seq. 
146 Hudson, 'A Tale ofTwo Urns', 312. 
147 See the analysis above, ch. 3, E.1. and 2., pp. 27-29. 
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implied by the Sale of Goods Act 1979.148 Second, these clauses also try to exclude all 
direct liabilities of the auctioneer. It is the validity of conditions of business in 
application to the latter case that this section of the chapter is concerned with, because, 
as discussed above, the auctioneer as the seller's agent is not liable on the contract of 
sale. 
a. Excursus: "The Opinion-Defence" 
In this context, however, it is suitable to briefly look at the general discussion on the 
legal nature of statements made about works of art in a transactional context. The 
question is especially important when it comes to assessing the contractual relationship 
between the seller and the buyer of a work of art. The remedies available to the 
disappointed buyer in a contractual situation depend on whether an authenticity 
statement has become a term of the contract as a condition or only as a warranty; 
whether the attribution is qualified as a representation with no contractual effect but 
which induced the buyer to enter into the contract; or whether it is to be qualified as an 
opinion with no legal effect whatsoever. 149 
The decision in Jendwine v Slade 150 is perhaps the oldest reported case concerning a 
catalogue statement, and set the traditional approach to the issue. This case arose from 
the sale of two pictures which were described in a catalogue as being a sea-piece by 
Claude Lorrain (1600-1682) and the other of a fair by Teniers (161 0-1690), when in fact 
the paintings were copies. The court had to address the question of whether the 
appearance of an artist's name in a catalogue constituted a warranty or merely an 
opinion on which the buyer was not intended to rely. Lord Kenyon held that it "was 
impossible to make this the case of a warranty; the pictures were the work of artists 
some centuries back, and there being no way of tracing the picture itself, it could only 
be a matter of opinion whether the picture in question was the work of the artist whose 
name it bore, or not"151 and that "[T]he catalogue of the pictures in question leaves the 
determination to the judgment of the buyer, who is to exercise that judgment in the 
purchase." 152 
148 The conditions implied by the Sale of Goods Act 1979 can be found in s.12 (implied terms about title), 
s.l3 (sale by description), s.l4 (implied terms about quality and fitness) and s.15 (sale by sample). 
149 See for a more detailed discussion of this question in the context of art transactions: Olsburgh, 
Authenticity in the Art Market, ch. 4. 
150 ( 1797) 2 Esp. 572., 170 Eng. Rep. 459. 
151 170 Eng. Rep. 459. 
152 Ibid., 460. 
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That this rule is not absolute can be seen in a later case: the case of Power v Barham 153 
was about a receipt given to the buyer by the seller at the time of the sale, stating: "Four 
pictures, Views in Venice, Canaletto". Here it was held that this statement could be a 
warranty, distinguishing it from Jendwine v Slade on the ground that Canaletto (1697-
1768) was "not a very old painter". The artist had died relatively recently, so that the 
seller should have been able to ascertain the paintings' origins. 154 
Both cases should not now be taken as being authoritative on the effect of a catalogue 
statement. Not only has the law on imposing liability for statements changed a great 
deal since; 155 attribution techniques have also advanced far beyond what was thought 
possible when these cases were decided in 1797 and 1836. 156 One might thus be induced 
to argue that today a statement in a catalogue may well be a term ofthe contract. 157 
Two recent cases involving private treaty transactions show, however, that this largely 
depends on the surrounding circumstances and any qualifications made in the statement 
itself. The first case, Harlingdon and Leinster Enterprises v Christopher Hull Fine 
Art, 158 concerned a sale between two London dealers of a painting clearly described in 
the invoice as being by the German painter Gabriele MUnter (1877-1962), which later 
turned out to be a forgery. The second case, Drake v Thos Agnew & Sons Ltd, 159 
involved the sale of a painting by an eminent London dealer specialized in Old Master 
paintings to a private client in the USA, whose agent was a dishonest art dealer. The 
seller was convinced that the painting was by Sir Anthony van Dyck (1599-1641), but 
expressly stated in his correspondence to the buyer's agent the existence of doubts. 
These doubts, however, never reached the buyer who sought to recover the price after 
he was advised that the painting was not by van Dyck. 
Both cases were decided in favour of the defendant sellers, holding that there were no 
terms that the paintings were respectively by MUnter and van Dyck and therefore no 
153 (1836) 4 Ad. & E. 473; 111 Eng. Rep. 865. 
154 111 Eng. Rep. 865, 866. 
155 Old cases show reluctance to impose liability for statements unless there was deceit, or contractual 
liability was clearly undertaken. But other categories of liability have developed in between. Old cases 
should be read with these developments in mind, see Anthony Gordon Guest (general ed.), Benjamin's 
Sale ofGoods (6th edn, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), para. 10-004. 
156 See ch. 3 above, D., pp. 19 et seq. 
157 In Leaf v International Galleries [1950] 2 K.B. 86; [1950] 1 All E.R. 693, the Court of Appeal 
indicated that a representation that a painting was a Constable could be a warranty. 
158 [1991] 1 Q.B. 564; [1990] 3 W.L.R. 13, CA. 
159 [2002] E.W.H.C. 294, QBD, noted by Anthony Hugh Hudson, 'Attribution of Paintings and Sale by 
Description' (2003) 8 Art Antiquity and Law 201-208. 
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sales by description governed by section 13 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. Buckley J 
explained this conclusion in the second case as follows: 
" a sale cannot be "by description" unless the parties intend the 
description to be a term of the contract. It is only then that the implied 
condition that the goods must correspond with the description arises .... It 
only does so if the proper conclusion from all the evidence is that the 
parties intended the description to be a term of the contract. That makes 
good sense if one bears in mind the serious consequences that flow from a 
breach of the implied term, when the statute makes it a condition that the 
goods should correspond with the description." 160 
That in these cases the statements as to the authenticity of the paintings were held to be 
matters of opinion without legal consequences can be explained by reference to the 
particular circumstances: in Harlingdon, the seller disclaimed to have specialist 
knowledge and the buyer was much more expert than the seller in the particular field of 
German expressionist art. In Drake, doubts about the attribution were made known to 
the buyer by the seller. Consequently, the buyers were held to have bought the paintings 
"as they were" and section 13 ofthe Sale of Goods Act 1979 did not apply. 
Because the description accorded to works of art sold in an auction forms a key feature 
for this type of sale, Harvey and Meisel argue that auction cases must be distinguished 
from private treaty sales. 161 However, even here it can now be said with confidence that 
the position in law takes into account the idiosyncrasies of the art market: that the art 
world deals in opinions and not facts has once again been acknowledged in the recent 
auction case of Thomson v Christie 's. 162 According to Hudson, the decision in this case 
even constituted the recognition of a trade usage for the field of cataloguing. 163 The 
reasons for defining auction descriptions as matters of opinion only have been set out 
before: absolute certainty that the description attached to a work of art is correct is often 
not possible because of the risks inherent in the dating and attributing of objects that 
160 [2002] E.W.H.C. 294, QBD, at para. 26, referring to Harlingdon, where it has been held that for the 
sale to be by description, the description had to be influential in the sale so as to become an essential term 
or condition of the contract, per Nourse LJ, at 571, and citing Lord Diplock in Gil/ & Duffus S.A. v 
Berger & Co. Inc. (No.2) [1984] A.C. 382, HL, at p. 394. 
161 Auctions Law and Practice, para. 6.45. 
162 [2005] E.W.C.A. Civ. 555, para. 161, referring back to para. 188 of Jack J [2004] E.W.H.C. 1101, 
QBD. See the detailed discussion of this case above, pp. 72 et seq. 
163 
'A Tale of Two Urns', 310 and 312, see further n. 135 above. 
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often were created centuries ago, and the result of the attribution depending on the 
current state of scholarship. 
However, the qualification of statements on the authenticity or the attribution of a work 
of art as opinions does not mean that there is no basis for a disappointed buyer to sue. 
As Palmer points out, a statement of opinion can itself contain an actionable 
misrepresentation of fact: "either on the ground that the statement of opinion suggests 
the existence of facts which reasonably support the opinion, or on the ground that an 
opinion itself is a fact capable of misrepresentation."164 A mere reliance on what has 
been described here as "opinion-defence" thus does not put an end to the matter. The 
disappointed buyer is thus well advised to first contest whether under the particular 
circumstances the description attached to the work of art has not become a term of the 
contract. Further, a liability for damages can arise under section 2(1) of the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967 for negligent misrepresentation in a contractual situation 165 
and under the tort of negligence for misrepresentation as developed above. 
It is because of this that catalogue descriptions are almost inevitably subject to some 
form of express caveat or exclusion of liability in auction conditions. 
b. Typical Content and Interpretation of Exclusion Clauses 
If the disappointed buyer wishes to sue against the auctioneer and base his action on an 
alleged misrepresentation in the catalogue description, 166 it becomes necessary to look 
at the auctioneer's conditions of business to determine whether there is a clause that 
effectively excludes any liabilities. 
As an illustration, Christie's current Conditions of Sale167 on this subject matter are set 
forth here: 
164 
'The Civil Liability of the Professional Appraiser', p. 26. See also Treitel, Law ofContract, p. 331. 
165 While it is established that auctioneers - in common with agents generally - cannot be liable under 
s.2(1) Misrepresentation Act 1967 with regard to inducing the contract of sale (see above, B.3.a., p. 57), a 
claim under the statutory provision is possible directly against the auctioneer when a collateral contract 
between buyer and auctioneer can be found into which the claimant entered as a result of representations 
made by the auctioneer. Such a collateral contract was held to have existed between Ms Thomson and 
Christie's in the first instance decision of Thomson v Christie's [2004] E.W.H.C. 1101, QBD, para. 199. 
166 Of course, the disappointed buyer will also be likely to sue against the seller as principal for breach of 
the implied condition of compliance with description, s.l3 Sale of Goods Act 1979, and that the goods he 
bought were not of satisfactory quality under s.l4(2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. As set out above, 
this study concentrates on the exclusion of direct liabilities of the auctioneer. 
167 The conditions of business of the leading auction houses are similar in essence. 
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"2. BEFORE THE SALE 
{a) Examination of property 
1Prospective buyers are strongly advised to examine personally any 
property in which they are interested, before the auction takes place. 
2Condition reports are usually available on request. 3Neither Christie's nor 
the seller provides any guarantee in relation to the nature of the property 
apart from the Limited Warranty in paragraph 6 below. 4The property is 
otherwise sold "as is". 
(b) Catalogue and other descriptions 
10ur cataloguing practice is explained m the Important Notices and 
Explanation of Cataloguing Practice which appear after the catalogue 
entries. 2 All statements by us in the catalogue entry for the property or in 
the condition report, or made orally or in writing elsewhere, are statements 
of opinion and are not to be relied on as statements of fact. 3Such 
statements do not constitute a representation, warranty or assumption of 
liability by us of any kind. 4References in the catalogue entry or the 
condition report to damage or restoration are for guidance only and should 
be evaluated by personal inspection by the bidder or a knowledgeable 
representative. 5The absence of such a reference does not imply that an 
item is free from defects or restoration, nor does a reference to particular 
defects imply the absence of any others. 6 ••• 7Except as set forth in 
paragraph 6 below, neither Christie's nor the seller is responsible in any 
way for errors and omissions in the catalogue, or any supplemental 
material. 
(c) Buyer's responsibility 
1Except as stated in the Limited Warranty in paragraph 6 below, all 
property is sold "as is" without any representation or warranty of any kind 
by Christie's or the seller. 2Buyers are responsible for satisfying 
themselves concerning the condition of the property and the matters 
referred to in the catalogue entry." 
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"5. EXTENT OF CHRISTIE'S LIABILITY 
1We agree to refund the purchase price in the circumstances ofthe Limited 
Warranty set out in paragraph 6 below. 2 Apart from that, neither the seller 
nor we, nor any of our officers, employees or agents, are responsible for 
the correctness of any statement of whatever kind concerning any lot, 
whether written or oral, nor for any other errors or omissions in 
description or for any faults or defects in any lot. 3Except as stated in 
paragraph 6 below, neither the seller, ourselves, our officers, employees or 
agents, give any representation, warranty or guarantee or assume any 
liability of any kind in respect of any lot with regard to merchantability, 
fitness for a particular purpose, description, size, quality, condition, 
attribution, authenticity, rarity, importance, medium, provenance, 
exhibition history, literature or historical relevance. 4Except as required by 
local law any warranty of any kind whatsoever is excluded by this 
paragraph." 
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The repeated reference to paragraph 6 of the Conditions points at Christie's current anti-
forgery provision. It is similar to the version discussed above that came under scrutiny 
in de Balkany v Christie 's: 168 Christie's (in common with other leading auction houses) 
provides that they will set aside a sale and refund the original purchase price when 
certain strictly limited conditions are fulfilled which establish that a lot is not 
authentic. 169 
Christie's Condition 2 instructs buyers that they should make an appropriate inspection 
of the lots they are interested in before the sale starts. Especially inexperienced bidders 
are addressed with the advice to make use of independent experts for conducting an 
inspection on their behalf (Condition 2(b) cl.4). Besides ensuring that bidders must 
accept responsibility for making an inspection, it is emphasised that all property is sold 
"as is" (Condition 2(a) cl.4 and 2(c) cl.l). It is further declared that all information 
about lots supplied to buyers in any form are not statements of facts but rather 
statements of opinion (Condition 2(b) cl.2). Altogether, it is obvious that Condition 2 is 
drafted to achieve that the auction transaction is performed as a transparent caveat 
emptor transaction. 
168 [1997] Tr.L.R. 163; THE INDEPENDENT, 19 January 1995. 
169 See for the discussion of such anti-forgery conditions above, 8.2., pp. 52 et seq. 
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Christie's Condition 5 then excludes all implied warranties or conditions or assumptions 
of responsibility other than the limited warranty given in their Condition 6 authenticity 
provision and such obligations which are not excludable by law ( cls.3 and 4 ). 
c. Validity ofExclusion Clauses: 
Test of Reasonableness under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
A full consideration of the validity of exclusion clauses, especially whether such clauses 
are effectively incorporated into the contract of sale, cannot be made in this context. 170 
The situation considered here is the auctioneer that seeks to avoid liability for negligent 
misstatements. To recall, this question regards whether the auctioneer is in breach of a 
tortious duty of care towards the buyer in the making of the catalogue description. If it 
can be established that there is a breach of the duty, consideration needs to be given to 
the disclaimer provisions and whether the disclaimers were effective in absolving the 
auctioneer from liability for negligent misstatement. 
The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 provides that exclusion clauses may be invalid if 
they are judged to be "unreasonable". The Act does not apply solely to a contractual 
situation: 171 according to section 2(2) of the Act, a person cannot "exclude or restrict his 
liability for negligence except in so far as the term or notice 172 satisfies the requirement 
of reasonableness." "Negligence" is defined in section 1(l)(b) as "breach of any 
common law duty to take reasonable care or exercise reasonable skill". 
It was questioned for some time whether the Act of 1977 applies to such disclaimers 
that prevent any duty arising in the first place because section 2(2) only makes 
exclusions of "liability for negligence" subject to the test of reasonableness. A wording 
such as the one in Christie's Condition 5 cl.3 ("neither ... assume any liability") 
suggests, however, that the auctioneer wants to prevent a duty coming into existence 
170 See for a detailed consideration of this issue Harvey and Meisel, Auctions Law and Practice, ch.6. 
Especially the validity of conditions under the requirement of fairness imposed by the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 will not be considered here. The Regulations are applicable only to 
contractual terms. On doubts whether the Regulations are applicable on auction house disclaimers, 
especially in relation to the auctioneer, see the detailed account by Palmer, 'Misattribution and the 
Meaning of Forgery', 55-56. 
171 Cf Harvey, 'Problems ofldentity and Description in the Saleroom', 432. 
172 Meant with notice is a statement that does not have contractual effect, cf section 11(3) ofthe Act. 
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rather than that he seeks to avoid liability for the loss arising from the breach of the 
duty.I73 
In Hedley Byrne v He/ler 174 (decided before the enactment of the Act) the defendants 
were, in the result, not held liable because they had expressly disclaimed liability by 
stipulating that their advice was given "without responsibility" on their part. As Harvey 
and Meisel explain, 175 a person cannot normally avoid liability for negligence by 
broadcasting that he does not incur it. However, the basis of the duty in this area is that 
the defendant has expressly or impliedly undertaken that he will give his advice or 
information with care. Thus, if he says in advance that he undertakes no such thing, no 
duty will arise. 176 In the words of Lord Devlin in Hedley Byrne v Heller: "A man cannot 
be said voluntarily to be undertaking a responsibility if at the very moment when he is 
said to be accepting it he declares that in fact he is not."177 
Regarding the question of whether such disclaimers fall within the ambit of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977, the House of Lords in Smith v Eric S Bush 178 drew on 
sections 11(3) and 13(1) ofthe Act and concluded that the Act does catch disclaimers of 
this sort. Section 11(3) provides that in considering whether it is fair and reasonable to 
allow reliance on a notice which excludes liability in tort, account must be taken of "all 
the circumstances obtaining when the liability arose or (but for the notice) would have 
arisen." Section 13 ( 1) prevents the exclusion of any right or remedy and (to that extent) 
section 2 of the Act also prevents the exclusion of liability "by reference to ... notices 
which exclude ... the relevant obligation or duty." The House of Lords interpreted these 
sections as meaning that the existence of a common law duty of care had to be judged 
by considering whether it would exist "but for" the notice excluding liability. Any other 
interpretation would result in removing all liability for negligent misstatements from the 
ambit of the Act. 
Do such disclaimers then satisfY the requirement of reasonableness imposed by section 
2(2) ofthe Act? The meaning of reasonableness is dealt with by section 11(3). In Smith 
173 This interpretation is supported by the clauses that say that any statement represents only an opinion 
and that buyers must satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of any statements in the catalogue (Conditions 
2(b) cl.2 and 2(c) cl.2). 
174 [1964) A.C. 465, HL. 
175 Auctions Law and Practice, para. 5.151. 
176 Ibid. 
177 [1964] A.C. 465, HL, at 533. 
178 [ 1990] 1 A.C. 831, HL. 
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v Eric S Bush the House of Lords considered the factors that should be taken into 
account in determining the reasonableness of such disclaimers, in particular: were the 
parties of equal bargaining power? In the case of advice, would it have been reasonably 
practicable to obtain the advice from an alternative source taking into account 
considerations of costs and time? How difficult is the task being undertaken for which 
liability is being excluded? What would be the practical consequences of, for example, 
insurance, on the court's decision on the question ofreasonableness? 179 
The validity of conditions of business excluding liability for misrepresentations remains 
to be tested in the auction context. 18° Following Harvey and Meisel, 181 there is good 
reason for the suggestion that auctioneers' disclaimers may be vulnerable. It is 
especially the imbalance of power and knowledge between auctioneer and most buyers 
that speaks against an effectiveness of such disclaimers. 182 On the other hand, it needs 
to be taken into consideration that such disclaimers intend to have the effect that the 
idiosyncrasies involved in sales of works of art are recognized, which is, as recent 
judicial comment suggests, well understood by the market. 183 
d. Result 
The clauses excluding liabilities for misattribution employed by auction houses in their 
conditions of business are usually far-reaching. They build a barrier that is not easy to 
surmount for the disappointed buyer. Of course, exclusion clauses must be in 
accordance with the requirement of reasonableness under the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act 1977. However, since the clauses express what is long-established usage in the art 
trade, it is very difficult to decide whether such clauses are in fact unreasonable. The 
question has yet to be decided by a court. Often, such clauses are not tested because the 
parties do not wish to expend the time and costs, and, further, the risk involved in the 
179 [ 1990] 1 A.C. 831, HL, per Lord Griffiths. 
180 In the recent decision of Thomson v Christie's the Courts were not concerned with the issue of 
reasonableness of the conditions of business that sought to exclude liability because Christie's had 
announced that they did not rely on their conditions in relation to the claims made, [2004] E.W.H.C. 
1101, QBD, para. 14. 
181 Auctions Law and Practice, para. 6.63. 
182 Ibid. 
183 See especially Thomson v Christie's [2005] E.W.C.A. Civ. 555, para. 161, referring back to para. 188 
of Jack J [2004] E.W.H.C. 1101, QBD, and discussion of this case above, especially text accompanying 
note 135. 
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review of standard clauses. 184 In consequence, although such conditions of business 
may prima facie be of questionable validity, they continue to govern the relations 
between buyer and auction house. 
5. The Trade Descriptions Act 1968 
As a final point, attention must be drawn to the provisions of the Trade Descriptions Act 
1968 and their application to auction sales of art. Though the Act is a criminal statute, it 
can also have civil consequences: in addition to convicting the defendant, the court has 
the power to make a compensation order in the victim's favour. 185 
Section 1(1) of the Act reads as follows: 
"Any person who in the course of a trade or business 
(a) applies a false trade description to any goods; or 
(b) supplies or offers to supply any goods to which a false trade 
description is applied; 
shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be guilty of an offence." 
The offence is one of strict liability, meaning that the prosecution only has to prove that 
the description was false, and was made in the course of a trade or business - not that 
the trader intended to deceive or mislead. Section 24 of the Act, however, gives the 
defendant a defence when he can prove that the false trade description was made by 
mistake, accident, reliance on a third party, and that he took all reasonable precaution 
and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of such an offence. 
The most recent case under the Act of 1968 concerning art auctioneers was decided by 
the Divisional Court of Queen's Bench, on appeal from a decision of the magistrates' 
court, in 1990. The facts in May v Vincent186 were these: an auctioneer put up a picture 
for sale which was described in the catalogue as "JMW Turner, RA. A watercolour of 
moorland, stream, bridge and people, unframed 6 W' x 9 W"'. Sold at £400, it 
subsequently turned out not to be by Turner and was found to be "virtually worthless". 
184 Harvey, 'Problems ofldentity and Description in the Saleroom', however, reports of a number of cases 
settled out of court where buyers had successfully challenged auction houses on the reasonableness of 
such exclusion clauses, at 432. 
185 Palmer, 'The Civil Liability of the Professional Appraiser', p. 27. 
186 (1990) 154 J.P. 997; [1991] 04 E.G. 144. 
94 
When the auctioneer was prosecuted under section 1(l)(a) of the Trade Descriptions Act 
1968 for applying, in the course of trade, a false trade description, his first ground of 
defence was that the Act does not apply to auctioneers and, moreover, does not apply to 
the art world. The latter belief was reflected by the defendant's reliance on the fact that 
he had issued a complete, comprehensive disclaimer in the catalogue which warned 
bidders that all statements as to origin, authorship, date, age, period and authenticity 
were statements of opinion and not of fact. 
The Divisional Court had no difficulties in ruling that, contrary to the defendant's 
belief, section 1(1) of the Act applies to auctioneers in the same way as it does to any 
other trade or business, it being irrelevant that the auctioneer was only acting as an 
agent in applying a description for the vendor. 187 The Court then turned to the question 
of whether a disclaimer can ever be a defence to a charge of applying a false trade 
description to goods under section 1(1)(a) of the Act. Here, the Court was able to rely 
on the earlier authority in Newman v Hackney LBC,188 where it was held that the 
offence under section 1(l)(a) is committed when the false trade description is applied to 
the goods and that the common law doctrine of disclaimer, for that reason, was not open 
to a person charged under section 1(1)(a). 189 The distinction between applying a false 
trade description as opposed to supplying goods already bearing a false description was 
expressly approved in R v Southwood. 190 On the basis of these authorities, the Court 
rejected the auctioneer's submissions. 
By applying section 1 (1) of the Act, the Court also implicitly established that a 
catalogue statement about the authorship of a work of art is a "trade description" for the 
purposes ofthe Act, and thus dismissed the auctioneer's proposition that the Act would 
not be applicable to members of the art world because they deal in opinions only. 
Indeed, the term "trade description" is defined in section 2(1) of the Act, among other 
things, as an indication as to the person who "manufactured, produced, processed or 
reconditioned" the goods. However, recalling what has been said above in chapters 2 
187 The Court based its finding on the authoritative decision in the Scottish case of Aitchison v Reith and 
Anderson Ltd [1974] Sc.L.T. 282, at 284, where The Lord Justice-Clerk Wheatley pointed at the wide 
scope of the Act of 1968. 
188 [1982] R.T.R. 296. 
189 Otherwise, it would be possible for a person to disclaim his own fraud. 
190 [1987] 1 W.L.R. 1361. It was held in this case that a disclaimer could have some effect on a charge 
under s.1 (1 )(b) of the Act, and approved that it is not open to someone charged with applying a false trade 
description to rely on a disclaimer. 
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and 3, and following Palmer, these words hardly seem to be suitable to describe the 
process of artistic creation. 191 
Still, the case law on the Act offers a "back door route" for disappointed buyers, should 
they be unsuccessful with their civil claims and have the desire to nevertheless hold an 
auctioneer to a literal compliance with a catalogue description. 192 On the other hand, in 
such cases the auctioneer will quite likely be able to successfully argue the defence of 
due diligence. 193 It is probably because of this, and the fact that a compensation order 
usually cannot substitute for carefully assessed damages, 194 that the provisions of the 
Act have not developed as a significant legal instrument in disputes over attribution in 
the art market. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The law governing the auctioneer's liability to the disappointed buyer in disputes over 
attribution clearly favours the auctioneer. 195 While it can now be said with confidence 
that a liability can at least arise in tort of negligence for misrepresentation, the 
thresholds for establishing the tort in the context of an art sale are still very high. This is 
mainly due to courts acknowledging that the difficulties inherent with the dating and 
attribution of art must be taken into account when the level of care to be expected for 
producing a catalogue description needs to be determined. 
However, as a result of the law reflecting the expectations of the trade, it becomes very 
difficult for the buyer of a misdescribed work of art to prove that the auctioneer acted 
negligently in reaching his description. This means that the risk intrinsic to dating and 
attribution of works of art is to a large extent located with the buyer. Beyond this, 
auction houses actively discourage dissatisfied buyers from approaching them through 
their strict sets of auction conditions, where, even in the case of the anti-forgery 
provisions, the burden and expense of proof is on the buyer. It thus must be concluded 
191 
'The Civil Liability of the Professional Appraiser', p. 27. 
192 Palmer, ibid. THE TIMES, 25 November 1987, reported of a case where the Trade Descriptions Act 
1968 was applied in relation to an auctioneer for wrongly attributing a painting in his catalogue to the 
painter Thomas Girtin (1775-1802). The auctioneer was fined £100. Subsequently, the auctioneer also 
voluntarily paid compensation in full to the buyer of the painting, which shows that a conviction under 
the Act can also help the disappointed buyer to achieve out of court settlements in his favour. 
193 See s.24 of the Act. 
194 Cf Brian W. Harvey, Violin Fraud (2"d edn, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 74. 
195 For individual summaries and analyses of the legal issues discussed, see the particular result sections 
in this chapter. 
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that the current nature of the auction sale is such that buyers need to exercise the utmost 
vigilance. 
On the one hand, one can argue that such a clear allocation of risk ensures the security 
of transactions and is thus positive for the prosperity of the market. As one judge 
commented in a misattribution case: "there is much to be said for the view that on 
acceptance [of a work of art] there is an end of that particular transaction, ... otherwise, 
business dealings in these things would become hazardous, difficult and uncertain." 196 
This, however, completely disregards the information asymmetries and the unequal 
bargaining powers by which the art auction market is marked. One may not forget that 
in recent years auction houses have especially targeted beginners and amateurs to 
engage into bidding at their art auctions, to quote from one drastic comment, "they have 
pumped out glamorous catalogues, mounted high-glamour evening dress sales and 
attracted the public through the doors with a thousand high-profile parties". 197 
Entranced by the prestige, the glamour and the excitement of entering the art market, it 
is no wonder that many buyers remain unaware of the risks and dangers involved in 
purchasing art. It is thus argued that consumers in art are in need of some protection. As 
examined, the current legal regime under which disputes over attribution are governed 
does not offer such protection. Having reached this conclusion, it would surely be 
disappointing if this study did not have some suggestions to offer as to how risk 
allocation in auction transactions can be made more balanced. These ideas will be 
presented in chapter 5. 
It must, however, be repeated that the current application of the general rules of law on 
disputes over attribution is such that the attributions and descriptions of works of art 
made in the context of auctions, especially those in auction catalogues, may only be 
seen by the consumer as a springboard for engaging in own research and study. 198 Most 
of all, the art buyer must remember the maxim of caveat emptor. 
196 Leafv International Galleries [1950] 2 K.B. 86, CA, per Evershed MR, at 95. 
197 Godfrey Barker, 'Let the Seller Beware' in THE GUARDIAN, 20 May 2004. 
198 Amateur buyers should especially consider employing their own experts. 
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5 
Alternative Theories of Auction House Liability 
It has been concluded that under the current legal regime the risks intrinsic to the dating 
and attribution of works of art are to a large extent located with the buyer at auction. 
While courts generally acknowledge that the peculiarities of works of art as commercial 
goods must be regarded in resolving authenticity disputes, it has been seen that the 
approach by which this recognition is exercised favours the position of the auctioneer 
through a strict enforcement of the principle of caveat emptor. As long as art auctions 
were mainly frequented by art dealers with an equal level of expertise as auctioneers, 
this approach could be justified in view of ensuring the safety of transactions in art. 
With the art auction market now being frequented by many private, non-expert buyers, 
it is argued, however, that this application of the law puts auction houses in a position of 
unjustified superiority over buyers. The amateur buyer certainly buys art at auction with 
no other alternative but to rely on the auctioneer's expert descriptions of the goods 
offered. This reliance of consumers in art deserves some protection. 
In the following, two alternative theories of liability as they have been offered and 
discussed by American art law commentators will be presented. Both of them attempt to 
alleviate the present liability asymmetries by strengthening the accountability of auction 
houses for erroneous attributions. None of them is unproblematic and easy to implement 
into the current legal system. These models are therefore only presented with the 
intention to promote further debate. 
A. AGENCY-BASED LIABILITY 
The first such theory is based on agency principles and comes close to the views 
adopted by Jack J in the particular circumstances of the "special client" relationship 
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between the claimant-buyer and the auction house in the High Court ruling of Thomson 
v Christie 's. 1 
According to this theory, the relationship between the auctioneer and the buyer at 
auction would be characterised as an agency relationship. 2 The auctioneer therefore 
would act as the agent for both seller and buyer. As examined above, the buyer often 
relies on the auctioneer's expertise regardless of whether the law recognises a formal 
agency relationship or not. It can be argued that the extent of a duty of care under 
agency principles is bigger than what is covered by the duty of care in case of an action 
in tort of negligence. A duty of care arising from an agency relationship would cover the 
exercise of degrees of diligence that seem to be unreasonable to impose under the tort of 
negligence for misrepresentation, such as a duty to give warnings about the inherent 
uncertainties in attribution if this seems to be appropriate in the special circumstances. 
The downside of this approach is obvious. An agent who represents both parties to a 
transaction, of course, presents a conflict of interest problem and, for this reason, the 
theory is unsuitable under English law.3 
Regardless of this conflict, those who advance this view point at the flexibility an 
agency approach would offer. The auctioneer would only incur liabilities where the 
buyer reasonably regarded the auction house as acting on his behalf. 4 The level of 
probable reliance of a particular buyer would depend on his level of expertise:5 some 
buyers need less protection than others. Where the buyer is a sophisticated art dealer 
himself, liability would not attach. If there is a significant disparity in knowledge and 
expertise between the two parties, such as in the case of amateur first-time buyers, then 
the auctioneer would become responsible. This way, the unsophisticated purchaser 
1 [2004] E.W.H.C. 1101, QBD. See discussion ofthe High Court ruling above, ch.4, pp. 72-75. 
2 See for a discussion of this proposal: Patty Gerstenblith, 'Picture Imperfect: Attempted Regulation of 
the Art Market' (1988) 29 William and Mary Law Review 501-566, 557 et seq. 
3 In the Court of Appeal's ruling in Thomson v Christie's [2005] E.W.C.A. Civ. 555, May LJ clarified 
that an auctioneer must not put himself into a position where he owes a duty to a third person which is 
inconsistent with his duty to his principal, here the seller at auction, at paras. 33 and 34. See discussion 
above, ch.4, pp. 78. Considerations whether an analogy can be drawn with the common situation of a real 
estate agent who similarly finds himself advising both the seller and buyer simultaneously need not to be 
made here after this clarification. It must be pointed out, however, that recent American decisions 
recognise this duality by imposing an agency relationship on the estate agent when the buyer views the 
estate agent as his agent. See Gerstenblith, 'Picture Imperfect', 558, with case references. 
4 Gerstenblith, 'Picture Imperfect', 559. 
5 Stuart Bennett, 'Fine Art Auctions and the Law: A Reassessment in the Aftermath of Cristallina' (1992) 
16 Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 257-284, 270. 
99 
would receive some protection, while the liability of the art auctioneer would be limited 
to situations in which he indeed has superior knowledge and resources. 6 
B. STRICT LIABILITY 
The second theory is one of strict liability based on tort notions of enterprise 
responsibility and an assessment of who is best placed to bear the losses if a work of art 
is discovered to be misattributed. Though the application of a strict liability regime is 
generally limited to inherently defective products7 and unreasonably dangerous objects,8 
and to situations where the losses involve personal injury or property damage, 9 it is 
argued by some commentators that a system of strict liability would fit best to solve the 
art world's misattribution problem. 10 
It is especially two arguments discussed in favour of strict liability which show that a 
regime of strict liability would be particularly suited to solve disputes over attribution. 
They are (1) the proposition that the auctioneer is best equipped to pay for damages 
caused by a defective product; and (2) the view that the requirement of proving fault in 
tort of negligence claims is overly burdensome and expensive. 11 
As Jauregui explains, the auctioneer is in the best position to intemalise and extemalise 
the costs of preventing the risks involved in describing works of art: the auctioneer has 
the choice to offer a work of art with a lesser level of attribution, thus intemalising the 
lower price but preventing the risk of misattribution, or to sell with an unqualified 
attribution and taking the risk that the attribution may turn out to be wrong. In the latter 
case, the costs of the risk of misattribution could be covered by the purchase of adequate 
insurance. These insurance costs would then be transferred to the consumer by 
6 Such a flexible standard, however, also contains effects that are undesirable for the art market. A factual 
determination would have to be made in each instance as to whether the buyer in fact viewed the 
auctioneer as his agent and reasonably relied on representations made to induce the subsequent purchase, 
which involves difficult questions of proof and would thus result in uncertainty and increased litigation, cf 
Gerstenblith, 'Picture Imperfect', 559. 
7 See, for example, the rules on strict liability contained in the Consumer Protection Act 1987. 
8 See the rules on strict liability contained in s.2( I) of the Animals Act 1971. 
9 According to Lord Porter in Read v J Lyons [1947] A.C. 156, HL, 'strict liability' cannot be assigned a 
constant meaning. Rather, the rules of strict liability differ from tort to tort- consequently the nature and 
extent of the liability in each of them must be considered separately, at 178. For the origins of strict 
liability, see Rylands v Fletcher (1866) L.R. I Exch. 265; (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330. 
10 The model is especially advocated by Raul Jauregui, 'Rembrandt Portraits: Economic Negligence in 
Art Attribution' (1997) 44 U.C.L.A. Law Review 1947-2029,2012-2026. 
II Ibid., 2024. 
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increasing the minimum sale price of the lot, thus extemalising the expense of risk 
prevention. 12 Jauregui compares the situation to other risks common in the auction 
context which are prevented with insurance, and where the costs are passed on to the 
consumer. For example, the risks that lots kept by auction houses in their storage rooms 
may be stolen or damaged are always covered by insurance. Likewise, auction houses 
could easily arrange to have misattribution insurance to cover such claims that may 
arise under a strict liability regime. 13 Only the auctioneer can absorb such widespread 
liability, as he is in the best position to spread the costs of accident prevention among all 
purchasers through a small increase in price, in contrast to the imposition of the entire 
costs caused by one misattribution on a single buyer. 14 
It has further emerged from the entire previous discussion that the art world's problem 
of misattribution often involves no fault: in the majority of cases auction houses act 
without negligence and to the best of their ability when they set out to describe the 
artworks they offer for sale. 15 Nevertheless, misattributions do occur and, due to lack of 
negligence, a morally culpable agent often cannot be assigned to the economic loss 
caused by the misattribution. Why then should the art auctioneer be burdened with a 
strict liability? As seen, the auctioneer is also in a far better position than the purchaser 
to determine the authenticity of an artwork, be it by conducting scientific tests, 
researching, questioning of the owner, or simply by refraining from making unreliable 
claims as to the authenticity and attribution. 16 In contrast, there simply is no opportunity 
for the purchaser to conduct equally diligent and exhaustive examinations prior to an 
auction sale, besides the facts that most of the buyers lack the expertise and knowledge 
necessary for making such appraisals, nor can they afford the expense of a professional 
second-opinion. Furthermore, the costs of litigation when an attribution is being 
challenged in court can easily rise well above the price paid for the item whose 
authenticity is in doubt. 17 
12 Ibid., 2018 and 2024. 
13 Ibid., 2025. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 2024. 
16 Gerstenblith, 'Picture Imperfect', 562. 
17 In the 2005 case of Thomson v Christie's [2004] E.W.H.C. 1101, QBD; [2005] E.W.C.A. Civ. 555, the 
litigation costs in the High Court were estimated at £1,6 million, with the additional costs for the appeal 
having driven the final total above the £1,9 million the claimant paid for the urns whose attribution she 
challenged, see Will Bennett, 'Christie's Wins Appeal Over £2m 'Fake' Urns' in THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, 
13 May 2005. 
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By holding auction houses accountable on a strict liability basis, the buyer would be 
freed from such unreasonable burdens and could be reassured not to suffer a loss 
because he would obtain a refund from the auctioneer in the event of a misattribution. 18 
Because of the insurance, the auctioneer would also be protected against losses, and, as 
a side effect, and compared to the current "it's up to you to discover if our opinion's 
right"-approach19 taken, auction houses would also turn "into completely reliable and 
prestigious suppliers in the eyes of their customers. "20 
There are, of course, objections against this model, which would entirely change the 
current regime based on caveat emptor into one of caveat auctionator. First of all, it is 
yet again questionable whether such a model is arrangeable with the prevailing agency 
relationship between the auctioneer and the seller-consignor, as it encourages the 
auctioneer to make risk averse attributions, which may bring him in conflict with his 
fiduciary duties to his principal. Further, doubts have been expressed about the fairness 
and utility of the theory in the context of the art market. It is argued that the buyer of art 
would be able to purchase works more cheaply at auction than if sold through a dealer, 
but in exchange for this benefit, the buyer would assume a greater risk of misattribution 
of the work.21 The argument is based on the notion that dealers buy works from the 
owner or artist at a definite price, rather than taking it on consignment, and sell them to 
the purchaser on their own behalf, rather than on behalf of the original owner or artist. It 
is argued that works of art sold this way generally command a higher price than if sold 
at public auction, because the dealer is held to a higher standard of obligation in 
certifying the title and authenticity of the work of art. 22 By preserving a market 
environment where the liability of the auctioneer is limited, the purchaser of art would 
have more choice: "the buyer who is risk averse can buy from a dealer, whereas the 
buyer who wants a bargain can assume the risk and buy from an auction house.'m 
However, such a clear distinction between dealers and auctioneers does no longer 
reflect the reality of the market. Auction houses nowadays enter the domain of dealers 
18 Jauregui, 'Rembrandt Portraits', 2025. 
19 Words of Godfrey Barker, 'Let the Seller Beware' in THE GUARDIAN, 20 May 2004. 
20 Jauregui, 'Rembrandt Portraits', 2025. 
21 Cf Gerstenblith, 'Picture Imperfect', 554-555. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 565. 
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by purchasing works of art and reselling them on their own behalf, 24 and dealers offer 
works for sale which have been given to them on consignment and thus broker such 
deals comparable to auction houses. 25 It is therefore not too far-fetched to call for 
auction houses to be governed by equivalent standards as dealers and galleries. 
C. RESULT 
As argued, both alternative suggestions are difficult to implement into the current legal 
system. There is thus little likelihood that changes will be imposed on auctioneers from 
outside. Traditionally, private actions between parties have not been subject to detailed 
regulation in England. Considering that the art market is a comparatively small market, 
and the group of art buyers an unorganised set of consumers, 26 it is not to be expected 
that the legislator will intervene by imposing rules of stricter liability on art auctioneers. 
Judges ruling on misattribution cases must take into consideration the impact an 
expansion of the liability of auctioneers would have for other areas of professional 
negligence. The Court of Appeal's recent decision in Thomson v Christie 'i7 has shown 
that courts are currently not willing to reallocate risks in favour of consumers in the 
auction context, which is in line with the general trend of limiting the scope of tortious 
liability in cases of pure economic loss. 
Especially in Thomson v Christie's, however, the asymmetry in knowledge and 
expertise between the consumer and the auction house had been astonishing. If auction 
houses want to avoid scaring off such amateur buyers in the long term, they would be 
well advised to voluntarily adopt measures that provide effective remedies for buyers in 
the event of a misattribution. This could be done, for example, by offering more 
generous authenticity guarantees28 than it is currently the case. Such an approach of 
24 If so, it is established practice that the fact that an auction house has a direct financial interest in a lot is 
disclosed to the buyer by attaching a symbol to the lot which indicates the auction house's ownership. 
Another controversial practice that indicates a direct interest in the good is the practice of auction houses 
guaranteeing minimum prices to consignors, regardless of whether or not the work sells. See on 
guaranteed prices Jorge Contreras, 'The Art Auctioneer: Duties and Assumptions' (1991) 13 Hastings 
Communications and Entertainment Law Journa/717-751, 747. 
Notably, and to the detriment of dealers, the leading auction houses have also acquired art galleries in 
recent years and managed to gain access to such traditional dealers' events as The European Art Fair in 
Maastricht, see Anthony Haden-Guest, 'A New Treaty for Maastricht?' in FINANCIAL TIMES, 24 February 
2007, p.9. 
25 Gerstenblith, 'Picture Imperfect', 556. 
26 Gertrude Prescott Nuding, 'Saleroom Practice' (1988) 128 Apollo 34-41, 35. 
27 [2005] E.W.C.A. Civ. 555. 
28 See on authenticity guarantees above, ch.4, pp. 52-57. 
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"quasi-strict liability"29 would make the buyer whole in the event of a loss and could 
also be operated in form of the purchase of misattribution insurance, whose costs are 
passed on to all buyers at auction. 
29 The tenn has been introduced by Jauregui, 'Rembrandt Portraits', 2026, in his description of the broad 
guarantees offered to buyers at art fairs. 
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6 
Conclusion 
Two main conclusions may be drawn from this research. First, the notion of authorship 
governing contemporary art market expectations is very different from that which 
prevailed during earlier non-Romantic periods. As explored, flowing transitions of 
authenticity in the past militate against art experts meeting the expectations of the 
current market with definite and precise attributions. Admittedly, art auction houses 
have standards which allow them to express lingering doubts in a description. But 
auctioneers act not only as art experts when cataloguing works of art, but also as 
merchants, that is, they owe fiduciary and contractual duties to their principals, the 
sellers of art, and they consequently act with a view to gaining the highest possible 
profit. Optimistic descriptions can turn out to be wrong, however, and this usually 
results in great economic loss. 
Second, it has been established that the current law solves the art world's misattribution 
problem in the context of auctions by placing the risk and burden of loss almost fully on 
the buyer. Buying art at auction appears in every sense to be a speculative business. 
Since compared to the large group of amateur buyers, which has emerged in recent 
years, auction houses tend to have the advantage of superior knowledge and expertise, 
this allocation of risk is seen as unfair: auction houses have particularly targeted 
beginners and amateurs to engage into bidding at their auctions, and many of these new 
buyers, entranced by the excitement of entering the art market, do not appreciate the 
difficulties with attribution and remain unaware that they must often shoulder the risk of 
misattribution. The assessment of who is best placed to bear and spread the cost of these 
losses, strongly suggests that the auctioneer should have liability imposed upon him 
when a work of art sold at auction is discovered, at a later point, to be forged or 
misattributed. It is not expected that legislative action or judicial opinion can initiate 
such a move; but there are signs that market forces may eventually affect the position of 
auction houses, imposing pressure on them to offer consumers better protection. A self-
imposed regime of "quasi-strict liability" would not only protect the consumer at 
auction, but also the auctioneer, who would thereby gain in prestige. 
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